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ABSTRACT

As public administration evolved to encompass a strong focus on supporting safe growth and
development for communities, the role and responsibilities of government became increasingly
complex with aspects of emergency management becoming quintessential. The ability to assess
resilience plays a strong role in understanding the capability of a community to face a range of
threats. Additionally, issues with communication uncovered the need to understand how
administrators collect, disseminate, and adapt critical information through understanding crisis
type and local community needs. This dissertation discusses the connection between public
administration and emergency management, the evolution of crisis communication and
strategies, resilience and its measurement, along with Situational Crisis Communication Theory.
This study conducted an online-survey of county, and county-equivalent, emergency managers
across the United States. Results of Structural Equation Modeling included statistically
significant relationships between Crisis Type and Local Community Needs on Crisis
Communication Strategies as well as between strategies onto Community Resilience.
Comparative analysis with the Baseline Resilience Indicators for Communities showed stark
contrast in perceived resilience capacity. Follow-up, semi-structured interviews were conducted
with voluntary respondents and analyzed via axial, deductive coding. Comparing quantitative
and qualitative analysis highlighted the importance of county characteristics, critical
relationships, overcoming obstacles, need for learning and adaptation, and importance of
communication.
Keywords: emergency and crisis management, crisis communications strategies,
community resilience, situational crisis communication theory
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This dissertation is dedicated to the resilience of the human spirit. To those who have lost their
homes, jobs, loved ones, and sense of stability, yet they endured.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
As public administration and emergency management continues to integrate roles and
responsibilities focused on supporting safe growth and development for communities, the
complexity leads to aspects of emergency management being quintessential (Comfort, 1985;
Kapucu, 2018; McGuire, Brudney, & Gazley, 2010; Petak, 1985). Communities rely on their
local, state, and federal leaders to effectively communicate before, during, and after a crisis while
coordinating resources to prevent or reduce negative impact (Birkland, 2006; Sylves, 2014).
Issues with preparation, mitigation, response, and recovery activities uncover capacity building
needs for communities and leads researchers to examine how crises influencedd aspects such as
capacity and communication strategies (Boin & O’Connell, 2007; Comfort, 2007; Coombs,
2012; Cutter et al., 2008; Cutter, Burton, & Emrich, 2010; Cutter et al., 2013; Kapucu, 2006;
McEntire, 2007; Rubin, 2007; Syles, 2014; Waugh & Streib, 2006).
The difficulty continues, however, due to the increasing complexity of emergency
management practices and processes of professionalizing the field. Local communities rely
heavily on their local leaders due to their proximity to crises and their critical involvement in
emergency management activities along with their unique position in state and local governance
(Baker & Cormier, 2015; Cutter et al., 2008; Drabek, 1985; McGuire & Silva, 2010; Morrow,
1999; Okechukwu Okoli, Weller, & Watt, 2014; Ross, 2016; Waugh & Streib, 2006; Waugh,
1994). In terms of a community’s capacity, resilience is affected by a plethora of factors (i.e.,
social, economic, institutional, infrastructure, and community competence) and all areas rely on
effective communication (Boin & O’Connell, 2007; Clifford & Bourne, 2013; Comfort, 2007;
Cutter et al., 2008; Cutter, Burton, & Emrich, 2010; Hu, Knox, & Kapucu, 2014; Kapucu, 2006;
Kapucu & Van Wart, 2006; Liu, Guo, & Nault, 2014; McEntire, 2007; Waugh & Streib, 2006).
1

Effective communication hinges on the ability to learn and assess a community’s needs followed
by practically applying these lessons.
This reliance showcases trust and belief in the administrators’ knowledge, skills, and
abilities to support a safe and resilient community. In terms of local leaders, these administrators
are inherently assumed to be emergency management experts who bring about positive or
negative impacts with each decision they make, and their perspectives arguably affect
preparation, mitigation, response, and recovery outcomes (Baker & Cormier, 2015; Cutter et al.,
2008; Drabek, 1985; Mayunga, 2007; Norris et al., 2008; Paton & Johnston, 2001; Ross, 2016;
Sherrieb, Norris, & Galea, 2010). This perspective needs more attention if the nation expects to
fully safeguard life and property.
In addition to the integration of emergency management activities into the government,
local leaders are sought after for crisis-related communication when an event occurs. Emergency
management communication strategies incorporate a timeline focus of before, during and after a
disaster or hazard (Chandler, 2010), as well as incorporate best practices to aid in timely and
comprehensible messages for its diverse audiences (Drabek, 1985; Ulmer, Sellnow, & Seeger,
2017; Waugh & Streib, 2006; Walker, 2012). The main recommendations and considerations
generated by researchers and practitioners revolve around message transference, time to
disseminate, necessary components to include, comprehensibility, and potential response. The
linear format, although widely used, is superficially detailed and leaves the majority of decision
making to those initiating the communication. Crisis communication strategies build upon these
general strategies and provide more details to the need of adaptation for local community needs,
type of event, and stakeholders involved. Crisis communication strategies also provides more
details regarding contrasting a linear format for a cyclical timeline where communication is
2

constantly undergoing adaptation, instruction, and sharing (Benoit, 1997; Coombs, 2012;
Coombs & Holladay, 1996; Holladay, 2009; Liu, Austin, & Jin, 2011; Massey, 2001; Seeger,
2006).
The theoretical foundation for this study uses Situational Crisis Communication Theory
(SCCT) as a foundation. This specific theory broadens communication strategies found in
general emergency management and risk communication practice. It does so by providing a
prescriptive system to connect response strategies to the crisis situation integrated with
adaptations for local community needs and crisis typology (Coombs & Holladay, 2002). The
emphasis on adaptation comes from the psychological nature of relating preparation, mitigation,
response, and recovery activities for crises such as natural disasters, health epidemics, or
community violence to previous events and the automatic anticipation for future action.
Therefore, it is critical for emergency management practitioners to adapt information based on
the type of crisis and their knowledge of the local community's needs to assist their communities
in more effectively preparing, mitigating, responding, and recovering from crises. Moreover,
integrating crisis communication strategies and knowledge of SCCT into a manager's repertoire
leads to an enhancement of their knowledge, skills, abilities, and confidence in managing crises.

1.1 Statement of the Problem
Emergency Managers are called to continuously evaluate critiques regarding inattentiveness to
aspects of community, and the connection to resilience and community capacity (Cutter et al.,
2013). In terms of impact, Birkland (2006) estimated disasters and crises are responsible for
cumulatively affecting approximately three billion people, killing over 750,000 people, and
costing more than $600 billion for the United States. As of 2017, the Federal Emergency
3

Management Agency (FEMA) reported a total of 3,585 disaster declarations since 1953, with
natural disasters accounting for 99%, totaling 3,536. In terms of disaster assistance and
preparedness grants since 2005, FEMA reported having $56,498 million for public assistance,
$26,119 million for preparedness, $14,465 million for mitigation, and $15,657 million for
individual assistance. The difficulty in comparing FEMA's reported numbers with Birkland's
(2006) estimation is that not every disaster receives a disaster declaration. To accumulate the
economic and human impact of disasters means taking into account hardships to individual
states, counties, and towns as well as noting the reported lives lost and estimating those that are
unreported. Regardless, estimates of the knowable impacts are astronomical. For instance, the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association (2018) generated a number for 230 weather and
climate related disasters from the starting point of 1980 and the estimated cost exceeds $1.5
trillion.
Unfortunately, it is assumed that the estimation of damages, losses, and challenges in
response and recovery has greatly increased. This critically highlights a lack of resilience within
our communities and the difficult challenge of recovering when a crisis strikes. The ability to
assess resilience plays a strong role in understanding the capability of a community to face a
range of threats (Collins, Carlson, & Petit, 2011). A strategy to generate a culture of resilience
has been proposed through the involvement of informed leaders who promote resilience, routine
assessments of community resilience through standardized indicators, planning and preparation
efforts, robust research, and buy-in from emergency management practitioners on all levels
(Cutter et al., 2013; Cutter, Ash, & Emrich, 2014, 2015; Cutter, Burton, & Emrich, 2010).
Within the current study, the county and county-equivalent (i.e., parishes, boroughs,
special districts) level emergency manager's perspective was emphasized and examined in terms
4

of their understanding of crisis communication strategies and local communities’ needs. The
county level was chosen as it is the lowest, most formalized level in the United States emergency
management organizational structure (Cutter et al., 2008; FEMA, 2015d, 2016d; Kapucu,
Garayev, & Wang, 2013). More specifically, this study examined the relationship between crisis
communication strategies, local community needs, and the impact on community resilience.
Understanding this dynamic leads to a more effective emergency management system between
local, state and federal actors while highlighting the capabilities of diverse communities and their
citizens (Collins, Carlson, & Petit, 2011). This study was also founded on the Situational Crisis
Communication Theory (SCCT), which emphasizes adaptability and places importance on the
individuals within a community (Coombs & Holladay, 2002; Coombs, 2012; Sellnow & Seeger,
2013).

1.2 Research Questions
This study sought to answer the overarching question regarding the interaction between crisis
communication strategies and community disaster resilience. More specifically, the following
questions guided this research: 1) How do crisis communication strategies impact community
resilience? 2) How are crisis communication strategies shaped by the crisis type? 3) How are
crisis communication strategies shaped by local community needs, such as vulnerable
populations?

1.3 Significance of the Study
It is critical for the field of public administration to achieve a full acceptance and integration of
emergency management related responsibilities and recognize the practical implications these
5

activities bring (McGuire, Brudney, & Gazley, 2010; Petak, 1985). As stated by McGuire,
Brudney, and Gazley (2010):
[I]n the present era of the emergency manager as manager, this official is equally
a public manager. As we anticipate the considerable challenges that emergency
management will face in the new century, we look forward to building our
knowledge of effective planning and preparation to inform not only emergency
management but also collaborative public management (p. 126).
The question has surfaced of whether this full acceptance of emergency management
activities has occurred by public administrators (Agranoff, 1991; Comfort, Waugh, & Cigler,
2012; Petak, 1985; Preble, 1997). By focusing on the role of crisis communication strategies, this
dissertation sought to examine the intersection of emergency management and communication
strategies. Furthermore, the crisis communication strategies take into account crisis typology
(i.e., natural disasters, community violence, health epidemic, etc.) and promote adaptations for
local community needs. This intentional process of crisis communication is essential for building
community resilience.
The survey of emergency managers on the level encompassing county and equivalents is
pivotal, as this level is the beginning of preparation, mitigation, response, and recovery activities
(Cutter et al., 2008; McGuire & Silva, 2010; Morrow, 1999; Okechukwu Okoli, Weller, & Watt,
2014; Ross, 2016; Waugh & Streib, 2006; Waugh, 1994). Additionally, county and equivalents
level emergency management practitioners are considered the experts of their communities. This
means their knowledge base is critical to understanding relationships between crisis
communication strategies, knowledge of vulnerable populations, and community resilience.

6

During a crisis, there is an expectation for effective communication between an
organization and its constituents. This communication must be presented to a diverse range of
audiences and must recognize any potential communication challenges, audience needs, and an
awareness of how future plans and procedures must be adapted (Chandler, 2010; Seeger, 2006).
Yet, it must also be noted that knowledge of crisis communication strategies alone does not
equate to effective implementation (Paton & Johnston, 2001). When measuring impact,
researchers must be cautious in focusing solely on the messages rather than the perception of its
impact on the community. Likewise, administrators and researchers must support the concept of
a whole community approach:
The core value proposition of this whole community approach is that by
strengthening the assets, capacities, relationships and institutions within a
community…the community will prepare more effectively, better withstand the
initial impacts of an emergency, recover more quickly, and adapt to become better
off than before the disaster hit. In short, a whole community approach is the
pathway to resilience (Kaufman, Bach, & Riquelme, 2015, p. 158).
Although research has uncovered critical needs for local communities, it has become
imperative to not only identify these needs but to understand how effective crisis communication
and coordination influences the resilience capacity of these communities. For example,
Hurricane Katrina shed light on the inexcusable inabilities of emergency management personnel
to assist vulnerable populations classified by socioeconomic status, race, political connections,
infrastructure and more (Comfort & Haase, 2006; Garnett & Kouzmin, 2007; Phillips & Morrow,
2007). The critical relationship between community characteristics and vulnerability is not a
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linear relationship, so practitioners must understand how communities receive, react to, and
comprehend information (Lazrus, Morrow, Morss, & Lazo, 2012).
By strengthening resilience, a community increases their response and recovery
capabilities and more effectively copes with specific vulnerabilities (Kapucu & Özerdem, 2011).
Thus, these communities enhance their independence, which is imperative due to the possibility
of being completely isolated during a crisis (Waugh & Liu, 2014). This idea is significant within
the field of emergency management, and it is highlighted within the national planning
frameworks (FEMA, 2016). The focus on building resilience capacity is essential and an
administrator’s knowledge of crisis communication strategies and their community
demographics are integral towards supporting growth. More specifically, the indicators of
disaster and its scale, social, institutional, and community competence are directly affected by
crisis communication strategies, knowledge of vulnerabilities, and the unique typology, or
situation, of the event.
Through previous research (Boin & O’Connell, 2007; Comfort, 2007; Coombs, 2012;
Cutter et al., 2008; Cutter, Burton, & Emrich, 2010; Cutter et al., 2013; Kapucu, 2006; McEntire,
2007; Rubin, 2007; Syles, 2014; Waugh & Streib, 2006), resilience has been significantly
connected to communities, along with how to analyze needs to integrate in preparation,
mitigation, response, and recovery efforts. The results support the need for practitioners and
administrators to manage crises and vulnerabilities through a variety of strategies for effective
communication and resilience development. However, future research is needed to understand
the connections between these concepts, which was addressed in this study. “Community
resilience should be conceptualized and managed in a contingent rather than a prescriptive
manner. Understanding the nature of these contingent relationships has implications for
8

managing the allocation of finite resources and for designing risk reduction and communication
strategies” (Paton & Johnston, 2001, p. 277).
Essentially, building a community’s resilience capacity hinges on effective crisis
communication and the ability to send and receive vital information in a way that is
comprehensible for diverse audiences and inclusive of vulnerable populations, without adding
undue stress and anxiety or leading to negative consequences (Perry & Lindell, 2007). By
integrating crisis typology (i.e., natural disaster, community violence, health epidemic) and
communication strategies, emergency managers are theorized to more effectively respond to a
crisis and prepare for a future event; however, a level of adaptability is needed as perception and
reality typically differ due to the social psychological premise of self-concept (Bandura, 1989;
Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Markus & Wurf, 1987; Mead, 1934). Self-concept is the
phenomenon regarding how one conceptualizes their capabilities and the impact of this
knowledge on their actions. The perception of oneself generally differs from how another
individual or group views them. Situational Crisis Communication Theory provides practitioners
with more resources for informed decision-making to prepare their communities for crisis
response and recovery.

1.4 Context of this Study
This study builds upon and contributes to earlier studies on crisis communication in building
community resilience for vulnerable populations. The initiating field of public health focused
their crisis communication studies on the importance and role of communication, ways to
identify vulnerable populations, and impact on community resilience (Burkle et al., 2011;
Hanfling, Altevogt, Viswanathan, & Gostin, 2012; Schoch-Spana et al., 2016). Despite this, there
9

has been a growing interest in research focusing on a similar relationship between these concepts
within the field of emergency management (Doyle, 2016; Graham, Avery, & Park, 2015; Kar,
2015; Lindell, 2013; Malet & Korbitz, 2015; Pays, 2007; Rivera & Kapucu, 2015; Rodriguez &
Marks, 2006; Ross, 2016; Vaughan, Tinker, Truman, Edelson, & Morse, 2012). In addition, there
is little to no research on the relationship between Situational Crisis Communication Theory and
the perception of public administrators or emergency management practitioners, which is what
made this study unique (Sellnow & Seeger, 2013; Sisco, Collins, & Zoch, 2009).
Therefore, this study was conducted using a nationwide survey of county and equivalents
level emergency management practitioners within the United States. This survey encompassed
the concepts of crisis communication, local community needs, and community resilience in order
to understand their perception and connections of these concepts and determine the impact. The
responses were analyzed in conjunction with the Baseline Resilience Indicators for Communities
(BRIC), which provides data based on 49 indicators of community disaster resilience (Cutter,
Ash, & Emrich, 2014, 2016; Cutter, Burton, & Emrich, 2010). With deeper examination, the goal
was to generate recommendations for emergency management practitioners, future research, and
training. As such, this study provided insight to assist local, state and federal actors. This study
also provided insight for the academicians and involved practitioners, in building community
resilience through crisis communication strategies that adapt to vulnerable populations and the
crisis situation. Chapter two examined the concepts of emergency management as quintessential
to public administration, resilience and relevant measurement techniques, crisis communication
and management along with specific strategies, as well as the theoretical foundation of
Situational Crisis Communication Theory before presenting this study's conceptual framework
and hypotheses.
10

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter reviews the central concepts of crisis communication, local community needs, and
community resilience. The information provided in this section comprises a systematic literature
review encompassing published articles from peer-reviewed journals, reports by area experts,
and specific document databases refined by publication date of 1980 to present along with
targeted keywords. In addition, recommended readings from strategically identified researchers
who specialize in the areas of crisis communication, vulnerable populations, and resilience are
incorporated. These means of gathering information allows for a sound methodological review
since the inclusion of only published literature yields more disadvantages than advantages
(Cooper, 2010; Light & Pillemer, 1984). Therefore, the solicitation of expert knowledge from
leaders in the field reveals other sources not identified in scholarly journals (Cooper, 2010; Light
& Pillemer, 1984). This section begins by discussing the connections between public
administration and emergency management and crisis communication strategies. It then
discusses local community needs with an emphasis on vulnerable populations and community
resilience, followed by Situational Crisis Communication Theory.

2.1 Emergency and Crisis Management
This section discusses the development of public administration with a focus on how emergency
management became an integrated component of an administrator’s role and responsibility.
Further, this segment discusses the intersection of the county and equivalents level and its
connection to the National Planning Frameworks developed by the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA).
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2.1.1 Emergency Management as a Quintessential Role of Public Administration
Historically, public administrators were reluctant to incorporate emergency management related
responsibilities into their public service roles (Petak, 1985). Their early connections to
emergency management related tasks were mostly in response to a crisis. The incorporation of
emergency management into the public administrator role brought about challenges which
included a lack of policy related understanding, increasing complexity of intergovernmental and
intra-organizational relationships and differences in technical and administrative capacities. The
challenges also included discord among traditional ideals and new public management, and lack
of support for proactive measures due to the inability to determine the return on investment.
However, integrating emergency management into public administration became a promoted
ideal.
The public administrator, as emergency management, must have the conceptual
skill to understand (1) the total system, (2) the uses to which the products of the
efforts of various professionals will be put, (3) the potential linkages between the
activities of various professional specialists, and (4) the specifications for output
formats and language which are compatible with the needs and understanding of
others within the total system (Petak, 1985, p. 6).
The question surfaced of whether this full acceptance occurred by public administrators
(Agranoff, 1991; Comfort, Waugh, & Cigler, 2012; Petak, 1985; Preble, 1997). The field of
emergency management has made great strides since its beginnings in the 1800s and is defined
as “the discipline and profession of applying science, technology, planning and management to
deal with extreme events that can injure or kill large numbers of people, do extensive damage to
property, and disrupt community life” (Hoetmer, 1991, p. xvii).
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Moving from a reactionary management style to a unified command and control to
professionalization and legitimacy building, the emergency manager has become an essential
individual for each community (McGuire, Brudney, & Gazley, 2010). However, not every
community has an identified individual, so it may look to its public administrators for assistance
(Kreps, 1991). As stated by Drabek (2016), “What American communities need today are not
more bureaucrats who can endure; rather, we need managers with a vision and commitment to it:
managers who have the capacity to lead, who do grasp the forest, who understand the behavioral
reality of organized-disorganization and are willing to tackle the managerial challenge it
represents” (p. 165-6).
Regarding the integration of emergency management related tasks and responsibilities,
crises frequently uncovered issues related to preparation, mitigation, response, and recovery
between local, state, and federal actors (Birkland, 2006; Rubin, 2007). These crises (i.e., natural
disasters, community violence, or health epidemics) uncovered significant needs to enhance
public safety and influence aspects such as policymaker’s agendas, capacity for organizational
learning and change, issues regarding communication, and the presentation of vulnerable
populations (Birkland, 2006; Rubin, 2007; Waugh & Streib, 2006). The increasingly complex
environment of emergency management led to a push for strategic change and growth. “Creating
effective organizational response under the complex, uncertain operating conditions of a major
disaster [or crisis] poses a sobering challenge to public service agencies which bear the primary
responsibility for emergency management” (Comfort, 1985, p. 155). When determining where to
start with the change in emergency management approaches, the main objective was to plan and
prepare. However, emergency management has not fully acknowledged the implications and
proactive measures (Cutter et al., 2013; Drabek, 2016; Petak, 1985). This makes it even more
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critical for public administrators to fully understand all emergency management related
activities. They are the inevitable decision-makers whose policies have the potential for
negatively impacting their communities if they are without this critical knowledge.

2.1.2 Emergency Management, Local Level, and the National Planning Frameworks
Traditionally, the federal government was tasked with development of safe communities, yet the
county level was, and still is, the first to react to a crisis and deploy agencies related to the phases
of emergency management (i.e., preparation, mitigation, response, and recovery) with
overarching support from federal (McLoughlin, 1985; McEntire, 2007). Recognition of the
importance of county level emergency managers or public administrators is highlighted in
FEMA’s (2016) whole community approach integrated within the National Planning
Frameworks. These frameworks expanded the role and responsibilities of local government and
are critical for assisting communities in increasing their resilience capacity (FEMA, 2016).
According to the National Protection Framework (2016b), local governments are
uniquely responsible for the safety and security of their citizens. They must promote
coordination and implementation of protection plan and engage in sharing of information with
key stakeholders. Local governments must acknowledge geographic issues, such as transborder
concerns, and establish agreements for coordination between cross-sector and cross-jurisdictional
agencies. They are also responsible for the coordination and dissemination of critical information
within a variety of accessible domains (FEMA, 2016b).
Within the National Prevention Framework (FEMA, 2016a), local leaders provide
guidance for law enforcement, public safety, public health, fire, environmental response, public
works, and emergency medical services. They are responsible for coordination, security, and

14

safety their citizenry. The agencies designated for prevention activities respond to incidents,
collect intelligence, conduct investigations, and work with additional agencies for resolution.
Regarding the National Mitigation Framework (2016c), local governments enact core
capabilities related to health and social services, housing, economy, natural and cultural
resources, and infrastructure. Within this area, a regional, or county level, approach is critical to
understanding a community's potential risks and aspects of vulnerability that may impact the
ability to effectively and strategically mitigate crises. Within this arena, long-term risk and
vulnerability reduction is a possibility as community resilience prioritizes pre- and post-disaster
assessments and development opportunities.
The National Mitigation Framework specifically promotes a focus on fostering
preparedness and resilience among communities causing it to be a cornerstone for all areas of
national preparedness. This specific framework places significance on the role of local
leadership. Emergency management practitioners on the local level are critical to ensuring and
developing capabilities and collaboration among diverse entities within the whole community.
Also, this framework discusses a Risk-conscious Culture where information is disseminated with
the audience in mind. Strategies must be adapted based on the population who is receiving the
information.
The mitigation protocols only strengthen local governments’ role within the National
Response Framework. This framework specifically details responsibilities of specific crisis
types, such as manmade or natural events or hazards (Coombs, 2012; FEMA, 2016c). When a
local area is affected, responsibility falls to the elected or appointed official for emergency
management to guide response capabilities across all mission areas. This administrator must
have a thorough understanding of their role and responsibility along with geographic risks and
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vulnerabilities of their community. Their overarching mission is to protect the welfare of the
citizens and they are assumed to be more knowledgeable as to the capacity of their community in
terms of the ability to respond and recover (Baker & Cormier, 2015; Cutter et al., 2008; Drabek,
1985; Lazrus, Morrow, Morss, & Lazo, 2012; Mayunga, 2007; Norris et al., 2008; Paton &
Johnston, 2001; Ross, 2016; Sherrieb, Norris, & Galea, 2010).
Duties of an emergency manager often include:
•

Advising elected chiefs and appointed officials;

•

Conducting National Incident Management System (NIMS) structured response
operations;

•

Coordinating local agencies by functions;

•

Facilitating plan development and cooperation with private sector entities, community
organizations, local agencies, and non-governmental organizations;

•

Creating and maintaining mutual aid and assistance agreements;

•

Coordinating requests for resources via managing the emergency operations center;
overseeing damage assessments;

•

Informing and advising the public and local officials on emergency management
activities; executing public awareness programs among accessible domains;

•

Conducting training exercises related to plans and systems and adjusting based on lessons
learned; and, integrating rights of all individuals (i.e., race, gender, ethnicity, disability,
etc.) within emergency planning and response (FEMA, 2016d).
For the National Disaster Recovery Framework, local government is again emphasized as

the primary entity for preparing and managing response and recovery for its community (FEMA,
2016e). Their leadership is critical and sought out by businesses, families, and individuals.
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Specifically, within this framework, an emphasis is placed upon local government’s ability to
deploy core capabilities with limited to no notice. Therefore, continuity planning and operations
must be incorporated into pre-disaster planning processes. Strategic planning assists with
Recovery Support Functions and establish processes for assessments on pre- to post-disaster
damage.

2.2 Community Resilience
This section discusses the origins of community resilience and related research within the
emergency management area and continues the discussion on communication adaptation and
highlights the need for situation-based communication strategies. More importantly, this section
brings local community needs to the surface.

2.2.1 Community Resilience
Although researchers debate the definition of resilience, it is broadly considered as an
encompassing, proactive concept of capability to prepare, mitigate, respond and recover
(Edwards, 2012; Norris et al., 2008; Waugh & Liu, 2014). With its Latin roots, resilience comes
from resilio meaning to bounce back. For the social sciences, resilience is typically defined as
the ability to return to a sense of equilibrium after a disruption; however, recent studies showcase
variations in their operational definition and indicators used to measure this ability (see Table 1).
Researchers and practitioners continue to debate the capability of communities to return to a predisaster stage due to unique needs and challenges (Collins, Carlson, & Petit, 2011; Cutter,
Burton, & Emrich, 2008; Longstaff et al., 2010; Miller & Dabson, 2015; Norris et al., 2008;
Stewart, Kolluru, & Smith, 2009). For this study, resilience was defined via Cutter, Burton, and
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Emrich’s (2008) definition of “[r]esilience is the ability of a social system to respond and recover
from disasters and includes those inherent conditions that allow the system to absorb impacts and
cope with an event, as well as post-event, adaptive processes that facilitate the ability of the
social system to re-organize, change, and learn in response to a threat” (p. 599).

Table 1. Operational Variations of Community Resilience.

Authors

Publication Definition of Community
Date
Resilience
Cutter, Burton,
2008
The ability to respond to
and Emrich
and recover from a threat
once it has been realized.
Norris, Stevens, 2008
A process linking a
Pfefferbaum,
network of adaptive
Wyche, and
capacities (resources with
Pfefferbaum
dynamic attributes) to
adaptation after a
disturbance or adversity
Stewart, Kolluru, 2009
Utilizes definition from
and Smith
Norris et al. (2008)

Longstaff,
Armstrong,
Perrin, Parker,
and Hidek

2010

Collins, Carlson,
and Petit

2011

The ability of a
community to absorb a
disturbance while
retaining its essential
functions.
A function of the
resilience of the specified
subsystems.

Indicators for Measurement
Economic Development;
Community Capital; Institutional
Resilience; Infrastructure;
Economic Development;
Community Competence; Social
Capital;

Economic Development; Social
Resilience; Critical
Infrastructure; Public-Private
Partnerships; Supply Chain
Resilience
Economic Development; Civil
Society; Ecological Resilience;
Governance Resilience; Physical
Infrastructure
Economic Resilience;
Infrastructure Resilience;
Institutional Resilience;
Emergency Services Sector
Resilience; Civilian Population
Resilience

As noted by Cox and Hamlen (2015), the range of resilience definitions has evolved over
the years from a general sense of recovery to inclusion of activities related to preparation,
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mitigation, and adaptation due to focus on the community (Alexander, 2013; Berkes & Ross,
2013; Quinlan, Berbés‐Blázquez, Haider, & Peterson, 2016). Definitions of the community may
vary from rural, protected lands, or trade-specific, but the focus led researchers to include the
lens of risk reduction and vulnerability to assist in generating practical recommendations or
indicators for measurement. To give specific emphasis, the inclusion of a vulnerability lens does
not directly correlate to deficits or negative insufficiencies but speaks more to the competence of
the community's capabilities to understand nuances affecting capacity.
In terms of operationalizing community resilience, the capability of a local area is
determined via its ability to utilize resources, minimize disruptions, and guide growth through
complexity (Kapucu, Hawkins, & Rivera, 2013; Paton & Johnston, 2001). For assessing
resilience, many lean to more quantitative measures such as budget and staff ratio and fail to
incorporate a qualitative component to understanding how an administrators' understanding of
the more finite items impacts their conception of resilience capacity and affects their decisionmaking abilities. In essence, there is a disconnect between perception and reality as numbers
only detail so much to the area of resilience and community capacity. It is essential to understand
the capability for a community to recover and educate emergency management practitioners on
gauging resilience capacity through quantitative and qualitative indicators (Cutter et al., 2008;
Cutter, Burton, & Emrich, 2010; Pine, 2015). For the purpose of this study, the researcher
defined and operationalized community resilience as the capability of a community to respond
to, recover from, and adaptively develop from a crisis and will utilize methods to assess an
administrator's perception in contrast to more quantitatively driven assessment measures. The
next portion discusses the current assessment methods and measurement factors.
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2.2.2 Community Resilience and Measurement
As previously stated, local level emergency managers have a diverse range of responsibilities
from: coordinating local agencies by functions; facilitating plan development and cooperation
with private sector entities, community organizations, local agencies, and non-governmental
organizations; informing and advising the public and local officials on emergency management
activities; conducting training exercises related to plans and systems and adjusting based on
lessons learned; and, integrating rights of all individuals (i.e., race, gender, ethnicity, disability,
etc.) within emergency planning and response (FEMA, 2016).
Within these strategic planning efforts, it is critical for local governments to integrate the
needs of their community, such as geographic risks, vulnerable populations, economic or
resource deficits. This occurs through a variety of mapping and planning initiatives to visually
depict and identify susceptible geographic areas, infrastructure systems, neighborhoods,
demographic groups, and environmental or cultural resources. To measure and assess community
level resilience, researchers have created indicators coinciding with multiple facets of resilience
capacity (Collins, Carlson, & Petit, 2011; Cox & Hamlen, 2015; Cutter et al., 2008; Longstaff et
al., 2010; Norris et al., 2008; Renschler et al., 2010; Sherrieb, Norris, & Galea, 2010; Stewart,
Kollaru, & Smith, 2009).
The challenge with creating indicators to measure resilience is the focus on quantitative,
or arguably more objective, aspects. This varies from measurable components such as
population, budgets, emergency management connected staff, community size, number of
hospitals or clinics, shelter locations, etc. However, the tendency to incorporate measures
obtained via census data or more easily measured is the lack of inclusion for factors that have a
significant impact but require time and more analysis (Bowen & Kreindler, 2008; Cox &
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Hamlen, 2015; MacGillivray & Zadek, 1995; Miller & Dabson, 2015). An example of difficult
indicators to measure revolves around perception, or subjective, aspects or aspects such as
cultural competence of the community itself. These indicators range from social, economic,
infrastructure, institutional, and environmental arenas.
The promotion of quantitative indicators aligns with the common approach objectivity in
scientific inquiry where indicators must be mechanisms to explain complex processes with little
subjectivity. Yet, recent research has discussed including more qualitative indicators to assist in
generating a more comprehensive understanding of resilience (Birkmann, 2006; Cox & Hamlen,
2015; Norris et al., 2008; Sherrieb, Norris, & Galea, 2010; Twigg, 2009). For the purposes of
this study, the influence was drawn from Cutter, Burton, and Emrich's (2008) placed-based
indicators and subcomponents that were applied to a county-level study in order to determine the
community’s resilience capacity. These indicators included social, institutional, economic,
infrastructure, and community capital. These indicators were not only chosen for the focus on
county-level communities, but also due to the indicators providing inspiration for quantitative
and qualitative components for the perception survey that was disseminated to emergency
managers.
The social indicator consists of demographics (age, race, class, gender, occupation),
social networks and embeddedness, community values-cohesion, and nonprofit organizations
(Cutter, Burton, & Emrich, 2010; Pine, 2015). Understanding these social factors leads to
increased knowledge about the diversity and vulnerabilities within the community along with
issues to address when communicating about a crisis and developing a knowledge base for
preparation, mitigation, response and recovery (Boin & O’Connell, 2007).
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Institutional indicators embody a planning perspective between local, state and federal
agencies regarding hazard mitigation plans, emergency services, comprehensive land use plans,
communications, and continuity of operations plans; however, if ineffective communication
exists between local, state, and federal actors then the limited exchange of information
detrimentally affects the community’s understanding of a crisis and, in turn, negatively impacts
its resilience (Bharosa, Lee, & Janssen, 2010). In terms of economic indicators, components
include employment, property value, wealth generation and municipal finance/revenues.
Infrastructure is supportive in nature and incorporates critical systems, transportation networks,
residential housing, and commercial and manufacturing establishments.
Community competence entails a local understanding of risk, counseling services, health
and wellness, quality of life and community cohesion. Development of community competence
is specifically important for emergency management practitioners as it indicates whether they are
more connected and action-driven within their communities (Comfort, 2007; Comfort, Boin, &
Demchak, 2010; Cutter, Burton, & Emrich, 2010; Paton & Johnston, 2001; Pine, 2015). Within
each of the indicators, knowledge of a community in terms of its demographics, needs and
vulnerable populations is critical. This lends itself to supporting the county level focus of this
study. This study focuses on four of the indicators. The main is the disaster and its scale due to
its connection to crisis typology. Then social, institutional, and community capital was
highlighted due to their strong connections to local community and communication needs.
Furthering the application of county and county-equivalent level indicators, Cutter, Ash,
and Emrich (2014, 2016) applied United States census data to the indicators and created the
Baseline Resilience Indicators for Communities (BRIC). This scoring index generates a
resilience score for county and county-equivalent level communities and is used for strategic
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planning and assessing community needs. For the purposes of this study, BRIC scores were
utilized to create a comparative baseline for emergency managers who respond to the perception
survey (this is discussed in more detail in chapter 3) (Cutter, Ash, & Emrich, 2014, 2016; Cutter,
Burton, & Emrich, 2010). As far as indicator selection, the BRIC scores were adapted to the
social, institutional and community capital indicators being the focus (see Table 2) for selection.
Table 2. BRIC Indicator Selections per Category.
Category

Social

Institutional

Community Capital

Variables
Educational Equity
Age
Transportation Access
Communication Capacity
Language Competency
Special Needs
Health Coverage
Mitigation
Flood Coverage
Municipal Services
Political Fragmentation
Previous Disaster Experience
Place Attachment
Political Engagement
Social Capital-Religion
Social Capital- Civic Involvement
Social Capital- Advocacy
Innovation

2.3 Crisis Communication
This section discusses the evolution of crisis management and communication strategies, the
connection to emergency management communication strategies, as well as previous research.
Before beginning, it is important to note crisis communication differs from the field of risk
communication (Reynolds & Seeger, 2005; Walker, 2012). Whereas risk communication is
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focused more on threats to public health and methods to reduce harm, crisis communication is
focused more on a specific event, what is known and not known, the scope of impact, and is
principally informative.

2.3.1 Crisis Management and Crisis Communication
In terms of a concrete discipline of disaster communication, there is an argument of its
nonexistence due to a lack of consensus regarding the definition of communication research and
demarcation of this research area being a field of study (Anderson, 2016). However, there exists
an acknowledgment of territories within the research field distinguishing communication as an
intentional activity and a constitutive practice (Griffin et al., 2010). In terms of this study, the
perspective of communication is seen as an intentional activity, as it incorporates the intention of
communication and is connected to the areas of transmission and information processing, crisis
communication, and risk communication (Anderson, 2016). In terms of transmission and
information processing, this area is concerned with the aspects of channels and sources. Risk
communication focuses on the expressions’ influence on behavior whereas crisis communication
places an importance on rhetoric (Anderson, 2016; Griffin et al., 2010; Reynolds & Seeger,
2005). Essentially, risk communication is “a process of sharing information about hazards, risks,
vulnerability, assets, and adaptive mechanism within organizations or with the public. The
process is intentional and goal directed” (Pine, 2015, p. 186). Additionally, risk communication
arguably addresses cultural and social factors more so than crisis communication (Reynolds &
Seeger, 2005).
Where a disaster was viewed, and potentially defined, as an event that is seen collectively
as a harmful episode, a crisis is considered when “a community of people- an organization, a
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town, or a nation- perceives an urgent threat to core values or life sustaining functions, which
must be dealt with under conditions of uncertainty” (Boin & McConnell, 2006, p. 42). In terms
of its origin, Boin and McConnell (2006) discussed the Greek and Chinese connections to the
term and highlighted references to a critical point, a fork in the road, a threat, an opportunity, and
a critical phase. Moreover, the term crisis has been applied to a diverse range of situations from
natural disasters and environmental threats to infrastructural dramas, financial meltdowns or
organizational decline. More recently, Coombs (2012) generated crisis type to include: natural
disasters, workplace violence, rumors, malevolence, challenges, technical-error accidents,
technical-error product harm, human-error accidents, human-error product harm, and
organization misdeeds. The types are discussed more fully within the theoretical section; yet, this
study focused on natural disasters, community violence (an adaptation to workplace violence and
organization misdeeds), as well as health epidemic (an adaptation to human-error product harm).
However, “[w]hat all these dramatic events have in common is that they create impossible
conditions for those who seek to manage the response operation and have to make urgent
decisions while essential information about causes and consequences remains unavailable” (Boin
& McConnell, 2006, p. 43).
Viewing emergency management through the lens of a crisis approach incorporates the
act of seeking to answer questions related to the immediate situation, understanding the
unexpected event, and finding opportunities within the chaos (Boin & McConnell, 2006;
Rosenthal, Boin, & Comfort, 2001). Shifting the lens to the arena of communication, a crisis is
defined as “the perception of an unpredictable event that threatens important expectations of
stakeholders and can seriously impact an organization’s performance and generate negative
outcomes” (Coombs, 2012, p. 2-3). For the purposes of this study, the researcher built upon the
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previously stated definition of crisis by Coombs (2012) to view a crisis as connected to
perceptions of unpredictable events threatening stakeholder expectations and can seriously
impact performance with potential for not only negative outcomes but learning opportunities that
can lead to positive growth. The differentiation of negative and positive outcomes is done due to
previous literature highlights the opportunity to learn with each unprecedented event (Birkland,
2009; Drupsteen & Guldenmund, 2014; Norris et al., 2008; Toft & Reynolds, 2016).
The beginning of crisis communication and crisis management is attributed to the 1980s
when a tampering incident occurred within the Johnson & Johnson organization regarding its
Tylenol product that led to the death of seven individuals from Chicago due to poison within the
product (Coombs, 2014). This interest grew for corporate organizations as society and businesses
began to realize how negative consequences of improper management could have a resounding
impact on their bottom line and resilience. Crisis Management took form and became a field
where individuals sought to mitigate or diminish the negative impact of a crisis and protect
stakeholders (Coombs, 2012). The definition of crisis management is “a set of factors designed
to combat crises and to lessen the actual damage inflicted” (p. 5). In terms of these factors, the
process of lessening the impact spans across the phases of pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis. In
terms of crisis communication, the operational definition provided by Sellnow and Seeger (2013)
states, “crisis communication could simply be understood as the ongoing process of creating
shared meaning among and between groups, communities, individuals and agencies, within the
ecological context of a crisis, for the purpose of preparing for and reducing, limiting and
responding to threats and harm” (p. 13).
Although the concept of crisis management began in the early 1980s, research regarding
this arena did not start surfacing until later in the decade (Coombs, 2014). The early research is
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characterized by its focus on organizational reputation and practitioners discussing how they
managed issues and their personal experiences. With the Tylenol case being considered a catalyst
for this field, the critical importance was cemented with the Challenger explosion in 1986. These
two events led to research focusing on decision-making and emphasizing rhetorical analysis. It
created what is known as Apologia and became a dominant theory with researchers focusing on
what managers said and did to address crises and their lack of acknowledgment for impacted
stakeholders (Coombs, 2014; Dionisopoulos & Vibbert, 1988).
Within the 1990s, crisis communication, for lack of a better term, exploded due to
research driven by the field of public relations. Publications and case studies came about
focusing on corporate apologia, image restoration theory, and Situational Crisis Communication
Theory (SCCT) (Benoit, 1995; Coombs, 2014; Hearit, 1994; Ice, 1991). The theoretical surge
was supported by evidence-based research and management implications. Entering into the
2000s, interest in crisis communication increased within fields related to communication, but the
management arena keeps its strong hold along with organizational psychology (Coombs, 2014).
The expansion of crisis communication resulted in national and international conferences,
new theories (i.e. contingency theory), and practical models for implementation (i.e. Integrated
Crisis Mapping) (Cameron, Pang, & Jin, 2007; Jin & Pang, 2010). A distinction came about
surrounding macro versus micro conceptualizations of crisis communication and how it
influenced practice as well as stage of communication in terms of pre-crisis, during, and postcrisis or adjusting, sharing, and instructing (Coombs & Holladay, 2002; Frandsen & Johansen,
2010; Ulmer, Seeger, & Sellnow, 2013). In the recent decade, the introduction of social media
has continued the expansion of crisis communication and available strategies with a new focus
on marketing. In essence, crisis communication has gone global.
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2.3.2 Crisis Communication Strategies and Emergency Management
In terms of basic crisis communication strategies, a three-stage approach has been promoted
throughout the literature concerning ideal crisis management occurring before, during, and after
the crisis. Within these stages, there is a distinction between managing information and
managing meaning (Coombs, 2012). Within the precrisis, or before, stage, it is critical for
responsible officials to focus on planning and preparation. The more effective individual is one
who is knowledgeable about policies and procedures and goes through training and exercises to
determine any potential challenges. The crisis response, or during, stage focuses more on the
implementation of policies and procedures and differentiating how an official reacts to the crisis
and adapt communication strategies. The postcrisis, or after, stage concerns follow-up with
stakeholders and returning to a sense of calm before preparing for the next event.
Speaking to emergency management and communication strategies, research has
discussed the impact of communication before, during and after a disaster or hazard with an
emphasis on information collection, organization, and dissemination (Chandler, 2010; Kapucu,
Hawkins, & Rivera, 2013; Kapucu & Özerdem, 2011; McEntire, 2007; Sylves, 2014; Waugh &
Streib, 2006) as well as strategies to aid in generating timely and comprehensible messages that
meet the diverse needs of its audiences (Ulmer, Sellnow, & Seeger, 2017; Walker, 2012).
Although variations in this research are discussed in later sections, the general recommendations
and considerations revolve around: 1) how to transfer the message; 2) when to send the message;
3) will the recipient see, read or hear the message; 4) is the message comprehensible; and, 5)
what will be the response. Overlap is also seen in terms of Situational Crisis Community Theory
focusing on the aspects of instructing, adjusting, and sharing (see Figures 1, 2, and 3 for visual
overlapping between crisis communication and emergency management communication).
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Pre-Crisis

Crisis Response

Post-Crisis

Figure 1. Visualization of Crisis Communication Strategies in Linear Timeline.
It is important to note the major differentiation between the visualizations below are the
time-dependent, linear format of basic crisis communication and emergency management
communication versus the cyclical, always evolving structure of Situational Crisis
Communication Theory with elements of crisis communication integrated into it.

Before

During

After

Figure 2. Visualization of Emergency Management Information Collection, Organizing, and
Dissemination in Linear Timeline.
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Instructing: Inform
stakeholders of
response practices

Adjusting: Additional
insight regarding who,
what, when, where,
why and how

Sharing: Disseminate
at the onset of a crisis

Figure 3. Visualization of Crisis Communication Strategies connected to Situational Crisis
Communication Theory.
In terms of the current National Incident Management System (NIMS), developed by the
FEMA (2015a), a traditional, all-hazards approach to assisting communities during the life cycle
of a disaster (i.e., preparation, mitigation, response, and recovery) influences the adjustment of
emergency management information and communication. Preparation involves increasing the
readiness for potential disasters or hazards. Mitigation focuses on prevention and reduction of
potential impact through: (a) changing the nature of the threat; (b) decreasing vulnerability; and
(c) reducing exposure. The response component incorporates the community’s capacity to
monitor, predict, avoid, and reduce potential damage or address potential threats along with
strengthening preparation activities for responding to disasters and assisting those impacted
(Kapucu, Hawkins, & Rivera, 2013; Kapucu & Özerdem, 2011; McEntire, 2007; Sylves, 2014;
Waugh & Streib, 2006).
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Since it cannot be fully predicted how a crisis will affect local communities, trust and
reliance are placed within an Incident Command System (ICS). This centralized command and
control structure incorporates five dimensions (i.e., command, operations, planning, logistics,
and finance and administration) and may include a public information officer, safety officer and
a liaison (Boin & O’Connell, 2007; FEMA, 2015b). The main benefit of ICS is the ability for
unified command and collaboration between local, state and federal stakeholders (Hu, Knox, &
Kapucu, 2014); however, major challenges include lack of flexibility and adaptive capability of
the system, growing complexity of communication needs for citizens, and variations in
organizational hierarchy on local levels (Birkland, 2009; Hu, Knox, & Kapucu, 2014; Liu, Guo,
& Nault, 2014).
In order to address these challenges, FEMA (2011) developed a whole community
perspective to emergency management practice and expanded the significance of crisis related
activities. Broadening responsibility from a government-centric to a community engagement
perspective, FEMA (2011) promoted a deeper understanding of community complexity,
recognition of capabilities and needs, intentional relationships with leaders, support of critical
partnerships, empowerment of local action, and leverage of infrastructure, networks, and assets.
As stated by FEMA Administrator Craig Fugate (2015):
We need to move away from the mindset that the Federal and State governments
are always in the lead, and build upon the strengths of our local communities and,
more importantly, our citizens. We must treat individuals and communities as key
assets rather than liabilities.
The inability of emergency management practitioners to understand all the needs of their
community and generate a stable system for delivering critical information is time intensive and
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complex (Paton & Johnston, 2001) with the most important aspects of communication consisting
of the sources, channels and messages (Lindell & Perry, 2007; Walker, 2012). Sources are
characterized by their expertise and trustworthiness. Channels are organized via type and number
(i.e. radio, brochures, face-to-face, etc.). Messages consist of the information provided about
hazards and the protective measures are characterized via comprehensibility, specificity, and
number.
Concerning the sources, the “experts” sending and receiving information range from
community members, first responders, and local, state and/or federal actors (Lindell & Perry,
2007). Practitioners and researchers soon began to notice disconnects between the sources of
information, channels or communication tools utilized, and messages being released. As stated
by Emergency Manager Manual Soto (2017) from the City of Orlando, “There needs to be one
message…if your NGO partners, community partners, and government partners are saying
something different, then the community suffers.” However, issues arose concerning:
anticipation of community needs; adaptation of communication for crisis type; information
release before, during, and after a crisis; lack of initiative to communicate; inadequate or
incompatible communication technology; variations in values and norms; high levels of stress
and pressure on individuals and teams; rapid event shifts and changing information; tension with
media and the public; poor information-gathering capacities; inability to convey accurate
information and its meaning; and cognition and collaboration (Benson, 1998; Bharosa, Lee, &
Janssen, 2010; Chandler, 2010; Coombs, 2012; Walker, 2012). Although the intent of these
communication streams was well-intentioned, the impact varied due to how the message was
sent, received, applied and reacted to (Benson, 1998; Phillips & Morrow, 2007).
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Every communication situation during a crisis must be approached with
consideration of many dynamics. Therefore, communicated messages are
complex and ambiguous at the same time. Successful public communication seeks
to balance the needs and expectations of all of these diverse audiences and speak
to each of them while not miscommunicating to the remainder (Chandler, 2010, p.
58).
Without an explicit design, the communication processes utilized consist of serious
constraints due to an uncertainty of risk and the when, where, what, how and why (Comfort &
Haase, 2006; Coombs, 2012). In order to stabilize the practice of emergency management
communication, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) became responsible for
creating and administering policies regarding emergency communications and protection of
existing infrastructure. Moreover, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 established an Office of
Emergency Communications responsible for coordinating the establishment of a national
planning, implementation, and training of communications equipment for relevant state, tribal,
and local governments and emergency response providers (Department of Homeland Security
[DHS], 2014).
Through their efforts, a plan was generated focusing on national emergency
communication and provided guidance to practitioners and administrators. The National
Emergency Communications Plan (NECP) specifically addresses: governance and leadership to
enhance coordination, planning, and decision-making; planning and procedures in terms of
assessing and improving emergency management communications and their readiness for
dynamic environments; improving capabilities for responders to communicate and coordinate
through exercise and training programs; operational coordination to improve effectiveness of
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operations through communication of, and for, resources, personnel, and capabilities across the
community; and, research and development to evaluate and support responders and unveil
innovative capabilities (see Figure 4) (DHS, 2014).

National Emergency
Communication Plan

Analyze: Identify gaps
and challenges for
updating emergency
communication plans

Measure: Assess
progress through
metrics

Implement: Execute the
proposed plan

Develop: Update or
generate plans outlining
the vision, goals and
recommendations

Figure 4. Adapted Visualization of National Emergency Communications Plan Goal
Implementation (DHS, 2014).
The NECP was established to help local, state, and tribal emergency management
practitioners strategically plan and incorporate seven objectives (DHS, 2014). The first is the
creation of formal decision-making structures and designation of leaders to coordinate
emergency communications capabilities. Second is the promotion of federal programs and
initiatives to enhance collaboration and align with national goals. Third is the employment of
common planning and operational protocols to intentionally utilize personnel and resources.
Fourth relates to emerging technologies to be integrated into current communication structures
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and be available for research, development, testing and evaluation. Fifth, in terms of responders,
there must be a shared vision and approach to training and exercises to improve expertise and
enhance response capabilities. Sixth focuses on the advancement of emergency communication
within and between all levels, strategic planning efforts must integrate public-private
partnerships and develops procedures as well as allocate resources. Lastly, preparation,
mitigation, response and recovery capabilities must be implemented during all significant events.
Overall, the NECP provides a guiding tool for decision and policy makers to examine
their emergency management, or crisis, communication in a way to develop more effective
policies and procedures (DHS, 2014). The emphasis on assessment connects to the need for
understanding local community needs and identifying areas of vulnerability where the
community's resilience capacity could be affected. Intentional assessment and strategic planning
related to overcoming any potential areas that may negatively affect resilience lead to
information necessary for emergency managers. This information may lead to more insightful or
detailed plans, action-related messages for community members, new stakeholders or partners
that aid in related activities and tasks, or needed policies that do not currently exist.
To support effective crisis communication, emergency managers should operate in such
a way that information collection, organization, and dissemination leads to messages
characterized as: open, honest, accurate, tailored, two-way, and knowledgeable. Some additional
identified best practices include: promoting effective communication regarding process
approaches and policy development; pre-event planning; partnerships with the public; listening
to the public’s concerns and understanding the audience; collaboration and coordination with
credible sources; meeting the needs of the media and remaining accessible; communicating with
empathy and concern; accepting uncertainty and ambiguity; and promoting self-efficacy (Seeger,
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2006). “The more attention that a [public administrator] can give to providing information on
hazards, risk, and protective measures in non-crisis situations, the more likely it is that such
information communicated during an actual emergency will result in adaptive citizen actions”
(Perry & Nigg, 1985, p. 76). Essentially, the more attention given to crisis communication
strategies and adaptations for local community needs, then the more resilient a community can
become.

2.4 Identification of Local Community Needs
This section discusses local community needs with an emphasis on potential risks and
vulnerabilities with a connection to crisis communication strategies.

2.4.1 Local Community Needs
In terms of a community level understanding, the concept of resilience has intrigued scholars
from psychology to ecology to emergency management (Cutter et al., 2008; Drabek, 1985;
Mayunga, 2007; Norris et al., 2008; Paton & Johnston, 2001; Ross, 2016; Sherrieb, Norris, &
Galea, 2010). Regardless of the discipline focusing on resilience, dialogue between academicians
and practitioners generated themes for administrators to seek out in order to support local
community resilience. The themes consist of: 1) investing in a community’s social infrastructure;
2) expanding public participation; 3) deepening the process and opportunities for meaningful
exchange between community residents and authorities in order to build trust and learn together;
4) assessing and aligning leadership practices between local priorities and community structures;
5) collaborating across jurisdictional boundaries for the purpose of matching initiatives and
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resilience opportunities; and, 6) improving governance to increase a community’s capacity and
achieve a greater level of resilience (Bach, Kaufman, & Dahns, 2015).
Vulnerability is difficult to define. Early research related vulnerability to physical and
structural attributes. For example, White and Haas (1975) studied place-based needs and the
potential and actual losses from natural hazards. Mileti (1999) examined vulnerability in an
attempt to reduce losses through emphasizing natural and human systems, human agencies, and
the built environment. The more recent research focused on connections to specific populations,
or qualities of social systems, inherently exposed and sensitive during a crisis (Cutter et al.,
2008; Donner & Rodriguez, 2008; Myers, Slack, & Singelmann, 2008). Yet, at its basic level,
vulnerability speaks to a lack of resources or a potentially heightened risk for negative impact.
Taking a vulnerability approach in research includes a focus on interconnected
dimensions of social, political, and economic conditions (Bolin, 2006). This focus led to a
vulnerability science or analytical field, which utilized a broad theoretical approach to
investigate hazards and inequalities with an intrinsic focus on sustainability (Cutter, Boruff, &
Shirley, 2003; Kasperson, Kasperson, & Down, 2001). Within this vein, the concept of
vulnerability is a result of unnatural occurrences within already existing environmental, social,
political, and economic conditions (Cutter, Boruff, & Shirley, 2003; Cutter et al., 2008;
Quarantelli, 1990; Wisner, Blaikie, Cannon, & Davis, 2004).
The term vulnerability has been defined as “the characteristics of a person or group and
their situation that influence their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist, and recover from the
impact of a natural hazard” (Wisner et al., 2004, p. 11). The definition takes on the application of
human factor characteristics and connects to aspects of ethnicity, gender, race, class, immigration
status, and caste. Furthermore, the definition of a vulnerable population and a general guideline
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was identified by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2014b) through indicators of
socioeconomic status, geography, age (children and elderly), disability, and risk status related to
gender and sex.
Current research expanded these general guidelines to include populations that identify as
having special needs, such as individuals with serious mental illness, extremely obese
individuals, the institutionalized population, pregnant women, the homeless, English-as-secondlanguage speakers, individuals with serious health issues such as those on dialysis, households
with pets, households with no vehicles, and indigenous populations (Baker & Cormier, 2015;
Kailes & Enders, 2007; Walls, Whitbeck, & Armenta, 2016). This social perspective lends itself
to the need for understanding local context, adaptive capabilities, and fluctuating nature before,
during, and after crises (Cutter et al., 2008; National Research Council, 2006).
When referring to the practice of emergency management, vulnerable populations are
considered as individuals with the highest risk of injury, death or property loss due to specific
circumstances or social characteristics (McEntire, 2012; Phillips & Morrow, 2007; Lazrus,
Morrow, Morss, & Lazo, 2012). These specific circumstances or social characteristics may
inhibit an individual, on some level, to function once a crisis has occurred (Baker & Cormier,
2015). The inclusion of a vulnerability perspective of local community needs is necessary to
generate a holistic view of a community's capacity. This study referred to vulnerabilities as
characteristics, factors, or attributes that may heighten the risk of injury, death, property loss or
the inhibition to function fully once a crisis has occurred.
Within previous research, public administrators, and emergency managers, were deemed
the wisest or most successful when they “were fully aware of the cultural differences among the
myriad agencies there were involved in picking up the pieces,” (Drabek, 2016, p. 232) and had a
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deep understanding of cultural differences and utilized it. These administrators had an
“understanding of and respect for community diversity [that did] not preclude unity of
command” (Drabek, 2016, p. 233). Although this previous research lends itself to the knowledge
of populations with specific cultural characteristics, the incorporation of a vulnerability approach
only enhances an administrator's community competence as they are able to more realistically
gauge resilience capacity and have the knowledge of areas for future improvement to continue
building this capacity. There is an acknowledgment of adaptations needed depending on an
organization or administrator’s audience as well as challenges dependent upon specific cultural
groups for crisis communication (Chandler, 2010). “It is not just what you say and how you say
it, although those aspects are important- but it is the attention, perception, needs, and cognitive
abilities of people in the midst of a crisis and how they will understand and react to your
messages that ultimately determine how effective will be your emergency communication”
(Chandler, 2010, p. 58).

2.4.2 Identification and Incorporation into Research
The challenge then lies in identifying these populations and incorporating their unique needs in
preparation, mitigation, response and recovery activities as well as not viewing these groups as
impaired or weak (Kailes & Enders, 2007). In terms of crisis communication, the connections
between demographics and abilities to cope with a crisis hinge on effective policies and
implementation. If due attention is given to the why and how vulnerable populations receive and
interpret disaster information, then negative impacts can be effectively mitigated (Lazrus,
Morrow, Morss, & Lazo, 2012). For instance, individuals who are deaf or hard of hearing require
closed captions (Phillips & Morrow, 2007). The homeless, or transient, community lacks stable
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connections to electronic resources affecting the ability to receive crisis related information and
effectively prepare and respond (Wexler & Smith, 2013). Urban, or rural, communities are at a
higher risk to be completely isolated during a crisis and must rely on neighbors to assist should
response agencies be delayed, or communication infrastructure is damaged.
Moreover, the needs of each audience affect whether the community accepts or rejects
crisis-related information (Coombs, 2012). If research is going to be useful, then it must levy
behavioral responses and the complex array of situational and structural variables (Phillips &
Morrow, 2007). A way to identify vulnerable populations is through community mapping. A
Community Vulnerability Map is an inventory that reflects at-risk groups such as: residents of
group living facilities, elderly, individuals with disabilities, renters, low income households,
women-headed households, language minorities, recent residents/immigrants/migrants,
individuals under the age of 15, large households, the homeless, and tourists (Morrow, 1999). In
conjunction with identifying vulnerable populations, Community Vulnerability Maps can
identify valuable resources, shelters, and local response networks. Additional suggestions for
mapping include the integration with Geographic Information Systems.
The concept of mapping provides a scientific basis and achieve the following outcomes:
a) visualize complex processes and interactions that add to understanding of social, economic,
and physical events; b) utilize as a tool for teaching and learning; c) describe social, economic, or
physical phenomena and processes; d) compare and contrast processes, situations, events, and
dynamics of complex systems; e) collect and analyze data; and f) construct or explore theories,
concepts, or dynamics (Sylves, 2014).
In conjunction with mapping techniques, a Social Vulnerability Index (SoVI) was
generated by Cutter, Boruff, and Shirley (2003) focusing on factors of socioeconomic status,
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household composition, race/ethnicity/language, and housing and transportation. These factors
affect a community’s ability to prepare, mitigate, respond and recover from a crisis and provide a
more expansive contextual snapshot for decision-making. This index focuses on a geographically
limited area, specifically counties and county-equivalents in the United States, to generate a
cumulative score. This score uncovers the factors connected to areas of vulnerability, as well as
interactions that could have a positive or negative impact on the community's resilience capacity.
The usefulness of mapping techniques and understanding social vulnerabilities is to expand the
understanding of a community's ability to effectively prepare, mitigate, respond and recover
from a crisis. It is important to reiterate that vulnerability and resilience are not contrasting
concepts, but complementary and are critical to understanding the community's inherent
capacity. A population can be deemed vulnerable and still be resilient. These assessments are
critical to understanding the unique needs of these populations to assist in more effectively
preparing, mitigating, responding and recovering.
This study integrated the BRIC scores due to their range of factors connected to local
community needs within the indicators (Cutter, Ash, & Emrich, 2014, 2016; Cutter, Burton, &
Emrich, 2010). To briefly reiterate, the scoring index incorporates a range of factors connected to
social vulnerabilities and is used for strategic planning and assessing community needs. In terms
of a crisis communication plan, this document is essential in mapping out how to mitigate
communication breakdowns as well as how to adapt strategies to the diverse audience (Chandler,
2010). Within this plan, roles and responsibilities are designated and the administrator is able to
become the expert and source of information in terms of key stakeholders, contact databases,
information policies, legal and ethical concerns, message planning, communication tools,
common communication issues, and training timelines.
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2.5 Theoretical Perspective: Situational Crisis Communication Theory
This section expands on the origins of Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT) and its
placement within previous research, as well as the inclusion of SCCT as the theoretical
foundation for this study.

2.5.1 Theory Selection
Before moving to the discussion, it must be noted the researcher examined several other theories
before choosing SCCT as being most appropriate. The researcher first examined theories related
to the area of communication and emergency management. One of the first concepts investigated
was focusing events generated by Birkland (1996; 1997; 1998; 2006). Birkland spoke to the
phenomena of natural disasters acting as focusing events for policy change. With each new
disaster, a spotlight is given to the policies and procedures related to the disaster. For many
policies, the question of how to prevent the disaster from happening again is posed along with
how to improve policies that failed during response and recovery. Although the concept of
focusing events is easily connected to crisis communication and community resilience, the
researcher searched for a theory that could incorporate diverse types of disasters or crises into the
study.
The next concept examined is the discourse of renewal. This discourse incorporates four
theoretical objectives that highlight a crisis as an opportunity for organizational learning, ethical
communication, prospective vision, and positive rhetoric (Ulmer, Sellnow, & Seeger, 2007,
2017). In terms of organizational learning, the crisis unveils areas of growth, which is a similar
concept to Birkland's focusing event and other researchers that see disasters as learning
opportunities (Birkland, 2009; Drupsteen & Guldenmund, 2014; Norris et al., 2008; Toft &
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Reynolds, 2016). The focus on ethical communication is to emphasize the organization's positive
values that are, hopefully, in place before, during, and after the crisis. These values range from
honesty, transparency, and trustworthiness and are the best predictors of positive renewal.
Including a prospective vision means incorporating optimism into communication and keeping
the organization's purpose and mission in mind to support renewal. The last concept of the
discourse of renewal is positive rhetoric and connects to the leadership who would inspire others
to stay committed to the cause. The discourse of renewal is seen to contrast corporate apologia or
image restoration theory as not beginning from a perspective of protecting or repairing the
organization's image (Ulmer, Sellnow, & Seeger, 2007, 2017). Albeit an idealistic approach, the
reality of crises and disasters incorporates negatively impacted reputations and public images
necessitating a restoration or repairing element. The theory for this study could not focus so
intently on public relations and not be easily translatable into the area of emergency
management.
The next model examined was the Center for Disease Control and Prevention's Crisis and
Emergency Risk Communication (CERC) lifecycle (2014a). Although the focus is on public
health and leans more towards the arena of risk communication, the model emphasizes six
principles that connect to best practices of emergency management related communication.
These principles include being first, right, credible, empathic, action-oriented, and respectful.
The lifecycle of CERC is similar to the generalized timeline for emergency management related
communication of pre-crisis, during, and after with expansion to include an evaluation
component. CERC also incorporates similarity to SCCT with consideration for crisis type.
However, the intricate focus on public health and lack of expansion to all arenas of emergency
management led to further theoretical evaluations (CDC, 2014a).
43

2.5.2 Crisis Communication Theory
Regarding the endeavors of this study, a critical component is the application of theory to
practice. Theory is useful in guiding the research and providing an explanatory framework
regarding the results providing systematic explanations about relationships among phenomena
and knits together observations and facts into an orderly system (Creswell, 2012; Diesing, 1992;
Smith & Larimer, 2016). Integration of theory provides a way to predict future scenarios, inform
practice, promote understanding, and uncover research topics (Sellnow & Seeger, 2013).
Therefore, the theory guiding this study is Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT).
Speaking of theoretical perspectives regarding a crisis, Boin and McConnell (2006)
discussed the amalgam of perspectives connected to the range of social sciences. Within the
discipline of sociology, the disaster perspective views a crisis as a phase in which institutions
stop functioning. These phases are time-limited and functioning, or performance, of an
institution or organization is impacted to the point of stopping all actions until the event ends.
Additionally, sociologists incorporated a silver lining thought stream as a crisis was viewed as an
opportunity for growth and change. Although crisis research was not deemed a niche within
sociological research, the subfield of organization theory was integrated within a disaster event
and formulated one of the most powerful theories for the crisis approach (Boin & McConnell,
2006). The inquiry into organizational theory then created a bridge between sociology and
psychology and connects to the work done regarding safety research and decision making (Flin,
1996; Klein, 1999; Reason, 1990). The decision-making research led into international crises as
well as political science. Entering into these arenas led to a focus on leadership, conflicts, and
subjectivity (Allison, 1971; Boin & McConnell, 2006; George, 1991; Hermann, 1972; Herek,
Janis, & Huth, 1987; Lebow, 1984).
44

Within the political science arena, crises were studied more with the lens of structure and
function (Almond, Flanagan, & Mundt, 1973; Boin & McConnell, 2006; Keeler, 1993;
Rosenthal, Boin, & Comfort, 2001; Stern, 1997; Zimmerman, 2013). In some research, the crisis
was a necessary component that led towards a more democratic society (Almond, Flanagan, &
Mundt, 1973; Boin & McConnell, 2006; Linz & Stepan, 1978; Zimmerman, 2013). Shifting
towards the advancement of business management, research began to incorporate a focus on
reputation damage and business continuity (Mitroff & Pauchant, 1990; Coombs, 2012; Sellnow
& Seeger, 2006). The focus on reputation and organizations leads us back to the area of
communication studies and research on actors, stakeholders, and communities (Fearn-Banks,
2016; Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2003).

2.5.3 From Crisis Communication Theory to Situational Crisis Communication Theory
Linking crisis rhetorical theory and strategies with attribution theory, Coombs (2012) developed
Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT) to “evaluate the reputational threat posed by
the crisis situation and then recommend crisis response strategies based upon the reputational
threat level” (p. 138). The crisis response strategies came as a result of Apologia, Impression
Management, and Image Repair Theory. The incorporation of attribution theory, a social science
traditional approach, applies to crisis management situations by taking an audience-centered
approach and considering the reaction of stakeholders to an event (Coombs, 2012). Attribution
theory focuses on how an individual cognitively processes cause and effect within their
environment (Kelley, 1967; Weiner, 1985). SCCT expands the concept from individual focused
on an event to a group of individuals and how they infer a cause related to the action of an
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emergency management organization (Sellnow & Seeger, 2013; Ulmer, Sellnow, & Seeger,
2017; Walker, 2012).
At the heart of SCCT is an emphasis on recovering from the crisis. It attempts to balance
proactive and reactive measures in a way to intentionally respond and recover. With one of the
overarching goals being to maintain a positive reputation within crisis response, SCCT is
predominantly utilized in public relations research and acknowledges how the public assigns
responsibility to response organizations (Sellnow & Seeger, 2013; Walker, 2012). More
specifically, SCCT is focused on the degree to which individuals or a stakeholder holds an
organization responsible for a crisis. A threat to effective communication consists of any
negative reputation held by an administrator or organization. This theory proposed four groups of
response strategies:
1)

Denial Strategies- “Seek to prevent any connection between the organization and
some crisis event and include denial, attacking the accuser, and scapegoating”

2)

Diminish Strategies- “Try to reduce the perceived responsibility for the crisis and
include justification and excuses”

3)

Rebuild Strategies- “Attempt to improve the reputation and include compensation
and apology”

4)

Bolstering Strategy- “Try to draw on existing goodwill and should be used as a
secondary strategy in support of others” (Coombs, 2012, p. 11).

The basic premise holds that the increase in attribution to an organization concerning
crisis responsibility, then strategies must be adapted to meet the increased needs. In terms of
basic crisis communication strategies, an administrator or emergency manager can begin with a
threat assessment of crisis type, history, and prior reputation. As previously discussed, the
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typologies include natural disasters, workplace violence, rumors, malevolence, challenges,
technical-error accidents, technical-error product harm, human-error accidents, human-error
product harm, and organization misdeeds (see Table 3 for definitions). Depending on typologies,
administrators and their communities relate preparation, mitigation, response and recovery
activities to previous events and gauge predilection for future events. Prior connections
determine whether the community holds a negative or positive reputation for community
resilience capacity (Coombs, 2012; Sherrieb, Norris, & Galea, 2010).
Table 3. Definitions of Crisis Typologies (Coombs, 2012).

Crisis Type
Natural Disasters

Workplace Violence
Rumors

Malevolence

Challenges

Technical-error Accidents
Technical-error Product
Harm
Human-error Accidents
Human-error Product Harm
Organizational Misdeeds

Definition
When an organization is damaged as a result of the weather or
“acts of God” such as earthquakes, tornadoes, floods,
hurricanes, and bad storms.
When an employee or former employee commits violence
against other employees on the organization’s grounds.
When false or misleading information is purposefully
circulated about an organization or its products in order to
harm the organization.
When some outside actor or opponent employs extreme tactics
to attack the organization, such as product tampering,
kidnapping, terrorism, or computer hacking.
When the organization is confronted by discontented
stakeholders with claims that it is operating in an
inappropriate manner.
When the technology utilized or supplied by the organization
fails and causes an industrial accident.
When the technology utilized or supplied by the organization
fails and results in a defect or potentially harmful product.
When human error causes an accident.
When human error results in a defect or potentially harmful
product.
When management takes actions, it knows may place
stakeholders at risk or knowingly violates the law.

The crisis types for this study include natural disasters, community violence, and health
epidemics. In terms of natural disasters, this study incorporates an emphasis on earthquakes,
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hurricanes, tornadoes, and floods due to their prevalence in the United States (Disaster Survival
Resources, 2017; FEMA, 2017). Community violence is an adaptation of workplace violence
and organizational misdeeds where the act of violence is transferred from a workplace
environment to a community, which is an increasing crisis in the United States, and incorporates
actions of management, or community leaders, that may increase the risk for community
members and potentially violate current laws (Coombs, 2012). In the United States, civil rest is
arguably on the rise giving grounds to community related violence that incorporates violent
crime, hate crimes, and riots (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2013; Cook, 2017; Marable, 2016;
Sackett, 2016). Health epidemic was included as an adaptation to human-error product harm as
the United States has experienced health-related crises due to product tampering or biologically
driven terrorism caused by individuals versus technology (Coombs, 2012). Health epidemic was
chosen due to the connection to public health concerns and risk communication.
SCCT broadens these strategies and provides a prescriptive system to connect response
strategies to the crisis situation (Coombs & Holladay, 2002). Although the focus is on
organizational reputation, SCCT is applicable to this study as crisis type affects crisis
communication strategies and local community needs, including vulnerable populations, to
strengthen community resilience capacity. An emergency manager’s response to a crisis directs
the ability to adapt communication and whether they include local community needs and
vulnerable populations into this adaptation (see Table 4 for crisis response strategies) (Coombs,
1999; Coombs & Holladay, 2002; Sellnow & Seeger, 2013).
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Table 4. Crisis Response Strategies adapted from Coombs (2012).

Response Strategy
Attack on the accuser
Denial
Excuse
Victimization
Justification
Ingratiation
Corrective action
Full apology

Description
Crisis manager confronts the group or person that claims a crisis
exists.
Crisis manager claims that there is no crisis.
Crisis manager attempts to minimize organizational responsibility
for the crisis.
Crisis manager reminds stakeholders that the organization is a
victim of the crisis as well.
Crisis manager attempts to minimize perceived damage inflicted
by the crisis.
Crisis manager praises stakeholders and reminds them of the past
good works done by the organization.
Crisis manager tries to prevent a repeat of the crisis and/or repair
the damage done by the crisis.
Crisis manager publicly accepts responsibility for the crisis and
requests forgiveness from the stakeholders.

If an emergency manager is aware of how they will respond to the crisis, then they are
more apt to pick a strategy that will positively impact their company as they tailor their messages
and instruct specific stakeholders in such a way to circumvent any negative consequences. On
the other side, knowing these strategies assists those receiving the information to understand how
the manager is viewing the incident and how they and the community are impacted by their
leadership. In conjunction with the manager's response, the type of crisis impacts the
communication needs and previous history, or experiences, will affect how emergency
management practitioners and their community responds (Coombs, 2012; Liu, Austin, & Jin,
2011; Sherrieb, Norris, & Galea, 2010; Ulmer, Sellnow, & Seeger, 2017; Walker, 2012). In
addition to the response strategy groupings, SCCT takes into consideration crisis clusters, which
were formed by integrating crisis type with attributions of crisis responsibility (Coombs, 2014;
Coombs & Holladay, 2002).
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1)

Victim Cluster- Weak attributions of crisis responsibility where the organization
is considered a victim. These include natural disasters, workplace violence,
product tampering, and rumor.

2)

Accidental Cluster- Minimal attributions of crisis responsibility and the event is
considered uncontrollable or unintentional by the organization. These include
technical-error accident, technical-error product harm, and challenge.

3)

Intentional/Preventable Cluster- Strong attributions of crisis responsibility and the
event is considered purposeful. These include human-error accident, human-error
product harm, and organizational misdeed.

Once this information has been taken into account, an administrator or emergency
manager can utilize SCCT to organize information into three types: instructing, sharing and
adjusting, which parallel the basic emergency information communication process of
information collection, processing and dissemination. SCCT broadens these strategies and
provides a prescriptive system to connect response strategies to the crisis situation (see Table 5)
(Coombs & Holladay, 2002; Ulmer, Sellnow, & Seeger, 2017).
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Table 5. Crisis Type and Strategy Matching adapted from Coombs (2012).

Victim Cluster

Accidental
Cluster

Preventable
Cluster

Crisis Types
Natural Disaster
Rumor
Workplace Violence
Product Tampering/
Malevolence
Challenges
Technical-Error Accidents
Technical-Error Product Harm
Human-Error accidents
Human-Error Product Harm
Organizational misdeed with
no injuries or with injuries or
management misconduct

Crisis Response Strategies
Attack the accuser
Denial
Deny
Scapegoat
Strategies

Diminish
Strategies

Rebuild
Strategies

Excuse
Justification
Compensation
Apology

Overall, SCCT is applicable as it places importance on the individuals involved and how
they interact with the crisis. Although the focus is traditionally attributed to organizational
reputation and previous researchers applied this theoretical lens to the area of product recalls and
nonprofit organizations, SCCT is applicable to this study as situational response to a crisis
affects communication strategies and, in turn, impacts community resilience capacity (Coombs
& Holladay, 2002; Sellnow & Seeger, 2013).

2.6 Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses
The following conceptual framework highlights the relationship between crisis communication
strategies, crisis typology, local community needs, and community resilience. Moreover, the
framework is based on the research discussed in the literature review and theoretical perspective
(see Figure 5). Within the visualization, the definitive lines represent direct effect from one
variable onto another while the dotted line represents a potential indirect effect from one variable
to another.
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Figure 5. Conceptual Framework.
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Based on the literature review and research questions, the following hypotheses were
developed:
To support effective crisis communication, emergency managers must operate in such a
way that information collection, processing, and dissemination leads to instructing, adjusting,
and sharing messages characterized as: open, honest, accurate, tailored, two-way, and
knowledgeable (Kapucu, Hawkins, & Rivera, 2013; Kapucu & Özerdem, 2011; McEntire, 2007;
Perry & Nigg, 1985; Seeger, 2006; Sylves, 2014; Waugh & Streib, 2006). Some identified best
practices include: promoting effective communication regarding process approaches and policy
development; pre-event planning; partnerships with the public; listening to the public’s concerns
and understanding the audience; collaboration and coordination with credible sources; meeting
the needs of the media and remaining accessible; communicating with empathy and concern;
accepting uncertainty and ambiguity; and promoting self-efficacy. These practices are
intrinsically connected to crisis communication and are critical to building community resilience.
Therefore, the use of crisis communication strategies will improve community resilience and is
verified if the results of covariance structure model analysis yields a positive score.
H1: Use of crisis communication strategies positively affects community resilience.
It has become imperative to not only identify local community needs but the vulnerable
populations within an emergency manager’s jurisdiction. They must be able to understand how
effective crisis communication and coordination influences resilience capacity of these
communities (Comfort, 2007; Comfort, Boin, & Demchak, 2010; Cutter, Burton, & Emrich,
2010; Paton & Johnston, 2001; Pine, 2015). Recent catastrophes shed light on the inexcusable
inabilities of emergency management to adapt their communication needs to the local
community and its vulnerable populations, which can be classified by socioeconomic status,
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race, political connections, infrastructure and more. The critical relationship between community
characteristics and vulnerability is not a linear relationship; therefore, practitioners must
understand how communities receive, react and comprehend information and adapt crisis
communication strategies accordingly. Therefore, the use of crisis communication strategies
adapted to local community needs will improve community resilience and is verified if the
results of covariance structure model analysis yields a positive score.
H2: Use of crisis communication strategies adapted to local community needs affects
community resilience.
By integrating crisis typology into communication strategies, emergency management
practitioners are theorized to more effectively respond a crisis and prepare for a future event;
however, a level of adaptability is needed as perception and reality differ especially as how
someone perceives themselves differs from how another individual or group sees them (Bandura,
1989; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Markus & Wurf, 1987; Mead, 1934). The Situational Crisis
Communication Theory also provides practitioners with more resources for informed decisionmaking to prepare their communities for crisis response and recovery dependent upon adaptation
of communication strategies based on crisis typologies (Coombs, 2012; Coombs & Holladay,
2002; Sellnow & Seeger, 2013; Sherrieb, Norris, & Galea, 2010; Ulmer, Sellnow, & Seeger,
2017; Walker, 2012). Therefore, the use of crisis communication strategies adapted to crisis type
will improve community resilience and is verified if the results of covariance structure model
analysis yields a positive score.
H3: Use of crisis communication strategies adapted to crisis type affects community
resilience.
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2.7 Chapter Summary
This chapter discussed the incorporation of emergency management related tasks and activities
into the role and responsibilities of public administrators. More specifically, supporting safe
communities and fostering positive development to prepare, mitigate, respond and recover from
crises are quintessential. This goal is incorporated fully into emergency management
communication focused on trustworthy, accurate, and tailored messages where the process of
information collection, organization, and dissemination is imperative. The ineffectiveness of
communication negatively impacts community resilience albeit the concept is complex in its
measurement and hinges on experts connected to emergency management. Integrating the lens of
crisis communication strategies supports the goal of safe and resilient communities through its
emphasis on local community needs and adaptation due to crisis type. These pivotal connections
are also detailed in the theoretical perspective of the study, Situational Crisis Communication
Theory. Overall, the evolution of emergency management and public administration, complex
measurement of resilience, integration of crisis communication strategies with its inclusion of
adaptations per crisis type and local community needs, and infusion of Situational Crisis
Communication Theory led to the creation of a conceptual framework and study hypotheses for
testing. The next chapter highlights the research method deemed most appropriate for the study
as well as the chosen statistical analysis of Structural Equation Modeling.
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHOD
This chapter details the method for this non-experimental, cross-sectional research by discussing
variables, quantitative and qualitative methods, Structural Equation Modeling (SEM), power
analysis, survey instrument, and data collection. For this exploratory analysis, the researcher
collected data through a web-based survey to ascertain county level emergency management
practitioner’s perception of community resilience capacity with a focus on crisis communication
strategies and local community needs.

3.1 Research Design
This study utilizes a cross-sectional, non-experimental research design, as these are
predominantly used within social science research (Campbell & Stanley, 2015; Miller & Salkind,
2002). The cross-sectional portion of the study lends itself to being more feasible as it does not
encounter time or logistical constraints found within experimental or quasi-experimental designs.
Additionally, cross-sectional studies are characterized as being more useful for social science
research, since there is no need to create an artificial environment and it allows us to survey
groups at one point in time.
According to research, surveys are well suited for studies regarding public opinions or
perceptions (Coombs, 1997; Dillman, 2000; Kaplowitz, Hadlock, & Levine, 2004; Sills & Song,
2002). The strengths of this particular method include: the ability to obtain descriptive
information, enhance the feasibility of the research, allow for flexibility for analysis, and
strengthen measurement. Weaknesses incorporate requirements of question standardization,
challenges regarding contextual information, lack of flexibility in design, and social desirability
bias. As previously discussed, the proposed plan to survey emergency managers on the county
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level is pivotal as this level is the beginning of preparation, mitigation, response and recovery
activities (Cutter et al., 2008; McGuire & Silva, 2010; Morrow, 1999; Okechukwu Okoli,
Weller, & Watt, 2014; Waugh & Streib, 2006; Waugh, 1994). County level emergency
management practitioners are considered the experts of their communities meaning their
knowledge base is critical to understanding relationships between crisis communication
strategies, local community needs, and community resilience (Okechukwu Okoli, Weller, &
Watt, 2014; Sills & Song, 2002).
As discovered by Okechukwu Okoli, Weller and Watt (2014), eliciting expert knowledge
provides insight into information filtering, knowledge base and mental models, pattern matching,
leverage points and mental simulation. Information filtering calls to the ability of an expert to
systematically review information for relevance and increase their cognitive capacity.
Knowledgebase and mental model speaks to the ability to translate the information into a
meaningful representation. Pattern matching alludes to the expert’s ability to relate a current
situation to previous experiences and integrate into their actions. Leverage points speak to the
ability to improvise and adapt to each new situation. Mental simulation is the ability of an expert
to project their current situation to future events and plan accordingly.

3.2 Population, Sample Size, and Power Analysis
For the purposes of this study, the population consists of county level emergency managers in the
United States. As previously discussed, the county level is the lowest formalized level in the
organizational structure and the connected emergency managers are the experts of their
communities. The survey was distributed to 2073 county level emergency managers and
contained closed- and open-ended questions to understand practitioners’ perceptions of crisis
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communication, local community needs, and community resilience. For Structural Equation
Modeling (SEM), there lacks agreement on the sample size necessary for analysis (Arbuckle &
Wothke, 2012; Kaplan, 2001; Sideridis, Simos, Papanicolaou, & Fetcher, 2014; Weston & Gore,
2006; Wolf, Harrington, Clark, & Miller, 2013). Researchers vary in their recommendation from
5, 10, or 15 cases per parameter to a minimum of 200. Although the promoted sample size
varies, the main concern is whether model fit can be achieved. According to Wolf, Harrington,
Clark, and Miller (2013), the sample size requirement actually decreases when the number of
model indicators increases. Sideridis, Simos, Papanicolaou, and Fletcher (2014) concluded
model fit in their study that included five latent variables.
The researcher reviewed recommendations on general survey research. Dillman (2000)
stated a response rate of 70% could be achieved if the survey design is given close attention and
the subject matter is for general public populations. Kittleson (1997) stated response rates are
higher for those who utilize notices and reminders in an appropriate fashion without
oversaturation. If no notices or reminders are provided, researchers can expect a response rate of
at least 25 to 30%. However, obtaining a response rate of 25% or higher for this population
(approximately 519 respondents) is unrealistic, as practitioners in the field of emergency
management reach their peak of natural disasters and response scenarios at the end of the
summer season (Ready.gov, 2017; Staletovich, 2015; Stapf, 2017).
After reviewing the research and comparing to the variables in this study’s models, it was
determined that 60 to 200 responses are adequate. In terms of power analysis, this study utilized
an alpha level of .05. The power analysis takes into account effect size, or the salience of the
program relative to the noise, the alpha level or significance level, and the probability of
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rejecting the null hypothesis when the null hypothesis is false and means there is a 95%
confidence rate that the results are not due to chance.

3.3 Survey Instrument and Data Collection
The survey instrument is a 68-item questionnaire, containing 5-point Likert style and open-ended
questions as well as demographic information. The web-based survey, hosted in University of
Central Florida’s Qualtrics account, was created and disseminated to 2,073 county level
emergency managers across the nation. The informed consent page is located in Appendix A
with the survey instrument in Appendix B. It is important to note survey questions related to
communication avenues, collaboration potential, and demographics were adapted from
previously conducted research by Naim Kapucu to determine preparedness for hurricanes in
Florida (Kapucu, 2008). Moreover, a pilot test was conducted to determine whether there are
validity or reliability issues and if it produces stable and consistent results. Review of the initial
survey led to minor adaptations to the wording of questions as well as the addition of a section to
determine the time period when the emergency manager experienced natural disasters, health
epidemic, and community violence.
The survey instrument is divided into five sections: 1) Crisis Communication Strategies
with integrated Crisis Type, 2) Local Community Needs, 3) Community Resilience, 4) Openended Questions, and 5) Demographics (Appendix B). The measurement of these sections is
detailed in the next segment. Quantitative analysis was conducted for sections one, two and three
as specific questions align to a closed-ended, Likert-scale style where the respondent noted
agreement or importance for components of crisis communication strategies, local community
needs, and community resilience.
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The qualitative portion of the instrument applied to open-ended questions within the
survey to add depth to the breadth of the received responses. The questions are listed below and
were analyzed using coding and thematic analysis (Boyatzis, 1998; Miles & Huberman, 1994;
Saldaña, 2015), which is discussed in a later segment.
1. How would you describe your level of expertise?
2. Is there anything you would like to add that you believe is critical for crisis
communication?
3. Is there anything you would like to add that you believe is critical to building community
resilience?
4.

Are there any documents or reports you would like to share that connects the concepts of
crisis communication and community resilience? If so, how can the copies be obtained?
Another qualitative component of the study was the option for follow-up interviews for

those interested. This opportunity was presented at the end of the web-based survey. Those who
volunteered were contacted and provided more information (i.e. interviews were recorded and
adherence to anonymity) along with a link for scheduling a 30-minute timeslot with the
researcher.
In conjunction to the survey, the researcher utilized BRIC scores to provide a secondary
data source for comparing emergency manager’s perceptions and resilience scores for their
county. The BRIC data file the researcher utilized is the 2010 scores compiled from the
University of South Carolina Hazards and Vulnerability Research Institute (2016). BRIC creates
a resilience score based on 49 disaster-focused indicators on the county level (Cutter, Ash, &
Emrich, 2014, 2016; Cutter, Burton, & Emrich, 2010). During the survey creation process, the
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BRIC indicators related to disaster and its scale, institutional, social, and community competence
were integrated into those that measure community resilience.
The use of qualitative and quantitative methods assists in methodological triangulation
where multiple methods are used to gather data, such as surveys, interviews, and secondary
data (Denzin, 1978, 2012). The utilization of a web-based survey, comparison to BRIC scoring,
and follow-up interviews provides more support to obtained results through increased credibility,
reliability and validity of the study’s design (Denzin 1978, 2012; Jick, 1979; Olsen, 2004).
Once the data was collected, it was cleaned and reviewed for missing values to determine
if the values are missing at random, not at random, or completely. This is an important part of the
data cleaning process, as there may be a pattern needing attention before further analysis is
completed. The next set of examinations include descriptive statistics to get an overview of the
variables then verification of assumptions for Structural Equation Modeling, such as
confirmatory factor analysis and Cronbach’s alpha (Arbuckle & Wothke, 2012; Gliem & Gliem,
2003; Pallant, 2013; Santos, 1999). These assumptions include sample size, complete data,
multicollinearity, normality, and model identification.

3.4 Measurement and Study Variables
The primary dependent, and latent endogenous, variable for this study was Community
Resilience with Crisis Communication Strategies being a secondary, latent endogenous variable.
It is important to note although Crisis Communication Strategies was considered endogenous in
its relationship to Local Community Needs and Crisis Type, it is exogenous in its relationship to
Community Resilience and was categorized as an independent variable (Arbuckle & Wothke,
2012; Kaplan, 2001; Kenny, 2014; Kline, 2015). The unit of analysis was the county level
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emergency manager. The independent, or latent exogenous, variables consisted of Local
Community Needs and Crisis Type with. The study variables are included in Table 6 followed by
a more detailed discussion of each component closing with a comprehensive list and SEM
components.
Table 6. Study Variables.
Variable

Definition

Survey Section

Community
Resilience
(Endogenous)

The capability of a community to respond to,
recover from, and develop once a crisis has
been realized.

Crisis
Communication
Strategies
(Endogenous)

The ongoing process of creating shared meaning
among and between communities within the
ecological context of a crisis, for the purpose of
preparing for and reducing, limiting and
responding to threats and harm (Sellnow &
Seeger, 2013). This is done via strategies
connected to instructing, adjusting and sharing.
Crisis types include: natural disasters, health
concerns, and community violence (Coombs,
2012).

Crisis Typology
(Exogenous)

Local Community
Needs (Exogenous)

Demographics
(Control)

Includes aspects of Cutter, Burton, and
Emrich’s (2008) resilience model focusing on
Social, Institutional, and Community
Competence components. These components
also focus on vulnerable populations as
individuals with characteristics that inhibit their
ability to function once a crisis has occurred.
Characteristics of the survey participant and
their emergency management organization and
community (i.e., state, community type, gender,
age, educational degree).
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Likert-Scale Score for
agreement or importance
designation concerning
community resilience
section and comparison to
BRIC scores.
Likert-Scale (1-5) for
agreement or importance
designation for crisis
communication section.

Likert-Scale (1-5) for
agreement or importance
designation. This segment is
integrated into crisis
communication section of
the survey.
Likert-Scale (1-5) for
agreement or importance
designation. This segment is
integrated into crisis
communication section.

Open response area or
categorical response
possibilities

3.4.1 Crisis Communication Strategies
The questions related to the latent endogenous variable of Crisis Communication Strategies are
seen in Table 7. Response options included a 5-point Likert scale from strongly disagree to
strongly agree and a segment to denote time since experiencing certain crisis types and
importance of communication avenues.

Table 7. Crisis Communication Strategies Survey Connections.
Conceptual Connections

Variable Code
Q1

Instructing/Adjusting

Q2
Q3
Q4
Q5
Q6

Sharing

Q7
Q8
Q9
Q10

Adjusting

Q11

Instructing/Sharing

Q12

Survey Question
My department is mainly responsible for
creating crisis communication plans and
strategies
My department exercises crisis communication
strategies regularly
My department exercises crisis communication
strategies with community partners
My department focuses on information sharing
between different community departments
My department markets our plans on our
websites
My department markets our plans on other
community partner’s websites
My department markets our plans on flyers and
posters
My department markets our plans via social
media
My department provides updated information at
least every hour during the event
My department provides updated information at
least once every three hours during the event
My department assesses our crisis
communication plan at least once a year
My department assesses our crisis
communication plan with community partners

The proposed measurement model is illustrated in Figure 6.
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Figure 6. Crisis Communication Strategies Measurement Model.
3.4.2 Local Community Needs
The questions related to the latent exogenous variable of Local Community Needs are seen in
Table 8 and the response options are on a 5-point Likert scale denoting agreement.

64

Table 8. Local Community Needs Survey Connections.
Conceptual Connections

Variable Code
Q13
Q14
Q15
Q16
Q17

Local Community
Needs

Q18
Q19
Q20
Q21
Q22

Survey Question
My department has a positive relationship
with the community
My department identifies what is most
important for the community to know
My department provides tailored messages
for different cultures within the community
My department provides communications in
different languages for the community
My department provides community outreach
campaigns for vulnerable populations
My department uses (easy-to-understand)
language to explain what is going on
My department uses visual images such as
maps to help explain what is going on
My department identifies the most important
topics and highlights these in communication
My department uses a spokesperson with
whom the community is familiar
My department includes specific action to be
taken by the community in each warning
message

The proposed measurement model is illustrated in Figure 7.
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Figure 7. Local Community Needs Measurement Model.
3.4.3 Crisis Type
The questions related to the latent exogenous variable of Crisis Type are seen in Table 9 and the
response options consisted of a 5-point Likert scale denoting agreement as well as a categorical
scale for time period since experiencing certain crisis types.
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Table 9. Crisis Type Survey Connections.
Conceptual Connections

Variable Code
NA

NA

NA

NA
Crisis Type/
Disaster and its Scale
NA

NA
Q23
Q24
Q25

Survey Question
Please note how recently your community
has experienced the following crisis type(s):
Earthquake
Please note how recently your community
has experienced the following crisis type(s):
Tornado
Please note how recently your community
has experienced the following crisis type(s):
Flood
Please note how recently your community
has experienced the following crisis type(s):
Hurricane
Please note how recently your community
has experienced the following crisis type(s):
Health Epidemic
Please note how recently your community
has experienced the following crisis type(s):
Community Violence
My department adapts information for
natural disasters
My department adapts information for health
concerns
My department adapts information for
community violence

The proposed measurement model is illustrated in Figure 8.

Figure 8. Crisis Type Measurement Model.
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3.4.4 Community Resilience
The questions related to the latent endogenous variable of Community Resilience are seen in
Table 10 with response options include on a 5-point Likert scale denoting agreement or
importance level.

Table 10. Community Resilience Survey Connections.
Research
Connection

Variable Code

Corresponding Likert-Scale Survey
Question
Leadership support from the state
emergency management
practitioner(s)
Leadership support from surrounding
local emergency management
practitioner(s)
Trust with the community
Providing emergency management
training and certification opportunities
for administrators
Conducting routine assessments to
update plans and procedures

Q26

Q27
Q28
Q29
Q30
Institutional/
Q31
Social/ Community
Q32
Competence

Conducting routine needs assessments
Conducting comprehensive
vulnerability assessments
Collaborating with community
partners for support, expertise, etc.
Personally, participating in training
and certification opportunities focused
on emergency management
In the absence of a crisis, sustaining
relationships with other organizations
In the absence of a crisis, being
involved in collaborative strategies
(such as exercises, and meetings) with
organizations you collaborate with
during a crisis

Q33
Q34
Q35

Q36

The proposed measurement model is illustrated in Figure 9.
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Figure 9. Community Resilience Measurement Model.
3.4.5 Control Variables
The questions related to these indicators are seen in Table 11. Response options are also
provided in the table varying from an open box to categorical options.
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Table 11. Control Variables Survey Connections.
Question

Answer Options

How many years have your worked in your position?

Open

How many years have you worked in your current
jurisdiction?
How many years have you worked in public sector?

Open
Open

Approximately, how many full-time employees work _ 1-5
in your department/unit? (Please check one)
_ 6-15
_ 16-25
_ 26-50
_ over 50
What is your gender?
_ Male
_ Female
What is your age?

_ under 35
_ 35-44
_ 45-54
_ over 54

What is your highest degree?

_ High school graduate, diploma or
the equivalent
_ Trade/technical/vocational training
_ Associate Degree
_ Bachelor’s Degree
_ Master’s Degree
_ Doctorate degree
Public Administration, Engineering,
Emergency management, Sociology,
Political Science, management,
Others

In which field is your highest degree?

3.4.6 Structural Equation Modeling for the Covariance Structural Model
The hypothesized relationship between the endogenous and exogenous variables is examined
utilizing SEM and is presented in Table 12.
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Table 12. Operationalization of Variables for Structural Equation Model.
Code
1
Q26
Q27
Q28
Q29
Q30
Q31
Q32
Q33
Q34
Q35
Q36
2
Q1
Q2

Attribute
Endogenous
EndogenousIndicator
EndogenousIndicator
EndogenousIndicator
EndogenousIndicator
EndogenousIndicator
EndogenousIndicator
EndogenousIndicator
EndogenousIndicator
EndogenousIndicator
EndogenousIndicator

Variable
Community Resilience
Leadership support from the state emergency management
practitioner(s)
Leadership support from surrounding local emergency
management practitioner(s)

Measurement Type
Latent

Data Type

Measurable

Ordinal

Measurable

Ordinal

Trust with the community

Measurable

Ordinal

Measurable

Ordinal

Measurable

Ordinal

Conducting routine needs assessments

Measurable

Ordinal

Conducting comprehensive vulnerability assessments

Measurable

Ordinal

Measurable

Ordinal

Measurable

Ordinal

Measurable

Ordinal

Measurable

Ordinal

Measurable

Ordinal

Providing emergency management training and certification
opportunities for administrators
Conducting routine assessments to update plans and
procedures

Endogenous
EndogenousIndicator

Collaborating with community partners for support,
expertise, etc.
Personally, participating in training and certification
opportunities focused on emergency management
In the absence of a crisis, sustaining relationships with other
organizations
In the absence of a crisis, being involved in collaborative
strategies (such as exercises, and meetings) with
organizations you collaborate with during a crisis
Crisis Communication Strategies
My department is mainly responsible for creating crisis
communication plans and strategies

EndogenousIndicator

My department exercises crisis communication strategies
regularly

EndogenousIndicator
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Ordinal
Measurable

Code
Q3
Q4
Q5
Q6
Q7
Q8
Q9
Q10
Q11
Q12
3
Q13
Q14
Q15
Q16
Q17

Attribute
EndogenousIndicator
EndogenousIndicator
EndogenousIndicator
EndogenousIndicator
EndogenousIndicator
EndogenousIndicator
EndogenousIndicator
EndogenousIndicator
EndogenousIndicator
EndogenousIndicator
Exogenous
ExogenousIndicator
ExogenousIndicator
ExogenousIndicator
ExogenousIndicator

Variable
My department exercises crisis communication strategies
with community partners
My department focuses on information sharing between
different community departments

Measurement Type

Data Type

Measurable

Ordinal

Measurable

Ordinal

My department markets our plans on our websites

Measurable

Ordinal

My department markets our plans on other community
partner’s websites

Measurable

Ordinal

My department markets our plans on flyers and posters

Measurable

Ordinal

My department markets our plans via social media

Measurable

Ordinal

Measurable

Ordinal

Measurable

Ordinal

Measurable

Ordinal

Measurable

Ordinal

ExogenousIndicator

My department provides community outreach campaigns for
vulnerable populations

My department provides updated information at least every
hour during the event
My department provides updated information at least once
every three hours during the event
My department assesses our crisis communication plan at
least once a year
My department assesses our crisis communication plan with
community partners
Local Community Needs
My department has a positive relationship with the
community
My department identifies what is most important for the
community to know
My department provides tailored messages for different
cultures within the community
My department provides communications in different
languages for the community
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Latent
Measurable

Ordinal

Measurable

Ordinal

Measurable

Ordinal

Measurable

Ordinal
Ordinal

Measurable

Code
Q18
Q19
Q20
Q21
Q22
4
Q23
Q24
Q25

Attribute
ExogenousIndicator
ExogenousIndicator
ExogenousIndicator
ExogenousIndicator
ExogenousIndicator
ExogenousExogenousIndicator
ExogenousIndicator
ExogenousIndicator

Variable
My department uses (easy-to-understand) language to
explain what is going on
My department uses visual images such as maps to help
explain what is going on
My department identifies the most important topics and
highlights these in communication
My department uses a spokesperson with whom the
community is familiar
My department includes specific action to be taken by the
community in each warning message
Crisis Type

Measurement Type

Data Type

Measurable

Ordinal

Measurable

Ordinal

Measurable

Ordinal

Measurable

Ordinal

Measurable

Ordinal

My department adapts information for natural disasters

Measurable

Ordinal

My department adapts information for health concerns

Measurable

Ordinal

My department adapts information for community violence

Measurable

Ordinal

73

Latent

The hypothesized relationship between all variables is illustrated in the full model of
Figure 10.

Figure 10. Covariance Structure Model.
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3.5 Data Analysis
In terms of statistical analysis, the researcher utilized parametric tests as they transition
characteristics into interval values analyzed via statistical analysis within IBM SPSS Statistics
for Windows, version 22, software and Amos Graphics, version 24. Descriptive analysis via
SPSS provided a better understanding of the data in terms of frequencies, normality of indicators,
and correlation analyses. Correlation analysis was critical as highly correlated indicators lessen
the ability to determine effects between independent and dependent variables. Therefore, this
study imposed a correlation threshold of .85 (Weston & Gore, 2006).
In addition, Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) examined the relationships between
variables and focused on the strength of the relationships as well as the significance of them
through tests of model fit and individual parameter estimates (Arbuckle & Wothke, 2012;
Kaplan, 2001; Kline, 2015; Weston & Gore, 2006). This analysis was also chosen as the study’s
variables are considered latent and are indirectly measured from other observed variables.
Moreover, SEM allows for simultaneous comparison of regression coefficients, means, and
variances. The last feature was the added ability to visually create a unifying framework
(Arbuckle & Wothke, 2012; Kaplan, 2001; Kline, 2015; Weston & Gore, 2006).
As previously mentioned, the qualitative data analysis consists of reading, describing,
classifying, interpreting, and visualizing data. For the open-ended questions, the data was
reviewed to determine specific codes. A code is a short phrase or word “that symbolically
assigns a summative, salient, essence-capturing, and/or evocative attribute for a portion of
language based or visual data” (Saldaña, 2015, p. 4). More specifically, axial coding was utilized
as it aims to highlight core concepts that surface within the study (Boyatzis, 1998). Axial coding
connects to Boyatzis’ (1998) discussion of thematic analysis and codes as a way to translate
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patterns into a common language of sorts. The emphasis is on distinguishing relationships
between the concepts and categories. For instance, the transcripts of the semi-structured
interviews and responses to the open-ended questions are analyzed for their connection to the
concepts of crisis communication strategies, local community needs, and crisis types. Within
these core concepts, there are categories that surfaced to expand these concepts. The expansion is
discussed in Chapter 4 and 5 in terms of their relevance and implications.
Not only does thematic analysis and coding allow for qualitative researchers to speak
amongst each other, but it also allows for quantitative analysis and adds to the validity of
discovered themes. The qualitative methods complement the findings of this study and identified
areas that may need further research in future studies. The perceptions were analyzed in
conjunction with the BRIC scores for comparable counties within the emergency manager’s
state. This lends itself to a stream of analysis activity considered conclusion drawing and
verification where the researcher holds onto patterns, explanations, and propositions until the
data can verify (Miles & Huberman, 1994).

3.6 Researcher Bias
Due to the inclusion of qualitative analysis, it is essential to disclose any preconceived notions or
assumptions on behalf of the researcher from before the study's survey period. This section came
about as one preconceived notion surfaced during the survey distribution period. It was assumed
each county in the United States would have a full-time emergency manager. However, the
creation of a distribution listserv made it apparent that each county does not have an emergency
manager and even fewer have those dedicated to the role full-time.
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Additional assumptions the researcher made before analyzing the data includes the
consistency of knowledge for each emergency manager and decision-making capabilities when it
comes to policies and procedures. Likewise, the researcher assumed emergency managers
experienced formal training aside from the certifications available from the Federal Emergency
Management Agency to supplement any practical experience. More specifically, the researcher
assumes respondents are knowledgeable of crisis communication strategies and are responsible
for their inclusion in emergency management related activities.

3.7 Confirmatory Factor Analysis
SEM incorporates measurement models for each latent variable as well as a covariance structural
model. For each model, it is important to conduct a confirmatory process. This is accomplished
through Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) (Arbuckle & Wothke, 2012; Kaplan, 2001; Weston
& Gore, 2006). CFA assists in explaining variation and covariation within and between
indicators of the latent variables. This process begins with examining factor loadings for
statistical significance. If the factor loadings indicate statistical significance at the .05 level and
critical values are larger than 1.96, then they were retained in the model.
The next step is to review the Goodness of Fit statistics. Similar to determinations of
sample size, there are a range of statistics that determine fit (Kline, 2015). According to Kline
(2015), evaluating model fit is done through the indexes and related criterion listed in Table 13.
If the model is determined to fit, then it is considered valid and adequately fits the data.
However, if there are issues with achieving the proposed criterion, then Modification Indices are
examined to denote correlations between measurement errors and potential adaptations that
improve the model’s fit. This area is to be accompanied with an examination of the theoretical
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and conceptual foundation for the model as changes should only be made if they maintain logical
consistency.

Table 13. Goodness of Fit Indexes and Criterion.
Index
Chi-square (x2)
Degrees of Freedom (df)
Significance of Model (p)
Likelihood Ratio (x2 / df)
Goodness of Fit Index (GFI)
Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI)
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA)

Criterion
Low
>0
< .05
<4
> 0.9
> 0.9
< 0.05; 0.08

In terms of overall model fit and goodness of fit statistics, the process is similar to
validation of each latent variable measurement model. The path coefficients are examined for
statistical significance at the .05 level followed by a review of critical values to be larger than
1.96 and a review of goodness of fit statistics (Bentler, 1990; Kenny, 2014). In terms of these
statistics, Chi-square is called a discrepancy function and determines how closely a model
conforms to observed data. Degrees of Freedom relates to the number of observations in a data
set that are able to vary within estimated statistical parameters. The Likelihood Ratio is
calculated by the Chi-square value divided by Degrees of Freedom and is part of the foundation
for the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), which counter-balances the Chisquare statistic to help determine model fit through analysis of the hypothesized model and
population covariance matrix. Likelihood Ratio is set to less than 4 as this ratio determines the
probability of the data within the parameter estimates. The Goodness of Fit Index (GFI)
measures the hypothesized model against the observed covariance matrix and the Adjusted
Goodness of Fit (AGFI) provides a semblance of correction as GFI is influenced by the number
of indicators per latent variable. MacCallum, Browne, and Sugawara (1996) generated a range
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for RMSEA from .01, .05, and.08 to denote excellent, good, and adequate with a suggested
cutoff of .10 for poor fitting models.

3.8 Human Subjects
This study adheres to research guidelines to ensure respondents remain anonymous. Approval
was given by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of the University of Central Florida. The
documentation is presented in Appendix C.

3.9 Summary of the Chapter
This chapter discussed the study’s research design, sampling method, data collection process,
and connections between key variables and the survey instrument. The measurement models for
crisis type, local community needs, crisis communication strategies, and community resilience
were illustrated along with the covariance structure model. Lastly, the validation processes were
discussed before closing with acknowledging the approval received by the University of Central
Florida’s Institutional Review Board. The next chapter presents the results of the analysis and
presents key findings.
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CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS
This chapter presents the results of quantitative and qualitative analysis. First, the survey sample
is discussed with descriptive statistics. Next, all variables included in the Structural Equation
Model (SEM) are examined and their descriptive statistics are presented. Then, the data is
analyzed for potential violations of the assumptions related to SEM in terms of sample size,
complete data, multicollinearity, normality, and model identification. Once confirmatory factor
analysis (CFA) and Cronbach’s alpha is analyzed for model validation and reliability, then the
measurement models are analyzed. The quantitative analysis section closes with results of the
tested hypotheses. The qualitative analysis section begins with a review of responses to the openended questions within the survey. Next, the results from analysis of transcripts from the seven
semi-structured interviews are discussed.

4.1 Quantitative Analysis

4.1.1 Sample Size and Response Rate
The survey invitation and response period began on July 13, 2017, with reminders sent on July
27, 2017, August 10, 2017, and August 18, 2017. The official closing date of the survey was
August 31, 2017. The initial survey was sent to 2,073 county level emergency managers. Issues
arose during distribution as many counties do not have a full-time, emergency manager or the
survey period occurred during high incident periods for coastal states. The total responses were
198, but initial analysis of the results led to 171 usable responses adequate for SEM analysis.
The number of responses appears low, but many unanticipated factors surfaced and led
the researcher to question initial assumptions or biases. For instance, the researcher believed
each county would have a full-time, emergency manager resulting in a population totaling 3,142
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county and county-equivalents (i.e., parishes, boroughs, special districts); however, the creation
of the distribution listserv resulted in the population lowering to approximately 2,073. In
addition, some respondents stated how their state did not have designated emergency
management practitioners for all counties aside from related duties falling to lead administrators.
Moreover, the data collection period occurred during a busy time period due to delay in the
Institutional Review Board process.

4.1.2 Sample Representativeness
Within the 171 respondents, 39 out of 50 states were represented with Texas comprising the
largest at 12 (7%). The second largest group was Florida at 11 (6%) and Missouri at 10 (5%). Six
states only had one respondent while the majority had an average of 4 respondents. The full list
of states and percentages is listed in Appendix E. In terms of county and equivalents type, 132
(77%) identified themselves as Rural, while 20 (12%) designated Urban and 19 (11%) as Other.
If they noted other, they provided their own definition that mixed and combined urban, suburban,
and rural. A cross-tabulation is in Appendix E between states and county and equivalents types.
In terms of the respondents themselves, 114 (67%) were male, 41 (24%) were female,
and 16 (9%) did not respond. As for age, the largest group was 56 or older with 73 (43%)
followed by those 46 to 55 at 49 (29%), 36 to 45 at 21 (12%), 35 or Younger at 11 (6%), and did
not answer at 17 (10%). In terms of highest degree earned by the respondent, 47 (28%) hold a
bachelor’s degree, 32 (19%) have trade/vocational/technical training, 31 (18%) hold a Master’s
degree, 25 (15%) hold an Associate degree, 14 (8%) hold a high school diploma or equivalent, 5
(3%) hold a Doctorate, and 17 (10%) did not answer. For those who denoted the field of their
highest degree, 71 (42%) selected other, 36 (21%) for Emergency Management, 15 (9%)
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Business Administration, 13 (8%) Public Administration, 5 (3%) Political Science, 4 (2%)
Engineering, 1 for Sociology and 26 (15%) did not answer.
To gain more context as to the lens in which these respondents are answering from, the
survey included questions relating to their department and the number of full-time employees as
well as how recently they experienced certain crisis types. The overwhelming majority (122,
71%) of respondents noted they have 1 to 5 full-time employees, followed by 19 (11%) stating 6
to 15, 7 (4%) with 26 to 50, 4 (3%) 16 to 25, 3 (2%) 51 or more, and 16 (9%) did not answer. As
for the crisis types, the study narrowed its focus to natural disasters, health epidemics, and
community violence. In Table 14 below, a cross-tabulation is presented with the crisis type as
well as the survey selections of 1 to 3 years, 4 to 6 years, 7 to 10 years, 11 or more years, not
applicable, and did not answer.

Table 14. Years since Experiencing Crisis by Type.
Earthquake
Fre.
28

Per.
16.4

Tornado
Fre.
81

Per.
47.4

1 to 3
Years
4 to 6
15
8.8
30
17.5
Years
7 to 10
8
4.7
20
11.7
Years
11 or
36
21.1 29
17.0
More
Years
Not
82
48.0 11
6.4
Applicable
Did not
2
1.2
0
0
answer
Note: Fre.=Frequency; Per.=Percent.

Flood
Fre.
117

Per.
68.4

Fre.
19

Per.
11.1

Health
Epidemic
Fre. Per.
26
15.2

29

17.0

13

7.6

20

11.7

7

4.1

14

8.2

12

7.0

23

13.5

6

3.5

8

4.7

10

5.8

35

20.5

40

23.4

3

1.8

115

67.3

65

38.0

77

45.0

0

0

2

1.2

2

1.2

3

1.8
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Hurricane

Community
Violence
Fre. Per.
38
22.2

After reviewing the information on sample representativeness, the average respondent is
a male, 56 or older from a rural county with either a bachelor’s degree or trade/ vocational/
technical training. This respondent would come from the Southeast and work in a department
with 1 to 5 employees. Moreover, within the past 1 to 3 years they experienced tornadoes and
floods. Expanding to 4 to 10 years, they also experienced hurricanes and health epidemics.
Lastly, if expanding for more than 11 years then they may have experienced community
violence. Although this is not the lens that each respondent is incorporating when responding to
the survey, it may be relevant once all the data is analyzed.
In terms of the semi-structured interviews, seven individuals responded to the
opportunity. Six of the seven were male with one being female. Five of the respondents
considered their counties to be rural, 1 deemed it frontier, and 1 was considered mixed. In terms
of describing their experience, 3 entered their position from previous employment in military or
police operations and 4 came from emergency management programs or the emergency
management institute. The seven states represented by the respondents include: Florida,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, South Dakota, Texas, and Wyoming. To maintain anonymity
of the respondents, their names were changed. In addition, no further information is provided
without jeopardizing their true identity.

4.1.3 Data Completeness, Normality, and Multicollinearity
In reviewing the usable responses, missing data was the first aspect reviewed. After calculating
case summaries in SPSS, it was determined that any missing values were random and did not
encroach a 5% threshold. Due to this, the missing values were determined to be suitable for
imputation using maximum likelihood estimated values. This method is appropriate as the
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estimated values of each parameter were reviewed to determine what most likely would have
resulted in the observed data. The estimated values are appropriate as they did not suppress the
variance structure within the data and present unbiased parameter estimates along with their
standard errors (Allison, 2000; Hox, 1999; Schafer, 1999; Scheffer, 2002).
An additional component of the initial analysis was to determine normality of the data.
Multivariate normality was examined via skewness and kurtosis of the observed indicator
distributions. According to Weston and Gore (2006), the skewness values should be lower than
3.0 and the kurtosis index should have a value lower than 10. It should be noted the data is
ordinal and perfect normality is not achievable. After examination of these values, the data was
determined to fall within the accepted range of parameters and the values are provided in
Appendix D.
The next aspect to consider is multicollinearity. As previously discussed, the threshold
was set at .85 for determining whether the correlation is too high. To assist in this portion of the
analysis, Spearman’s rank order correlation was used due to the ordinal data (Pallant, 2013).
After reviewing the correlation matrixes, a few adjustments were made to the measurement
models and these results are presented in Appendix F.
In terms of the indicators for the latent construct Crisis Communication Strategies, none
of the indicators crossed the threshold of .85 indicating there is no multicollinearity present. The
coefficients were as low as .095 to the highest value of .713. The lowest correlations were
between My department exercises crisis communication strategies regularly (Q2) and My
department exercises crisis communication strategies with community partners (Q6). The
highest correlation between My department exercises crisis communication strategies regularly
(Q2) and My department markets our plans on other community partner’s websites (Q3).
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Another interesting result regarding correlations were those that were not statistically significant,
such as:
•

My department is mainly responsible for creating crisis communication plans and
strategies (Q1) and My department provides updated information at least every hour
during the event (Q9).

•

My department exercises crisis communication strategies regularly (Q2) and My
department exercises crisis communication strategies with community partners (Q6).

•

My department focuses on information sharing between different community departments
(Q4) and My department provides updated information at least every hour during the
event (Q9).
After reviewing the level of statistical and conceptual foundation, the indicators of My

department exercises crisis communication strategies with community partners (Q6) and My
department provides updated information at least every hour during the event (Q9) were
removed. The remaining indicators were kept in the measurement model due to connection to the
theoretical and conceptual foundation and since they achieved statistical significance at the .05
level in terms of their correlation coefficients.
Review of the indicators for the latent construct Local Community Needs, none of the
indicators crossed the threshold of .85 indicating there is no multicollinearity present. The
coefficients were as low as .030 to the highest value of .769. The lowest correlation was between
My department has a positive relationship with the community (Q13) and My department
provides communications in different languages for the community (Q16). The highest
correlation between My department uses (easy-to-understand) language to explain what is going
on (Q18) and My department identifies the most important topics and highlights these in
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communication (Q20). Another interesting result regarding correlations were those that were not
statistically significant, such as:
•

My department has a positive relationship with the community (Q13) and My department
provides communications in different languages for the community (Q16).

•

My department provides communications in different languages for the community (Q16)
and My department identifies the most important topics and highlights these in
communication (Q20).

•

My department provides communications in different languages for the community (Q16)
and My department includes specific action to be taken by the community in each
warning message (Q22).
After reviewing the level of statistical and conceptual foundation, the indicator of My

department provides communications in different languages for the community (Q16) was
removed. The remaining indicators were kept in the measurement model due to connection to the
theoretical and conceptual foundation and since they achieved statistical significance at the .05
level in terms of their correlation coefficients.
Review of the indicators for the latent construct Crisis Type, none of the indicators
crossed the threshold of .85 indicating there is no multicollinearity present. The coefficients were
as low as .431 to the highest value of .588. The lowest correlation was between My department
adapts information for natural disasters (Q23) and My department adapts information for
community violence (Q25). The highest correlation between My department adapts information
for health concerns (Q24) and My department adapts information for community violence (Q25).
All of the indicators were kept in the measurement model since they achieved statistical
significance at the .05 level in terms of their correlation coefficients.
86

Review of the indicators for the latent construct Community Resilience, none of the
indicators crossed the threshold of .85 indicating there is no multicollinearity present. The
coefficients were as low as .205 to the highest value of .823. The lowest correlation was between
Leadership support from the state emergency management practitioner(s) (Q26) and
Collaborating with community partners for support, expertise, etc. (Q33). The highest
correlation between Conducting routine needs assessments (Q31) and Conducting
comprehensive vulnerability assessments (Q32). All of the indicators were kept in the
measurement model since they achieved statistical significance at the .05 level in terms of their
correlation coefficients.

4.2 Confirmatory Factor Analysis
In the next section, the measurement models for all latent constructs are examined through CFA.
As previously discussed, CFA tests the goodness of fit.

4.2.1 Crisis Communication Strategies
The proposed model (hereafter referred to as generic model) of Crisis Communication Strategies
contained 12 indicators. Results of multicollinearity analysis led to the indicators of My
department exercises crisis communication strategies with community partners (Q6) and My
department provides updated information at least every hour during the event (Q9) being
removed. After the indicators were removed, the measurement model was tested (see Figure 11).
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Figure 11. Crisis Communication Strategies Measurement Model after Multicollinearity
Modifications.

To determine the validity of the measurement model, factor loadings were examined to
determine if the critical values of the indicators were larger than 1.96 and statistically significant
at the 0.05 level. These values are presented in Table 15. This is followed by reviewing goodness
of fit statistics. For Crisis Communication Strategies, the indicators adhere to the threshold for
critical value and statistical significance; however, the goodness of fit statistics indicate
otherwise due to the high Likelihood Ratio, low GFI, low AGFI, and high RMSEA scores as
presented in Table 16. As shown in Table 16, the Chi-square statistics dropped from 226.944 to
38.702, the Likelihood Ratio dropped from 6.484 to 1.548, GFI increased from .775 to .953,
AGFI increased from .646 to .915, and the RMSEA decreased from .180 to .057.
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Table 15. Parameter Estimates for Crisis Communication Strategies.

Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q5
Q7
Q8
Q10
Q11
Q12
d2 <-> d3
d5 <-> d8

Generic Model
USRW SRW
S.E.
1.000 .472
1.278 .675
.232
1.283 .762
.221
.615
.429
.144
.857
.366
.225
.955
.389
.240
.911
.347
.249
1.076 .498
.229
1.503 .697
.269
1.364 .782
.233

C.R.

P

5.516
5.797
4.261
3.809
3.983
3.658
4.692
5.591
5.849

***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***

USRW
1.000
1.212
1.278
.675
.761

Revised Model
SRW S.E. C.R.
.425
.576 .254 4.779
.684 .255 5.015
.423 .170 3.963
.292 .246 3.087

.721
1.214
1.814
1.649
.200
.721

.247
.505
.757
.851
.471
.566

.266
.280
.356
.321
.043
.114

2.711
4.332
5.093
5.138
6.654
6.308

P
***
***
***
.002
.007
***
***
***
***
***

Note: URW= Unstandardized Regression Weight; SRW= Standardized Regression Weight; S.E.=
Standard Error; C.R.= Critical Ratio; ***=Correlation is significant at the .01 level.

Table 16. Goodness of Fit Statistics for Crisis Communication Strategies.
Index
Chi-square (x2)
Degrees of Freedom (df)
Significance of Model (p)
Likelihood Ratio (x2 / df)
Goodness of Fit Index (GFI)
Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI)
Root Mean Square Error of
Approximation (RMSEA)

Criterion
Low
>0
< .05
<4
> 0.9
> 0.9
< 0.05;
0.08

Generic Model
226.944
35
.000
6.484
.775
.646
.180

Revised Model
38.702
25
.039
1.548
.953
.915
.057

To determine necessary adjustments, modification indices were reviewed, and the
theoretical, conceptual foundation of the study was referred to. The modification indices were
reviewed for any parameter whose estimate was significantly above the threshold of 10 or whose
potential impact warranted removal. The resulting measurement model is depicted in Figure 12
below with added correlational indicators between specific error terms and removal of indicator
My department markets our plans on flyers and posters (Q7).
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Figure 12. Revised Crisis Communication Strategies Measurement Model with Standardized
Estimates.

Another crisis communication strategy related question within the survey corresponds to
the avenue in which information is disseminated. The respondents were asked to rank the
importance of a multitude of avenues and the results are in Table 17. Analyzing the table results,
the avenues of Social Network (89), Text Messaging System (88), Telephone (86), National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Association (84), Commercial Radio Station (81), and Local
Television Stations (80) represent the avenues deemed Very Important with stark contrast in
frequency for Distributing Flyers (15) and Electronic Signage (27). If the designations of Very
Important and Important were merged together, then the results change rather significantly. The
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top avenues then include Telephone (161), Social Networking (158), Text Messaging System
(156), Commercial Radio Station (153), and Press Conferences (151). The differences between
higher and lower designations are not contrasted than in Very Important. However, the ones
achieving a lower score stayed the same with Distributing Flyers (88) and Electronic Signage
(95).
Due to the lower designations, an assumption could be made that Distributing Flyers and
Electronic Signage are unimportant. Yet, the column of Don’t Know/Can’t Say illustrates that
Distributing Flyers (45) and Electronic Signage (46) are closely connected and just may be
underutilized or not available. However, Distributing Flyers did receive ample responses in the
Unimportant category (25) in comparison to the remaining avenues. The last interesting result is
Local Television Stations received 0 in the Unimportant column. This was the only avenue that
no one connected it to lack of importance.
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Table 17. Importance of Communication Avenues.
Very Important
Telephone
National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Association
Email
Social Networking
Text Messaging System
Commercial Radio Stations
Local Television Stations
Outdoor Warning Sirens
Distributing Flyers
Community Website
Daily Situation Reports
Press Conferences
Electronic Signage

Fre.
Per.
Fre.
Per.
Fre.
Per.
Fre.
Per.
Fre.
Per.
Fre.
Per.
Fre.
Per.
Fre.
Per.
Fre.
Per.
Fre.
Per.
Fre.
Per.
Fre.
Per.
Fre.
Per.

86
50.3
84
49.1
61
35.7
89
52
88
51.5
81
47.4
80
46.8
54
31.6
15
8.8
40
23.4
33
19.3
61
35.7
27
15.8

Note: Fre.=Frequency; Per.=Percent
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Don’t Know/
Can’t Say

Important
75
43.9
59
34.5
82
48
69
40.4
68
39.8
72
42.1
67
39.2
60
35.1
73
42.7
78
45.6
80
46.8
90
52.6
68
39.8

1
0.6
18
10.5
15
8.8
8
4.7
6
3.5
11
6.4
5
2.9
16
9.4
45
26.3
29
17
34
19.9
12
7
46
26.9

Unimportant
6
3.5
4
2.3
12
7
3
1.8
5
2.9
4
2.3
0
0
8
4.7
25
14.6
9
5.3
13
7.6
5
2.9
9
5.3

Not Applicable
3
1.8
6
3.5
1
0.6
2
1.2
4
2.3
3
1.8
19
11.1
33
19.3
13
7.6
15
8.9
11
6.4
3
1.8
21
12.3

4.2.2 Local Community Needs
The generic model of Local Community Needs contained 10 indicators. Results of
multicollinearity analysis led to the indicator of My department provides communications in
different languages for the community (Q16) being removed. After the indicator was removed,
the measurement model was tested (see Figure 13).

Figure 13. Local Community Needs Measurement Model after Multicollinearity Modifications.

To determine the validity of the measurement model, factor loadings were examined to
determine if the critical values of the indicators were larger than 1.96 and statistically significant
at the 0.05 level. These values are presented in Table 18. This is followed by reviewing goodness
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of fit statistics. For Local Community Needs, the indicators adhere to the threshold for critical
value and statistical significance; however, the goodness of fit statistics indicate otherwise due to
the slightly high Likelihood Ratio, slightly low GFI, low AGFI, and high RMSEA scores as
presented in Table 19. As shown in Table 19, the Chi-square statistics dropped from 106.267 to
29.184, the Likelihood Ratio dropped from 3.936 to 1.717, GFI increased from .875 to .958,
AGFI increased from .792 to .912, and the RMSEA decreased from .131 to .065.

Table 18. Parameter Estimates for Local Community Needs.

Q13
Q14
Q15
Q17
Q18
Q19
Q20
Q21
Q22
d13 <-> d14
d17 <-> d19
d18 <-> d19

Generic Model
USRW SRW
S.E.
1.000 .502
1.427 .577
.262
1.230 .393
.293
1.699 .569
.314
1.778 .829
.273
1.928 .712
.316
1.894 .779
.298
1.695 .528
.329
1.641 .660
.279

C.R.

P

5.451
4.194
5.404
6.515
6.104
6.357
5.159
5.872

***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***

USRW
1.000
1.461

Revised Model
SRW S.E. C.R. P
.495
.584 .238 6.139 ***

1.498
1.754
1.710
1.976
1.772
1.726
.069
.190
.062

.495
.807
.628
.802
.545
.685
.248
.436
.292

.311
.284
.312
.320
.347
.299
.024
.037
.021

4.811
6.181
5.481
6.171
5.107
5.780
2.865
5.086
3.029

Note: URW= Unstandardized Regression Weight; SRW= Standardized Regression Weight; S.E.=
Standard Error; C.R.= Critical Ratio; ***=Correlation is significant at the .01 level.

Table 19. Goodness of Fit Statistics for Local Community Needs.
Index
Chi-square (x2)
Degrees of Freedom (df)
Significance of Model (p)
Likelihood Ratio (x2 / df)
Goodness of Fit Index (GFI)
Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI)
Root Mean Square Error of
Approximation (RMSEA)

Criterion
Low
>0
> .05
<4
> 0.9
> 0.9
< 0.05;
0.08
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Generic Model
106.267
27
.000
3.936
.875
.792
.131

Revised Model
29.184
17
.033
1.717
.958
.912
.065

***
***
***
***
***
***
.004
***
.002

To determine necessary adjustments, modification indices were reviewed, and the
theoretical, conceptual foundation of the study was referred to. The resulting measurement model
is depicted in Figure 14 below with added correlational indicators between specific error terms
and removal of indicator My department provides tailored messages for different cultures within
the community (Q15).

Figure 14. Revised Local Community Needs Measurement Model with Standardized Estimates.
4.2.3 Crisis Type
The generic model of Crisis Type contained 3 indicators. Results of multicollinearity analysis did
not lead to adjustments, so the measurement model was tested (see Figure 15).
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Figure 15. Crisis Type Measurement Model after Multicollinearity Analysis.

Due to the limited indicators for Crisis Type, factor loadings and goodness of fit statistics
could not be reviewed due to the limited indicators in this section of the model. Also,
significance could not be calculated. However, the theoretical and conceptual foundation for the
study led to the decision to keep the measurement model.

4.2.4 Community Resilience
The generic model of Community Resilience contained 10 indicators. Results of
multicollinearity analysis led to all indicators staying in the model. The measurement model was
then tested (see Figure 16).
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Figure 16. Community Resilience Measurement Model after Multicollinearity Modifications.

To determine the validity of the measurement model, factor loadings were examined to
determine if the critical values of the indicators were larger than 1.96 and statistically significant
at the 0.05 level. These values are presented in Table 20. This is followed by reviewing goodness
of fit statistics. For Community Resilience, the indicators adhere to the threshold for critical
value and statistical significance; however, the goodness of fit statistics indicate otherwise due to
the high Likelihood Ratio, low GFI, low AGFI, and high RMSEA scores as presented in Table
21. As shown in Table 21, the Chi-square statistics dropped from 297.903 to 33.730, the
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Likelihood Ratio dropped from 6.771 to 1.874, GFI increased from .733 to .954, AGFI increased
from .600 to .908, and the RMSEA decreased from .184 to .072.
Table 20. Parameter Estimates for Community Resilience.

Q26
Q27
Q28
Q29
Q30
Q31
Q32
Q33
Q34
Q35
Q36
e1 <-->e2
e6 <-> e7

Generic Model
USRW SRW
S.E.
1.000
.365
1.200
.533
.288
1.205
.753
.259
1.342
.590
.310
1.448
.762
.311
1.687
.820
.356
1.621
.777
.346
1.400
.765
.300
1.406
.761
.302
1.405
.776
.300
1.340
.780
.286

C.R.

P

4.174
4.649
4.332
4.661
4.738
4.683
4.667
4.661
4.681
4.687

***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***

USRW
1.000
1.337
1.339

Revised Model
SRW S.E. C.R. P
.337
.549 .319 4.188 ***
.772 .312 4.293 ***

1.642
1.524
1.554
1.513
1.584

.737
.675
.785
.757
.808

.396
.396
.370
.363
.375

4.150
4.067
4.201
4.172
4.223

.101
.126

.235
.668

.035
.021

2.856 .004
6.161 ***

***
***
***
***
***

Note: URW= Unstandardized Regression Weight; SRW= Standardized Regression Weight; S.E.=
Standard Error; C.R.= Critical Ratio; ***=Correlation is significant at the .01 level.

Table 21. Goodness of Fit Statistics for Community Resilience.
Index
Chi-square (x2)
Degrees of Freedom (df)
Significance of Model (p)
Likelihood Ratio (x2 / df)
Goodness of Fit Index (GFI)
Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI)
Root Mean Square Error of
Approximation (RMSEA)

Criterion
Low
>0
> .05
<4
> 0.9
> 0.9
< 0.05;
0.08

Generic Model
297.903
44
.000
6.771
.733
.600
.184

Revised Model
33.730
18
.014
1.874
.954
.908
.072

To determine necessary adjustments, modification indices were reviewed, and the
theoretical, conceptual foundation of the study was referred to. The resulting measurement model
is depicted in Figure 17 below with added correlational indicators between specific error terms
and removal of indicators Providing emergency management training and certification
opportunities for administrators (Q29), Conducting routine assessments to update plans and
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procedures (Q30), and In the absence of a crisis, being involved in collaborative strategies (such
as exercises, and meetings) with organizations you collaborate with during a crisis (Q36).

Figure 17. Revised Community Resilience Measurement Model with Standardized Estimates.
4.3 Reliability Analysis
To determine reliability, or internal consistency, the researcher ran Cronbach’s alpha test. This is
especially critical for this study as a standardized scale was not utilized. The test was conducted
for the generic and revised models before being reviewed to determine if the coefficients
achieved a value of .70 or higher (Gliem & Gliem, 2003; Pallant, 2013; Santos, 1999). The
values are presented in Table 22. After reviewing the results, all measurement models achieved a
score above .70 and are deemed reliable.

99

Table 22. Cronbach's alpha Values for Measurement Models.
Latent Variable
Crisis Communication Strategies
Local Community Needs
Crisis Types
Community Resilience
Full Model

Number of Indicators
Generic
Revised
10
9
9
8
3
3
11
8
33
28

Cronbach’s alpha ()
Generic
Revised
.810
.791
.839
.841
.744
.744
.903
.863
.782
.781

4.4 Model Summary and Analysis
In terms of the Covariance Structure Model contained all latent variables and their relevant
indicators. Results of multicollinearity analysis and goodness of fit statistics for each latent
variable led to the modification of the generic model. After the indicators were removed, controls
were added, and endogenous variables were given residual errors, the measurement model was
tested (see Figure 18). To determine the validity of the measurement model, factor loadings were
examined to determine if the critical values of the indicators were larger than 1.96 and
statistically significant at the 0.05 level. These values are presented in Table 23. This is followed
by reviewing goodness of fit statistics.
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Figure 18. Generic Covariance Structure Model.
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Table 23. Parameter Estimates for Covariance Structure Model.
Generic Model
USR
W
Crisis Communication Strategies <-> Crisis
.598
Type
Crisis Communication Strategies <-> Local
.554
Community Needs
Community Resilience <-> Crisis
-.288
Communication Strategies
Q26 <-> Community Resilience
1.000
Q27 <-> Community Resilience
1.308
Q28 <-> Community Resilience
1.312
Q31 <-> Community Resilience
1.608
Q32 <-> Community Resilience
1.495
Q33 <-> Community Resilience
1.080
Q34 <-> Community Resilience
1.493
Q35 <-> Community Resilience
1.555
Q1 <-> Crisis Communication Strategies
1.000
Q2 <-> Crisis Communication Strategies
1.156
Q3 <-> Crisis Communication Strategies
1.148
Q4 <-> Crisis Communication Strategies
.831
Q5 <-> Crisis Communication Strategies
.807
Q8 <-> Crisis Communication Strategies
.753
Q10 <-> Crisis Communication Strategies
1.214
Q11 <-> Crisis Communication Strategies
1.630
Q12 <-> Crisis Communication Strategies
1.396
Q13 <-> Local Community Needs
1.000
Q14 <-> Local Community Needs
1.419
Q17 <-> Local Community Needs
1.467
Q18 <-> Local Community Needs
1.708
Q19 <-> Local Community Needs
1.635
102

SRW

S.E.

C.R.

P

USRW

Revised Model
SRW S.E. C.R.

P

.559

.147

4.060

***

.560

.517

.150

3.728

***

.352

.179

3.092

.002

.527

.435

.159

3.324

***

-.464 .093

3.083

.002

-.246

-.451 .087

-2.824

.005

.299
.306
.378
.359
.238
.349
.359

4.376
4.292
4.248
4.162
4.544
4.279
4.329

***
***
***
***
***
***
***

3.962
3.812
3.780
3.719
3.814
4.043
3.836

***
***
***
***
***
***
***

4.957
5.215
4.824
3.458
2.991
4.749
5.439
5.550

***
***
***
***
.003
***
***
***

.202
.211
.242
.257
.264
.285
-

5.298
4.873
3.630
3.026
4.752
5.082
-

***
***
***
.002
***
***
-

.226
.297
.266
.292

6.268
4.942
6.416
5.593

***
***
***
***

.309
.550
.775
.778
.737
.676
.758
.810
.463
.558
.600
.367
.290
.569
.659
.544
.512
.840
.629

.368
.383
.472
.446
.439
.407
.450

.234
.220
.172
.233
.252
.256
.300
.252

1.000
1.458
1.459
1.784
1.658
1.674
1.647
1.725
1.000
1.069
1.030
.878
.778
1.255
1.450
1.000
1.136
1.341
1.262

.217
.193
.214

5.237
6.957
5.903

***
***
***

.344
.548
.774
.722
.737
.676
.763
.810
.452
.585
.653
.554
.330
.274
.537
.723
.766
.508
.582
.498
.806
.617

Generic Model
USR
W
Q20 <-> Local Community Needs
Q21 <-> Local Community Needs
Q22 <-> Local Community Needs
Q23 <-> Crisis Type
Q24 <-> Crisis Type
Q25 <-> Crisis Type
Local Community Needs <-> Crisis Type
d8 <-> d5
d3 <-> d2
d17 <-> d19
e2 <-> e1
e6 <-> e7
d13 <-> d14
d18 <-> d19
d2 <-> d1
e9 <-> e1

1.879
1.822
1.683
1.000
1.643
1.784
.062
.696
.208
.192
.099
.126
.067
.067

SRW

S.E.

C.R.

P

USRW

Revised Model
SRW S.E. C.R.

.783
.575
.686
.670
.742
.738
.514
.558
.477
.437
.230
.667
.240
.310

.296
.336
.282

6.344
5.414
5.968

***
***
***

.219
.238
.016
.112
.043
.037
.035
.020
.024
.020

7.516
7.496
3.872
6.228
4.887
5.166
2.810
6.180
2.794
3.315

***
***
***
***
***
***
.005
***
.005
***

1.437
1.301
1.000
1.615
1.754
.087
.674
.233
.190
.111
.126
.057
.144
.062

.794
.545
.677
.737
.734
.533
.551
.497
.438
.256
.668
.288
.221
.224

.210
.238
-

6.827
5.475
-

***
***
-

.217
.23
.022
.111
.046
.037
.035
.020
.021
.048
.023

7.454
7.437
4.039
6.062
5.080
5.076
3.203
6.179
2.727
3.013
2.663

***
***
***
***
***
***
.001
***
.006
.003
.008

Note: URW= Unstandardized Regression Weight; SRW= Standardized Regression Weight; S.E.= Standard Error; C.R.= Critical Ratio;
***=Correlation is significant at the .01 level.
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Table 24. Goodness of Fit Statistics for Covariance Structure Model.
Index
Chi-square (x2)
Degrees of Freedom (df)
Significance of Model (p)
Likelihood Ratio (x2 / df)
Goodness of Fit Index (GFI)
Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI)
Root Mean Square Error of
Approximation (RMSEA)
Tucker Lewis Index (TLI)
Comparative Fit Index (CFI)
Incremental Fit Index (IFI)

Criterion
Low
>0
> .05
<4
> 0.9
> 0.9
< 0.05

Generic Model
592.157
339
.000
1.747
.811
.774
.066

Revised Model
321.668
240
.000
1.340
.870
.837
.045

> 0.9
Value close to 1
> 0.9

.869
.883
.885

.945
.952
.953

For the Covariance Structure Model, the indicators adhere to the threshold for critical
value and statistical significance; however, the goodness of fit statistics indicate the model could
be improved as presented in Table 24. To determine necessary adjustments, modification indices
were reviewed, and the theoretical, conceptual foundation of the study was referred to. The
resulting measurement model is depicted in Figure 19 below with added correlational indicators
between specific error terms and removal of indicators: My department focuses on information
sharing between different community departments (Q4), My department assesses our crisis
communication plan with community partners (Q12), My department has a positive relationship
with the community (Q13), and My department includes specific action to be taken by the
community in each warning message (Q22).
After reviewing goodness of fit statistics once more, the researcher noted the GFI and
AGFI were still lower than the threshold; however, there are supplemental goodness of fit
statistics that support the conclusion that the model is a good fit. These statistics include the
Tucker Lewis Index (TLI), Comparative Fit Index (CFI), along with the Incremental Fit Index
(IFI) and are presented in Table 23. As shown in Table 23, the Chi-square statistics dropped from
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592.157 to 321.668, the Likelihood Ratio dropped from 1.747 to 1.340, GFI increased from .811
to .870, AGFI increased from .774 to .837, and the RMSEA decreased from .066 to .045. In
addition, TLI increased from .869 to .945, CFI increased from .883 to .952, and IFI increased
from .885 to 953.

Figure 19. Revised Covariance Structure Model with Standardized Estimates.
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After validating the model, the next step included reviewing the parameter estimates to
determine the importance of each predictor in relation to its latent variable. Referring to Table
25, the standardized regression weights were examined. For Crisis Communication Strategies,
the predictors with the highest significant influence included My department assesses our crisis
communication plan at least once a year (Q11) at .659, My department exercises crisis
communication strategies with community partners (Q3) at .600, and My department exercises
crisis communication strategies regularly (Q2) at .558. Local Community Needs was most
significantly impacted by My department uses (easy-to-understand) language to explain what is
going on (Q18) with .840 with the next being My department identifies the most important topics
and highlights these in communication (Q20), and the next having a noticeable difference at .629
My department uses visual images such as maps to help explain what is going on (Q19).
For Crisis Type, all three indicators were close in terms of importance with My
department adapts information for health concerns (Q24) at .737, My department adapts
information for community violence (Q25) at .734, and My department adapts information for
natural disasters (Q23) at .677. Community Resilience indicator In the absence of a crisis,
sustaining relationships with other organizations (Q35) was the highest at .810 with
Collaborating with community partners for support, expertise, etc. (Q33) at .778, Trust with the
community (Q28) at .775, Personally, participating in training and certification opportunities
focused on emergency management (Q34) at .758, and Conducting routine needs assessments
(Q31) at .737. In terms of mediating impact to Crisis Communication Strategies, Crisis Type was
higher in significance at .517 with Local Community Needs at .435.
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Table 25. Standardized Regression Weights for Parameters.
Parameters
Covariance
Structure Model
Community
Resilience

Crisis Communication Strategies <-> Crisis Type
Crisis Communication Strategies <-> Local Community Needs
Community Resilience <-> Crisis Communication Strategies
Q26- Leadership support from the state emergency management practitioner(s)
Q27- Leadership support from surrounding local emergency management practitioner(s)
Q28- Trust with the community

Q31- Conducting routine needs assessments
Q32- Conducting comprehensive vulnerability assessments
Q33- Collaborating with community partners for support, expertise, etc.
Q34- Personally, participating in training and certification opportunities focused on emergency
management
Q35- In the absence of a crisis, sustaining relationships with other organizations
Crisis
Communication
Strategies

Local
Community
Needs

Crisis Type

Q1- My department is mainly responsible for creating crisis communication plans and strategies
Q2- My department exercises crisis communication strategies regularly
Q3- My department exercises crisis communication strategies with community partners
Q5- My department markets our plans on our websites
Q8- My department markets our plans via social media
Q10- My department provides updated information at least once every three hours during the event
Q11- My department assesses our crisis communication plan at least once a year
Q14- My department identifies what is most important for the community to know
Q17- My department provides community outreach campaigns for vulnerable populations
Q18- My department uses (easy-to-understand) language to explain what is going on
Q19- My department uses visual images such as maps to help explain what is going on
Q20- My department identifies the most important topics and highlights these in communication
Q21- My department uses a spokesperson with whom the community is familiar
Q23- My department adapts information for natural disasters
Q24- My department adapts information for health concerns
Q25- My department adapts information for community violence
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Estimates
.517
.435
-.451
.309
.550
.775
.737
.676
.778
.758
.810
.463
.558
.600
.367
.290
.569
.659
.544
.512
.840
.629
.794
.545
.677
.737
.734

The final aspect considered was the percentage of variance, or R2, explained within the
model. For Crisis Communication Strategies, 70% (R2 = .696) of variation is attributed to its
predictors that incorporates indirect effects of Local Community Needs and Crisis Type. The
predictors for Community Resilience account for 20% (R2= .204) of its variation. In terms of
indirect effects of Crisis Type or Local Community Needs on Community Resilience. Local
Community Needs accounted for -20% (R2= -.196) of the variation whereas Crisis Type
accounted for -23% (R2= -.233). Thus, the model achieves a statistically significant level of fit
and is appropriate to analyze the relationships between Local Community Needs and Crisis Type
onto Crisis Communication Strategies, as well as the relationship between Crisis Communication
Strategies and Community Resilience. By understanding the variation, emergency managers and
decision-makers gain deeper understanding into how the indicators of each variable ultimately
impact the overall resilience of their communities.

4.5 Qualitative Analysis and Results
The following section incorporates analysis of the open-ended questions within the survey
followed by the transcripts of seven semi-structured interviews. The interviews were recorded
with consent and sent to a research transcriptionist to avoid initial analysis or bias by the
researcher. The resulting documents were analyzed via axial coding for the connections to crisis
communication strategies, local community needs, and crisis types as well as relationships
between and within.
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4.5.1 Open-Ended Survey Questions
The survey incorporated four open-ended questions. The first asked for the respondent to
describe their level of expertise. A total of 140 responses were analyzed and the patterns that
surfaced related to how they described the level (see Table 26).
Table 26. Expertise Level Coded Patterns.
Code
1

Definition
Level

2

Year

3

Simple Justification

4

Detailed Justification

Notes
Association with level variation
without justification
Justification connected to years in
the field, service, association, etc.
Level and/or Year with minimal
details
Level and/or Year with substantial
details
Total:

Frequency Percentage
44
32
36

26

41

30

17

12

138

100

For 32% of the responses (44), individuals simply stated a level they associate with their
expertise, such as high, above average, excellent, moderate, experienced, expert, fair, low, etc.
The answers were short and no explanation as to why they designated a certain level. The next
pattern was justification by stating years related to time in the field, certain positions served, or
related aspects. Therefore, the justification was equated to amount of years of experience. The
third pattern was a statement of simplified justification that mixed a level or year with added
details, such as the number of disaster declarations they experienced, certification or degree they
acquired, or a comment related to their areas of expertise. The fourth pattern consisted of
substantial detail meaning the respondent connected to Level or Year with multiple connections
to certifications, positions, certifications, degrees, etc.
The next survey question asked the respondents whether they wanted to share anything
else that is critical for crisis communication. There was a total of 81 responses to this question
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and four themes emerged relating to relationships, adaptation, capacity, and crisis
communication. In terms of relationship focused, there were a total of 18 (22%) that spoke to the
necessity for collaboration, stakeholder buy-in, training and exercises, teamwork, sustaining
relationships even after an event, and having relationships with a variety of public, private and
individuals. Moreover, there was an emphasis on understanding the role and responsibility of the
emergency manager position in general.
The theme of adaptation surfaced in 31 responses (38%). Adaptation related to the
necessity for integrating old and new communication technology, incorporating multiple
communication avenues, and utilizing social media. Other responses connected to adaptation
consisted of making sure messages are clear, dissemination to the appropriate individuals,
comprehensible to the audience, distributed in a timely manner, and acknowledged the need to
verify rumors. Regarding the theme of capacity, respondents (27%) spoke mostly about the need
to understand the county and equivalents’ abilities during an event as well as the capacity of the
ones they work with. In conjunction, an element of capacity linked to the emergency manager’s
knowledge of their community and its past, the incident command structure, and the technology
at their disposal. In addition, it falls onto the emergency manager to place responsibility on the
community itself and what actions they must take. The last theme was on crisis communication
as a concept as well as the need for its growth in the field. This became evident when 9
respondents (11%) indicated needs for clarity of terminology, even regarding the survey itself.
The next open-ended question allowed respondents to state if there was anything they felt
is critical to building community resilience. For this question, there were a similar 81 responses.
The themes emerging from the responses spanned characteristics, relationships and
communication, community approach, and overcoming obstacles. For characteristics (21%),
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some of the answers spoke to the traits of an emergency manager, such as trust, transparency,
consistency, perseverance, honesty, and competence.
For relationships and communication (26%), the responses focused on networking or
sustaining/generating relationships with involved stakeholders. The general aspect of
communication was discussed along with a focus on the whole community approach or a
community approach (42%) in general and the necessity for buy-in and relationships. Also, there
was a connection to community education and outreach programs. The last theme was
overcoming obstacles (20%). There were a number of obstacles listed, such as economics,
disconnects between emergency managers and their leadership, designation or understanding of
responsibility, accountability, traditional ideals of the emergency management role and attitude
towards response, planning disconnects, and overcoming apathy.
The last open-ended survey question asked the respondents if there were any reports or
documents they wanted to share that connected the concepts of crisis communication and
community resilience. Only 14 individuals responded aside from simply stating no and gave
specific sites to refer to:
•

After Action Reports

•

National Weather Service for preparedness on severe weather

•

Federal Emergency Management Agency

•

National Flood Insurance Program

•

Ready.gov

•

Incident Action Plans

•

Fire Adapted Communities

•

County website
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•

National Institute of Standards and Technology Technical Investigation of the May
22, 2011, Tornado in Joplin, Missouri

Reviewing the responses to the open-ended questions, it is interesting to note the
emphasis placed on adaptation for crisis communication. More specifically, the 38% of the
respondents who emphasized adaptation also made mention of how pivotal it is for crisis
communication to incorporate a clear, timely message that is sent to appropriate individuals and
is comprehended by those who receive the information. These findings support the literature and
confirm the importance of strategies for crisis communication especially as it impacts a
community's capacity, which was the second-highest ranking response.
In terms of capacity, the imperative connection comes to the knowledge base or expert
who is the decision maker. Without knowing all aspects of needs, the community cannot develop
its capacity. The last two themes focused on relationships and growth of crisis communication in
the field. These strategies are not fully known and have not infiltrated all disciplines connected to
emergency management practice. Seeing as how many respondents identified public relations, or
related departments, as the creator and implementers of crisis communication plans and the lack
of an emergency manager in every county holding decision-making responsibilities, it is not
surprising that these critical strategies are not well-known. Yet, the knowledge of these
variations leads to strategic efforts to disseminating the information and clarifying the concept in
its terminology and best practices for practitioners.
These efforts support the cause of positively developing community resilience. For the
majority of respondents, the whole community approach that echoes throughout the field and
guiding materials developed by FEMA and educational institutions supports community
resilience. The less popular variations of responses connected to characteristics of communities,
112

relationships, and overcoming obstacles. For characteristics and obstacles, these concepts are
connected as no county is alike and neither are their capabilities. The next step is to determine
the most impactful characteristic differences between counties to help increase resilience
nationwide through strategic goals and initiatives.

4.5.2 Emergency Manager's Perception of their Role and Responsibilities
To determine the lens by which the surveys were completed, one could deduce the average
respondent to be male, 56 or older, located in a rural county with a bachelor’s or
trade/vocational/technical training with 1 to 5 employees (more details are located in chapter 4).
Attempting to surmise an average level of experience, knowledge, skills, and abilities were more
difficult to undertake as 140 individuals ranged in providing justification by acknowledging the
years in the field, level of certifications received, variety of job placements, diverse threats faced,
etc. Some examples of those that justified their level of expertise through more simplistic
explanations include:
•

Over 30 years of experience with a State Level Emergency Management Certification.

•

21+ years of experience in EMA including multiple presidential declarations.

•

Entry level. My background has been working through local search and rescue teams and
the local RACES group.

•

I don't consider myself to be an expert at all. I have relationships and agreements with
other agencies and individuals who are experts in their respective fields. I can call upon
them when needed.
On the other hand, some respondents provided more detailed justifications including a

mix of years in the field, positions held, and threats faced, such as:
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My experience is a little above average for the size of my rural jurisdiction. Most
similar counties have invested little in hiring well qualified EM's. I came with 22
years of active duty with considerable background in using disasters to increase or
decrease the training experience for brigade level training exercises. I have also
completed a master’s in emergency management/homeland security as well as the
FEMA PDS and APS series of training.

I have experience in County Government, City Government, Law Enforcement,
Emergency Medical Services; I am Chief of a 80 person volunteer hazmat team
(we have 7 branches, two dive/water rescue teams and a multi-county EMS Strike
Team. I am an Emergency Management Director and have an AS Degree, BS
Degree & MS Degree. I am very active both on the Local, County and State
Government.

I served a total of 33 years as a police officer for a city of approximately 10,000.
The last 6 years I was the Public Information Officer for the city. I have been the
Emergency Management Director for [County] for 10 years. I earned my
Professional Emergency Manager (PEM) certification from the State of [Name
removed for anonymity purposes] and I earned my Associate Emergency
Manager (AEM) certification from the International Association of Emergency
Managers.
The variation in experience is important to note as the description of the individual's
qualifications does not change the fact that many, if not all, emergency managers are not the
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sought-after decision-maker within their county. Although some may have a direct connection to
the administrator who does have influence over policies and procedures, the majority are just
individuals who generate recommendations. This was a difficult reality to accept. The contrast in
expertise, as well as the realization that not every county even has a full-time staff member, led
to the question of: Are emergency managers valued? This question may seem harsh, but today's
time consists of increasing severity of natural disasters, community unrest, and the reality of
terrorist threats. Times have changed since the 1985 special symposium of public administration
and the integration of emergency management activities (Comfort, 1985; McGuire, Brudney, &
Gazley, 2010; Petak, 1985). We now must question whether these practitioners and experts are
being used to their full capability.
This line of thought also surfaced during the seven semi-structured interviews.
Interviewee North stated how their City Administrator is the individual with the decision-making
responsibilities and any presentation given about a situation or attempts to be proactive means
speaking to individuals such as police chief, fire chief, public safety director or public works
officer. They even noted how the lack of specific emergency manager in various departments has
led to the city administrator having the roles as part of their "Other duties as assigned."
Interviewee South echoed similar statement when describing their role as being a part of a
coordinating agency for local public safety-first responders. Interviewee East spoke to the unique
positioning of being a part of an independent county department with other emergency managers
falling under the organizational hierarchy of police or fire, health department, or 9-1-1 operators.
Interviewee West mentioned their role as emergency manager was only 85% of their job while
the rest was Veteran's Services and Interviewee NorthEast falls under the Board of County
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Commissioners but is privileged to have multiple staff members and a seat at the table with the
Chief Administrator who is responsible for decision making.
Interviewee SouthEast also deemed themselves lucky as they have a second staff member
and is one of four staff members overseen by their county's judge. Although they are not the ones
making the final decision, they felt as if their voice was well-regarded and their county judge
was an exception who understood the need for dedicated staff. The last interviewee, Central, was
even more unique in being a county emergency management coordinator who is the second
highest ranking individual in their state due to years of experience, yet they are not a state
employee. Interviewee Central jokingly stated: "We're always wondering what would happen if
the County Commissioner and the Governor said that 'You're gone' and the County
Commissioner said, 'No.'"
Despite the noted variations, there was an unspoken confidence emanating from each of
the respondents about their role and what they bring to the table. There was, however, a
noticeable wavering when the question of how they are perceived by other managers or
administrators. For some, it came down to the audible sighs or mention of professional
frustration they feel when encountering other practitioners who do not share the same focus on
community well-being. As one respondent stated: “It's like water dripping on a stone. Just gotta
stay at it consistently all the time. Eventually you'll notice you're making headway.”

4.5.3 Building Resilience and Adaptation
The question of value surfaced not only due to the diversity of the emergency managers and
differentiation of their state, but due to the diversity of the counties they described. The range of
experience was seen in responses to an open-ended question about community resilience, some
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of the answers spoke to the traits or characteristics of the emergency manager, such as trust,
transparency, consistency, perseverance, honesty, and competence. These traits were connected
to the concept of resilience as practitioners whose main focus is not on community well-being
leads to a lack of proactivity. This connects to the literature where community resilience is
agreed to be a multi-faceted beast and the knowledge, skills, and abilities of its public
administrators is critical (Boin & O’Connell, 2007; Clifford & Bourne, 2013; Comfort, 2007;
Cutter et al., 2008; Cutter et al., 2013; Cutter, Ash, & Emrich, 2014, 2015; Cutter, Burton, &
Emrich, 2010; Hu, Knox, & Kapucu, 2014; Kapucu, 2006; Kapucu & Van Wart, 2006; Liu, Guo,
& Nault, 2014; McEntire, 2007; Waugh & Streib, 2006). If leadership is unaware of their
county's capabilities, then it negatively impacts the ability to prepare, mitigate, response, and
recovery. Within the interviews, each manager spoke to the nuances of their county and was very
aware of the barriers they face in their position. For example, Interviewee East stated:
Well, I think, you're right in the statement that the counties are important. It's not
just because I'm at a county level but it's because we're the closest connection to
the actual affected population...[M]y north, south and eastern contiguous counties
are completely different than I am...[Y]ou either have a proactive EM or you
don't...[O]ut of my three neighbors, two of them, this is a retiring gig for them.
And so, there's not as much proactiveness...[T]here is no standardization because
every county's demographics are so unique...And then how one county does it is a
difference in another county...it's just harder to say, 'Oh, your county's not
resilient'...I think that's where the issue is and why there isn't much research or
much at the county level because you can't standard federally from State to State
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and you can have standards at the State level, kind of county to county. But at the
county level, what works here will not work 30 to 40 miles down the road.
The variation supports the need for adaptation of policies and procedures, especially
crisis communication strategies. One of the most critical adaptations is for crisis type. According
to previous literature and theoretical evaluation, crisis type has the most significant impact on
crisis communication strategies. Each crisis calls for different information to be disseminated,
actions to take, and stakeholders to engage. Theoretically, each crisis causes those impacted to
refer to previous experiences to determine whether they will respect local leader's warnings and
act accordingly (Birkland, 1996, 1997, 1998, 2006; Boin & McConnell, 2006; CDC, 2014a;
Coombs & Holladay, 2002; Sellnow & Seeger, 2013; Sylves, 2014; Ulmer, Sellnow, & Seeger,
2007, 2017; Walker, 2012).
Additional components critical for building community resilience included relationships
and communication, community approach, and overcoming obstacles. For relationships and
communication, the responses focused on networking or sustaining/generating relationships with
involved stakeholders. The general aspect of communication was discussed.
[J]ust communicating regularly to community groups will provide them with the
feeling of inclusion in your planning. Many at risk feel they are not included in
the plan when in fact they are.

All aspects of emergency management and public safety should be built around
communications. The aspects of planning, training, exercising, responding and
recovering from disasters and larger than normal emergencies are all ineffective
without consistent communications. Community resilience cannot be obtained
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without communicating the who, what, when, where, how and why effectively
before, during and after an event!!
An additional theme was the focus on the whole community approach or a community
approach in general and the necessity for buy-in and relationships. There was a connection to
community education and outreach programs. “Getting the community to understand that "yes, it
can happen here" is a struggle. This also is reflected in the amount of money the community
spends (or doesn't') on preparedness.”
Moreover, one of the interviewees made an interesting comment related to the use of
planning frameworks by FEMA: "I love looking at these response frameworks and all of those
and talking to people about these planning frameworks and how to use them; but they're just
general guidelines, you have to tailor them so much specifically to your community. Lots of
work."
There's no such thing as a cookie cutter. But from going from a tropical
depression to a Category 4 in 44 hours. We're used to the four to five-day kind of
freight train that kind of points at us. The [Event removed for anonymity
purposes] spin up and it's kind of the worst case scenario for us because really,
normally, something that we would take three days to get in motion - have our
evacuation hubs ready, our evacuation process set, something that would take us
three to four days to get really going and just thoroughly done, we did in three and
a half hours.
The theme of overcoming obstacles, such as economics, disconnects between emergency
managers and their leadership, designation or understanding of responsibility, accountability,
traditional ideals of the emergency management role and attitude towards response, planning
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disconnects, and overcoming apathy. “Building community resilience is an economic issue.
Funding to build infrastructure resilience is most difficult due to the overall economic conditions
of the state and county.”
Hold local elected officials accountable for their leadership, that's what they run
on and give them training. Then we will better understand each person’s role in
all areas of emergency and emergency communication will stop being the number
one issue on ever AAR improvement list.

Getting rid of old centric attitudes: It has never happened, we'll deal with it when
it does, I have a plan - but doesn't share it, which suggests there is no plan. Your
question about how many full-time employees does not include 0-part. My
position is a part time position only. There is no full-time EM program here.
The overcoming obstacles connection only adds support to the need to adapt crisis
communication strategies to local community needs as well as crisis type. This component is
also supported by previous literature especially in the arena of measuring resilience and the
county's capacity. Through the survey, several themes emerged when respondents were asked
about what they believe is critical for crisis communication. There were four themes that
emerged relating to relationships, adaptation, capacity, and crisis communication. In terms of
relationship focused, respondents spoke to the necessity for collaboration, stakeholder buy-in,
training and exercises, teamwork, sustaining relationships even after an event, and having
relationships with a variety of public, private and individuals and emphasized understanding the
role and responsibility of the emergency manager position in general. An example of the critical
nature of relationships is:
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I believe, as with any communication, the best thing an EM could do is built upon
their own personal "people skills". You must be able to relate to people, to foster
and build the relationships you need in emergency management. If the citizens
respect you, they will listen to your message and take the actions you are giving.
[W]orking toward collecting the political buy in and acceptance/understanding of
critical communications. Tearing down silos and beliefs that individual
departments or groups don't share information and will go it alone.

Speaking specifically to the role and responsibility, a respondent stated:
The first thing is County level Emergency Management is a Coach and
Coordinator, my office ‘supports’ local leadership. all disasters start and ‘remain’
in the control of local elected leadership. We train and coach, we never take the
leadership away from them nor do we let them fail. Any successful Emergency
Management department knows we're always in a supporting role. We also help
them write plans, but ownership must be from local government. If we run as your
survey as questions, then preparing for disaster and recover would be a disaster
itself. This survey puts the wrong perspective on the job of a emergency manager.
Studies like this give faults and dangerous results to government and school
leadership. Local leadership is "always" in charge of not only leadership but also
what and how the plan and training is done and to what standard. Were all to
ready to push off who is responsible to supporting agencies who are expert
resources. (Emphasis via quotation marks added by respondent)
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4.5.4 Challenge to Implementing Crisis Communication Strategies
The theme of adaptation not only connected to building a community's resilience capacity, but to
the concept of crisis communication. The responses ranged from the challenge of integrating old
and new communication technology, incorporating multiple communication avenues, and
utilizing social media. Other responses connected to adaptation consisted of making sure
messages are clear, dissemination to the appropriate individuals, comprehensible to the audience,
distributed in a timely manner, and acknowledged the need to verify rumors. These connections
support the literature and highlight how many initiatives to create a nationwide communication
system will always encounter challenges as decision-makers do not take into account county
variation (Birkland, 2006; Kapucu & Haupt, 2016; Kapucu, Haupt, & Yuksel, 2017; Rubin,
2007; Waugh & Streib, 2006). Speaking of communication technology, one example is:
Maximizing new technologies such as social media are essential to
communicating today. However, old analog radio continues to function with
social media and digital/wireless methods bog down under emergency situations.
Redundancy and legacy are vital. Many in my community have scanners. We
broadcast some warnings over pagers "to responders" because we know much of
the community will get the message quickly through that method.

And interviewee South reiterated this component as the biggest disconnect for their area:
Radio systems designed by manufacturers are typically designed with a 10-year
life cycle...and they stop manufacturing parts for the existing system. If they do
that after seven years, then there's a three-year time frame you have to buy.
Basically, you buy off the inventory of spare parts. Once they're gone, they're
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gone, once they quit making them...That is the biggest problem that we all face.
There is a huge disconnect between the price of technology today and the funding
that the local government agencies have. That's the number one.

Transitioning from the technological challenges, there are aspects promoted by the
respondents to keep in mind in terms of message dissemination and comprehension, one
respondent stated: “Do not overuse systems when crises don't exist- for PSA's, community
events, etc. This has a "numbing" effect on recipients.” Another wrote: “The community MUST
trust you and you MUST provide adequate and accurate information to them. Important that you
let them know that it is THEIR responsibility to respond to the information you provide, period.”
Another component related to policy-making is understanding funding streams. One of
the major challenges to emergency management on a general level is to obtain enough funding to
prepare for events. For many, the lack of acknowledging potential impact of an event is difficult
to substantiate the need for funds. Many rural counties are finding the funding streams to be
disproportionate and another difficult obstacle to overcome. For example:
Residents are always looking at maintaining what the property tax is. We're in the
same area where we really do our best to try to maintain our annual budget
request at zero. That's really not an increased based on-- except for [inaudible
00:17:35] cost of living line. We're in the same boat as many others, doing the
same things, doing as much as we can with what we have.

The majority of the country is rural. You don't have as many people, but you have
a large area that you have to cover, so I think more it's taking more money...You
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have a large population, an urban population, that has a tax base. They have the
funding to take care of themselves and really don't need as much from the FEMA
but they're getting the majority of the FEMA funds. If you take a rural county,
like us, we get just a little bit of FEMA money based on our population overall, if
you don't have the tax base to support the day-to-day operations of the program.
Aside from challenges of technological disconnects and lack of funding streams, the
biggest challenge discussed by respondents was apathy.
Sometimes it's just complacency. I'm still getting that word out, still have people
understand the importance of preparing. And I think now that we've had two to
three storms in the last few years. They understand that. But for the last ten-plus
years we had a lot of population growth. It's very sad but it's a continual thing. We
continue. Even though we can't rest on our laurels, we continue with public
education throughout the year.
Apathy is indeed a challenge and continuing to promote the concept of preparation has
yet to be solved and may never be. However, building capacity is not as out of reach. This arena
is where the expertise of emergency management practitioners truly shines as respondents spoke
about the need to understand the county and equivalents’ abilities during an event as well as the
capacity of the ones they work with. The intrinsic connection to the practitioner's knowledge of
their community and its past, the incident command structure, and available technology was
evident in the responses, but there was still a challenge of community involvement especially
with stark variations inside the counties themselves. It falls onto the emergency manager to place
responsibility on the community itself and what actions they must take. As far as the county and
equivalents’ capacity, one respondent stated:
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Not enough foresight from some agencies with regards to rural/small population
communities regarding what applies in a big city does not necessarily apply in a
rural, low-populated state. Expectations that communication is the same across
the board (we have had several events where public communications - cell phones
- were brought down) due to lack of cell towers is always an issue. Our agency
has 2 people; it is difficult to fulfill duties and act as a PIO to keep the public
informed.
Focusing on the knowledge of the community and capacity of collaborators, one
respondent stated: “Communities with few crises struggle because they have little real
experience or frequency of use with many systems.” Another wrote: "Accountability training for
country EMA directors. Too many chosen based on local politics rather than skills and level of
training. My personal experience with some has been quite disappointing. They freeze under real
life situations.”
Bringing together an intersection of capacity and relationships, one respondent provided
an interesting statement of:
It is critical that we continue to work towards not just communications with the
citizens we work for but that we continue the mission of interoperable
communications between response disciplines. Many times, during mutual aid
situations I have witnessed the lack of communications between local to local,
state to state, and almost any to federal becomes overwhelmed on the federal
interop channels. As much money as has been thrown at this we are still in poor
shape.
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The last theme was on crisis communication as a concept as well as the need for its
growth in the field. This became evident when respondents indicated needs for clarity of
terminology, even regarding the survey itself. For example: “Terminology and the perceived
level of understanding are critical elements, just as with this survey, several of the questions are
challenging not because of content, but due to some of the terms utilized.”
Crisis communication tends to be tasked to public affairs/relations personnel. In
small to mid-sized communities like ours, those are people who take on that role
for the organization in addition to other duties - they are typically NOT part of a
dedicated public affairs office. As a result, crisis communication tends to be
somewhat disjointed and disorganized.

[I]t's almost impossible to get enough people in these small counties trained and
keep them trained to the level that they're expecting. We've figured, as long as
we're trained and can fill in, there's not going to be anything that hits all of us or if
it is, you know?

4.5.5 Semi-Structured Interviews
Of the 22 respondents who volunteered for a follow-up interview, 7 responded to the scheduling
email sent by the researcher for a 15 to 20-minute timeslot. The interviews were conducted via
phone and were recorded with the knowledge the name and county and equivalents of the
interviewee would be changed to maintain anonymity. Although the county names are not
publishable, the respondents represented 7 states: Florida, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,
South Dakota, Texas, and Wyoming. Six of the interviewees were male (86%) and one was

126

female (14%). In terms of county identification, 4 identified as rural (57%), 2 as mixed meaning
urban and rural (29%), and 1 as urban (14%).
As the interviews were semi-structured in nature, the researcher had 4 guiding questions:
1. What is your role and describe your community.
2. What are some aspects that help or hinder your crisis communication efforts?
3. What do you feel positively or negatively impacts your community’s resilience?
4. Anything else you would like to add when thinking of communication and
community resilience?
The area in which variation is first discovered is in the simple descriptions of the
respondent's role and county description. Only three of the seven respondents are full-time
practitioners for their counties, whereas the rest are partially connected to other departments (ex:
15% to 40%). The description of each county could not easily be checked off as rural or urban.
Each county incorporated some combination of both or was described by their major economical
exports, such as oil or agriculture. Their responses only support the uniqueness and complexity
of each county and necessity for knowledgeable practitioners to understand each attribute and
how it impacts resilience.
When questioned on aspects that help or hinder their crisis communication efforts and
community resilience, the connecting response is due to the contrasting characteristics of each
county. As respondent Central stated: "That's one of the complexities you run into. It is not
everybody does the same thing or reports to the same people." Not only are there organizational
variations, but differences in geography, economy, and support. For instance, one respondent
stated how they are geographically unable to assist surrounding counties as it can take an hour
and a half to three hours depending on which direction.
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By the time something outside the system can come in, it's just not realistic. Let
alone, we're the larger-- when we're the largest one. we wind up providing
assistance sometimes to the smaller counties around us if they have a bad fire or
something like that... It's just, it isn't feasible so most of us wind up, “You deal
with it, with what you have.” And the other parts, fortunately, we don't wind up
with major disasters in the same way.

"You can either bracket the county on the north, middle and south or the east,
middle and west. It depends on what the disaster is or what area it's affecting. It
can be very isolated or very limited in impact or broad."
Another aspect of integrating knowledge and practice is for educational institutions
teaching future emergency managers or individuals who return to school to obtain a degree. If
the classroom contrasts too much from practice, then educational institutions are hindering
growth and development. As one interviewee noted:
To me, that's where it's just-- there really is a gap between the academic side of
emergency management and then actual practitioner side. There's so much focus
on homeland security and the response phase of emergency management. The
recovery side, in both immediate and long-term, is a really a hidden area that just
is not well understood both by the academic world and also by the general public,
and understanding that this is just going to take time... I just had a graduate
student as an intern here. My deputy just went through a graduate program as well
and she's like-- both of them had said, It's like, “What we've learned and we're
facing are just like drastically different.
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To emphasize the lack of a one-size-fits-all reality that exists, one respondent connected
to the area of education and training through a simple statement of: "And it doesn't quite match
what you hear or see in a lot of the professional books." This connected to another common
thread within the interviews of having to rely on yourself and your own resources or hoping if an
event is big enough that there will be enough volunteers and resources to assist.
The community spirit to pull yourselves up by your bootstraps. We're not going to
wait for government handout kind of thing where when a disaster happens up
here, it's not 'When is FEMA going to show up?' It's like 'If they're not going to
show' which is get your stuff done anyway...One size does not fit all. And I think
that's the biggest challenge, is that it's personality driven and demographics
driven. Like the [Name removed for anonymity purposes], my county down
south, their people come to me because they want things when their EM doesn't
give it to them. But at the same point in time, what we do up here [Name removed
for anonymity purposes] doesn't always work in [Name removed for anonymity
purposes] because there may not be the same unit and we not have the same
demographics so.
Another significant disconnect consisted of variation in the knowledge, skills, abilities
and proactivity of emergency managers within connected counties. As one interviewee noted:
"Basically, how prepared you are to handle some type of disaster is a direct result of how much
suffering you will endure, or the lack thereof, if you're prepared. This is America the great, 'I
want it all and I want it now.'"
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The final connection within the analysis is the inability to fully separate the responses
between what helps and hinders crisis communication versus community resilience. These are
two integrated concepts and should be approached, researched, and practiced as such.

4.6 Baseline Resilience Indicators for Communities comparison
An integrated component of the survey was the focus on the respondent’s perception for aspects
of crisis communication strategies, crisis type, local community needs, and community
resilience. To add a comparative analysis to balance subjective perception with objective
indicators, the coinciding Baseline Resilience Indicators for Communities' score was attached to
each respondent. This comparative analysis satisfies the triangulation method of utilizing a
combination of qualitative and quantitative methods to gather data and provide more support to
obtained results through increased credibility, reliability and validity (Denzin 1978, 2012; Jick,
1979; Olsen, 2004).
To generate a comparative score, the indicators that create the BRIC assessment tool
were reviewed and those relating to social, community competence, and institutional were drawn
out and a resilience score was generated. This was then compared to a composite score generated
from the perception survey (see Table 28). There are noticeable differences in the indicators to
avoid plagiarizing as well as integrating a perception component that would allow the emergency
managers to answer the question without having to revert to quantitative data.
Of the 171 respondents, the average for resilience score as a result of BRIC analysis was
1.698 with a minimum of 1 and a maximum of 2.447. Contrastingly, perceived resilience based
off of this study's survey indicators resulted in an average of 3.240 with a minimum of 1.890 and
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a maximum of 4.060. Performing a state comparison, Table 27 details the state, number of
respondents, BRIC mean score, and mean score of perceived resilience.

Table 27. State Comparison of Resilience Scores.
State

Cases

Alabama
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Florida
Georgia
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Maine
Maryland
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska

6
2
1
2
11
7
3
3
5
6
5
9
1
1
8
4
5
10
3
5

BRIC Survey Diff.
State
Cases BRIC Survey Diff.
Score Score
Score Score
1.577 3.323 1.746
New Jersey
4
1.845 3.387 1.542
1.658 3.221 1.563 New Mexico
2
1.408 3.217 1.809
1.642 2.817 1.175
New York
2
1.817 3.284 1.467
1.456 3.142 1.686 North Carolina
5
1.623 3.101 1.478
1.410 3.408 1.998 North Dakota
6
1.865 3.170 1.305
1.515 3.287 1.772
Ohio
6
1.831 2.972 1.141
1.503 3.331 1.828
Oklahoma
3
1.671 3.030 1.359
1.835 3.285 1.450
Oregon
1
1.440 3.635 2.195
1.851 3.278 1.427 Pennsylvania
4
1.801 3.173 1.372
2.089 2.979 0.890 South Carolina
5
1.615 3.641 2.026
1.894 3.480 1.586 South Dakota
4
1.931 3.418 1.487
1.704 3.206 1.502
Tennessee
6
1.564 3.284 1.720
1.696 2.692 0.996
Texas
12
1.511 3.323 1.812
1.775 3.827 2.052
Utah
2
1.355 3.012 1.657
1.718 3.142 1.424
Virginia
2
1.809 3.531 1.722
1.991 2.899 0.908
Washington
1
1.647 3.464 1.817
1.557 3.188 1.631 West Virginia
1
1.730 3.341 1.611
1.837 3.329 1.492
Wisconsin
4
1.979 3.197 1.218
1.595 3.257 1.662
Wyoming
4
1.416 3.132 1.716
1.968 2.896 0.928
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Table 28. BRIC and Survey Comparison.
BRIC Categories

BRIC Variables
Educational Equity
Age
Transportation Access

Study Survey

Communication Capacity
Social

Social
Language Competency
Special Needs

Survey Questions
Q31- Conducting routine needs assessments
Q32- Conducting comprehensive vulnerability assessments
Q28- Trust with the community
Q18- My department uses (easy-to-understand) language to
explain what is going on
Q19- My department uses visual images such as maps to help
explain what is going on
Q20- My department identifies the most important topics and
highlights these in communication

Health Coverage
Mitigation
Flood Coverage
Institutional

Municipal Services

Institutional

Political Fragmentation
Previous Disaster Experience

Place Attachment
Political Engagement
Community
Capital

Social Capital-Religion

Community
Capital

Social Capital- Civic Involvement
Social Capital- Advocacy
Innovation
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Q26- Leadership support from the state emergency management
practitioner(s)
Q27- Leadership support from surrounding local emergency
management practitioner(s)
Q34- Personally, participating in training and certification
opportunities focused on emergency management
Q5- My department markets our plans on our websites
Q8- My department markets our plans via social media
Q23- My department adapts information for natural disasters
Q24- My department adapts information for health concerns
Q25- My department adapts information for community violence
Q35- In the absence of a crisis, sustaining relationships with other
organizations
Q33- Collaborating with community partners for support,
expertise, etc
Q35- In the absence of a crisis, sustaining relationships with other
organizations
Q10- My department provides updated information at least once
every three hours during the event
Q21- My department uses a spokesperson with whom the
community is familiar

Regarding county type, there were 20 Urban with a mean BRIC score of 1.660 and
perceived resilience of 3.441 (difference of 1.781). For the 132 Rural counties, there was a mean
BRIC score of 1.708 with perceived resilience of 3.209 (difference of 1.501) and the 19 counties
who identified as Other had a BRIC score of 1.698 and perceived score of 3.240 (difference of
1.542). Although direct analysis cannot be drawn from these comparisons, it is intriguing to note
the Rural counties appeared to be more perceptive of their resilience capacity versus their Urban
and Other counterparts. For the statewide comparison, perceived resilience was always higher
than the scores generated by the BRIC analysis. This was connected to the difference in
indicators for each category (i.e., social, institutional, community competence) and the focus on
quantitative versus qualitative measures.

4.7 Hypotheses Testing
The aim of this study was to understand the impact of crisis communication strategies on
community resilience with components of local community needs and crisis type. Table
Table 29. Hypotheses Testing Results.

Hypothesis
H1: Use of crisis communication strategies improves
community resilience.
H2: Use of crisis communication strategies adapted to local
community needs affects community resilience.
H3: Use of crisis communication strategies adapted to crisis
type affects community resilience.

Result
Not Supported
Supported
Supported

The first hypothesis tested was:
H1: Use of crisis communication strategies positively affects community resilience.
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The first hypothesis was not supported by the data due to the results of the covariance
structure model analysis indicating a negative, statistically significant association between crisis
communication strategies and community resilience ( = -.451, p = .000). The unstandardized
regression coefficient of crisis communication strategies indicates one unit would lead to a -.246
increase for community resilience.
H2: Use of crisis communication strategies adapted to local community needs affects
community resilience.
The second hypothesis was supported by the data. The results of the covariance structure
model analysis showed a negative, statistically significant association between crisis
communication strategies with local community needs on community resilience ( = -.196, p =
.000). The unstandardized regression coefficient of crisis communication strategies indicates one
unit would lead to a -.130 increase for community resilience.
H3: Use of crisis communication strategies adapted to crisis type affects community
resilience.
The third hypothesis was supported by the data. The results of the covariance structure
model analysis showed a negative, statistically significant association between crisis
communication strategies with crisis type on community resilience ( = -.138, p = .000). The
unstandardized regression coefficient of crisis communication strategies indicates one unit would
lead to a -.223 increase for community resilience.
The negative, statistically significant associations are not a concern for the researcher as
there were positive, statistically significant associations between Local Community Needs and
Crisis Communication Strategies as well as Crisis Type and Crisis Communication Strategies.
The researcher anticipates future studies with larger sample sizes will overturn the negative
association as the literature does suggest crisis type and local community needs can negatively
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impact community resilience. The connections to previous literature and the conceptual
framework are explained further in chapter 5.

4.8 Summary of the Chapter
This chapter presented the results of the Structural Equation Modeling analysis as well as the
comparison to the Baseline Resilience Indicators for Communities’ scores. In addition, the openended questions and 7 semi-structured interviews were qualitatively analyzed for patterns and
themes. In terms of the quantitative analysis, the results were discussed by first exploring the
sample representativeness and adherence to necessary assumptions before Structural Equation
Modeling could be completed. This was followed by an examination of measurement models for
each latent variable. After confirmatory factor analysis was completed, the validated
measurement models were compiled into a covariance structure model that was found to be
valid, reliable, conceptually and theoretically justified as well as a good fit.
For the qualitative results, the open-ended questions of the survey were detailed first and
resulting themes were briefly discussed. Following this, the seven semi-structured interviews
were presented followed by the comparison of perceived resilience scores to the Baseline
Resilience Indicators for Communities. The findings were briefly presented with a general
summation of indicators and themes as the next chapter discusses the results in more detail and
connect to the previous literature and this study's conceptual and theoretical framework.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
This chapter presents the discussion and implications derived from the quantitative and
qualitative analysis results. The discussion will occur by presenting each of the research
questions and relevant results and findings. Then, implications are discussed in terms of
theoretical and methodological components, policy, and leadership or practical aspects. The
chapter concludes with a discussion of the limitations of the study and future research endeavors.

5.1 Key Findings

5.1.1 Crisis Communication Strategies Impacting Community Resilience
The initial focus of the study was to examine how crisis communication strategies impact the
multi-faceted concept of community resilience. Previous studies attempted to measure
community resilience and leaned towards quantitative factors arguing objectivity and linked
these indicators to environmental, social, institutional, economic, infrastructure, and community
aspects. The difficulty in doing this is neglecting the qualitative counterpart in research. This
study utilized both. There were arguably more objective quantitative indicators combined with
open-ended questions to bring in a qualitative component. In addition, follow-up interviews were
conducted. The logic behind this research design was to obtain a breadth of information as well
as depth.
Results from this study showcase that quantitative and qualitative components can be
integrated to research community resilience and should be. The main indicator of this is
respondents who answered to utilizing crisis communication strategies, such as adjusting
information based on crisis type or sharing with leaders the community knows, and yet their
answers to open ended questions showed they did not realize these were actual strategies. The
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researcher was not surprised by this situation as crisis communication strategies in emergency
management work is not fully known. It is important to note that although the support for
integrating quantitative and qualitative research methodology, the results of the Structural
Equation Modeling did show a negative impact on community resilience. However, this does not
worry the researcher as there was a low response rate and if more were gathered then it would
not take much to transition the negative impact to positive.
The negative result is also due to the complexity of emergency management roles and
responsibilities, as many individuals surveyed are not decision-makers and do not contribute to
plans of crisis communication on a deep level. As discussed in the assumptions of the researcher,
each county, and county-equivalents, in the United States do not have a full-time, dedicated
emergency manager to tend to its areas of preparation, mitigation, response, and recovery. The
researcher was unable to survey the public administrators who take on those tasks within the
timeline granted for this study, but this does leave room for future research.
In terms of indicators that led to the most impact on building community resilience in
respect to the crisis communication strategies, the covariance structure model revealed two. The
first is assessment of the plan at least once a year. This may be difficult seeing as how many
respondents stated they are not the creators of their crisis communication plan and leave most of
the responsibility to other departments. So, the emergency managers may enact the strategies
through findings the information needed for instruction, sharing with stakeholders, and making
any necessary adjustments, but they are not wholly responsible for all components of the
communication plan. If assessment is so critically important then emergency managers need to
make sure they are part of the assessment process as their expertise is critical for improvements.
The second component is exercising the strategies regularly and with community partners. This
137

component not only emphasizes the need for regular practice and training but adds the caveat of
including community partners. These partners not only include other first responder agencies, but
incorporates nonprofits, community leaders, advocates for vulnerable populations, and volunteer
organizations.
The covariance structure model also indicated the most impactful indicators for
community resilience being the relationships that are sustained when a crisis is not occurring as
well as collaboration with partners, maintaining trust with the community, continuing to
participate in training and certification programs and continuous assessment of local community
needs. These may seem like simple endeavors, but if an emergency manager is going to maintain
the reputation of being an expert who effectively communicates with their community to prepare,
mitigate, respond and recover from crises, then they must continue to develop their knowledge,
skills, and abilities. More importantly, emergency managers need to understand that the network
they create of first responder agencies, nonprofits, community leaders, advocates for vulnerable
populations, and volunteer organizations, is absolutely critical for their success.

5.1.2 Crisis Communication Strategies adapted to Local Community Needs and Crisis Type
Overall, the indicators that lead to the most variation in crisis communication strategies are
connected to local community needs and crisis type. If policy makers or emergency managers
were to create crisis communication strategies and practices without considering local
community needs and crisis type, then they would detrimentally impact their communities and
the consequences could be astronomical. This is not surprising when reviewing previous research
on the creation and implementation of crisis communication strategies, the foundational
concepts, and Situational Crisis Communication Theory stress the importance of adaptation
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based on local community needs and crisis type. Although crisis type appeared to be more
impactful by a score of .517 over local community needs at .435, there is not a drastic difference
between the two. As for the types of crisis involved in this study (i.e., health epidemic,
community violence, natural disaster), the one having the greatest impact for those who
responded was health concerns followed by community violence and then natural disaster.
In terms of local community needs, the covariance structure model unveiled the highest
indicators being easy-to-understand language, identification of important topics to stress in the
instruction process and use of visual images such as maps. These practices connect to necessary
practices for communicating with a diverse audience and needing to generate comprehensible
material. Making sure communication is direct, gives critical information, and incorporates
common language or instructive visuals only helps crisis communication strategies reach a wider
audience and leads to more effective practice. In terms of critical information, the act of adapting
for crisis type supports crisis communication strategies as it is necessary when instructing
community members of what to do when certain crises occur. The information needed for health
concerns is different than community violence of a natural disaster.

5.2 Implications
There are several reasons this study resulted in significant contributions to the field. The first is
this study was one of, if not, the first to incorporate Situational Crisis Communication Theory to
a survey focused on emergency manager's perception of crisis communication strategies, local
community needs, crisis type, and community resilience. The results support the path of future
research to understanding how to integrate these strategies more fully into practice. Findings
support the need to generate more comprehensive understandings of how local community needs
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and crisis type lead to necessary adaptations for crisis communication strategies. Moreover, this
study examined how the perception of community resilience affects emergency management
practice and influences recommendations given to policy and decision makers. Although some
findings were unexpected, such as the lack of full-time, dedicated emergency managers for every
county and resulting questioning of their perceived value, the results did spurn implications for
theory, methods, policy, and practice. Lastly, the results led to future research endeavors to build
upon this study and continue contributing to the field. This next section highlights implications
of the research and closes with a discussion of limitations as well as future research.

5.2.1 Theoretical Implications
The findings of this study support the need for future research integrating Situational Crisis
Communication Theory into emergency management practice by the emphasis placed on
adaptation to build community resilience. It was readily acknowledged that the variation in
county characteristics, demographics and vulnerable populations, and resources must be
incorporated into crisis communication strategies. However, the difficulty not only lies in how to
disseminate the knowledge to the community, but to other practitioners and academics who study
the field. Moreover, the challenges lie in understanding how response strategies to a crisis lead to
positive changes regarding preparation and mitigation. With many crises, the response period is
the only time in which plans, and protocols are put to the test. Assessment of how the
practitioners respond on a collective level has occurred, but rarely are individual assessments
taken into consideration in terms of how to better prepare practitioners and understand their
innate leadership resilience. SCCT assists in this endeavor in the emergency management field
instead of taking place in public relations or business administration type disciplines.
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This is especially true when it comes to theoretical viewpoints and their connection to
reality. SCCT provides a prescriptive way to connect leaders' response to communication
strategies with an emphasis on adaptation to local community needs and crisis type. In theory, it
would easily transfer and translate into practice. However, not all concepts of crisis
communication strategies are known leaving a lower possibility for understanding SCCT as well.
This is due to the respondents who noted crisis communication plans are not created or fully
implemented within their department or connected to their role. Instead, this role and
responsibility lie in departments like public relations, 9-1-1 operations, or via the press.
Regarding adaptation to county characteristics, a component briefly touched upon in a
discussion of community apathy was past experience. Several respondents discussed the
challenge of keeping communities prepared or at-the-ready as past experiences with hurricanes
or blizzards leads to members believing they can handle it themselves or the transitioning of
constituents results in a revolving door of ill-prepared individuals. Not only do community
members exhibit apathetic behavior, but there are practitioners who do as well. As a couple
respondents mentioned, practitioners in surrounding counties may not give their full focus to the
position due to impending retirement or the responsibilities are included in 'other duties as
assigned.' The apathy impacts crisis communication strategies and is connected to SCCT as this
theory takes into account the practitioner's view and knowledge of strategies and how they
incorporate their knowledge, adjust to receiving audiences, share with stakeholders and instruct
the actions that each person needs to take. With future research, hopefully, SCCT will find more
of a footing in the emergency management literature and disconnect itself from being isolated in
public health or public relations literature.
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5.2.2 Methodological Implications
Regarding this study's contribution to methodology, the researcher faced a challenge when
determining how to integrate quantitative and qualitative indicators to measure resilience and the
effort is not without its merit. As discussed in the literature, quantitative indicators connect to the
promoted ideal of objective, scientific inquiry where indicators become mechanisms to explain
complex processes. Paired with qualitative indicators to add depth to the received data, this study
was able to incorporate influences from objective and subjective studies to measure resilience
and provide a foundation for future research with the goal of holistically understanding
community resilience.
Not only will future research efforts continue to find the most impactful indicators, the
ones that are indispensable to emergency managers and public administrators, but the continued
incorporation of quantitative and qualitative indicators with management perceptions will lead to
answers of why there are such stark contrasts between perception and reality? The research will
also discover what fuels the respondents to answer more favorably and how to mitigate against it.
Lastly, does this contrast affect emergency management practice? By continuing to integrate
quantitative and qualitative methods, researchers and practitioners begin to close that gap.
These future research efforts also connect to the need for re-testing the instrument
generated for this study and continue to compare and contrast to other assessments with the goal
of having a holistic resilience measurement tool that is reliable and valid for every county. This
is not an easy situation with the diversity of each county and the evolving demographics and
impending changes within the various indicators for component measurement.
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5.2.3 Policy Implications
Several respondents noted how planning frameworks and training materials are only a part of the
job. The true challenge lies in receiving buy-in from their communities and the decision-makers
to help generate more effective policies and procedures. This narrows down to the question of
how valuable and sought out are emergency managers? Do emergency managers value their role
and the position they are in? A few of the interviewees mentioned how surrounding counties are
being instructed by individuals who view the role as the last road to retirement. There is a lack of
proactivity on their part and it does not assist the individuals who are trying to build the capacity
of their own county.
An additional aspect of policymaking is including all voices in the process. As discovered
in the covariance structure model, crisis communication strategies must include emergency
managers in their assessment process and the exercising of these plans and strategies must
include not only first responder agencies but nonprofits, community leaders, advocates for
vulnerable populations, and volunteer organizations. The relationships with these partners is
critical for building community resilience and necessary for effective crisis communication
strategies.
Another critical component for the cycle of policy making and implementation is to adapt
current protocols to make sure emergency managers are invested stakeholders and give the
necessary support for their departments. This will initially occur when the role of emergency
managers is seen as critical for community development. The role needs to be one where
responsibilities do not consist mainly of preparation and response, but of mitigation and
recovery. Although ideally the tasks give each phase of emergency management their due
justice, many practitioners are forced to prioritize and aspects of fully assessing, adapting, and
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instructing plans and protocols can fall to the wayside. Policy makers can assist in this endeavor
through initial analysis of funding structures and streams to make sure departments are staffed,
training and certifications are accessible and affordable for obtainment, software and technology
is equitable across all counties and work with the private sector to make sure all stakeholders
have the same capabilities.

5.2.4 Practical Implications
On the side of leadership and practice, it falls to all stakeholders to advocate for a seat at the
table. To continue seeing a disconnect between academicians and practitioners do not assist in
the end goal of creating a resilient nation. However, incorporating more studies that allow
practitioners to speak and academicians to translate their research into comprehensible terms
only supports the process. The first step is for local leaders to understand the value and
importance of emergency managers and for emergency managers to do the same. It should not
fall to times of crises for these knowledgeable, skillful, and able individuals to be sought out. It
must occur during the absence of crisis and be supported not only by voice but through resource
attainment as well (i.e., budget, staff, materials, etc.).
More importantly, these individuals need to be involved in decision-making and policy
creation especially when it comes to creating and implementing crisis communication plans.
They should not be responsible for a component of the process but should have a hand in all
phases of information collection, organization, dissemination, instructing, adjusting, and sharing.
The challenge falls to building the capacity of the community's and the emergency management
departments to help in this endeavor. Capacity building falls to the arenas of technology,
terminology, staffing, and collaborative relationships. Future research on capacity building is
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essential as there is no one-size-fits-all plan that can be applied to every county, nor should there
be.
The last aspect to emphasize is an emergency manager must actively maintain their
reputation of being an expert who effectively communicates with their community. They must
continue to develop their knowledge, skills, and abilities and understand their network of first
responder agencies, nonprofits, community leaders, advocates for vulnerable populations, and
volunteer organizations, is critical for success.

5.3 Limitations
One of the major limitations of this study was the low response rate due to the survey
distribution period occurring during a high-traffic time period for many emergency managers. In
addition, the survey focused on concepts of crisis communication strategies and several
responses to open-ended questions made the researcher question whether the individuals knew
what these strategies were. Lack of familiarity with the subject could account for the low
response. Another limitation was the lack of a definitive listserv for the county, and countyequivalent, emergency managers or public administrators whose role encompasses related
activities. It became evident that each county does not have a full-time emergency manager and
the role may fall to public administrators who are only able to give as low as 10% of their focus
to these activities outside of crisis periods.
In terms of comparing the survey indicators to those of the Baseline Resilience Indicators
for Communities scores, the connections were generalized and there is room for growth in terms
of wording and creating more direct connections while integrating a qualitative focus to the
survey. The researcher places this component as a limitation only after analysis showcased stark
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difference from perception and reality causing a need for future research. Are the differences a
limitation or are they just areas for improvement? The BRIC scores utilized for comparison are
from 2010 although the 2015 scores were stated to be available on the website for the Hazards
and Vulnerability Institute at the University of South Carolina. During the data analysis period,
the 2010 scores were the only ones available leaving the researcher to wonder if the 2015 score
would have provided different results of perception versus reality.

5.4 Future Research
This study generated a foundation for future research. One goal of future research is to generate
more specific qualitative and quantitative indicators that continue to expand the current
community resilience assessment tools. Moreover, the researcher wants to conduct the study
during a more appropriate time-period to generate a higher response rate and compare the
significant indicators and impact of Crisis Communication Strategies on Community Resilience
for a grander population. The researcher is interested to integrate definitions into the next survey
and questions whether it impacts the perception of the survey and understanding of the questions.
Some respondents questioned the survey in a way that showcased their lack of understanding of
crisis communication strategies albeit their answers highlighted the use of some strategies
without knowing the conceptual connection.
An additional goal for future research is to delve deeper into the lack of knowledge
concerning crisis communication strategies and Situational Crisis Communication Theory as
their connections to emergency management practice is evident. Is the lack of literature
connecting emergency managers and public administrators to SCCT and crisis communication
strategies the reason for being unaware or are there other reasons for the lack of integration?
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Moreover, the knowledge of these strategies and this theory is ideally suitable for practice and
lead to more effective policies and procedures, but can this become a reality?
Another future research area is to understand the role and value of emergency managers
once more. Although they are theorized to be the experts, in practice the decision-making falls to
public administrators or policy makers and does not always include the voice and knowledge of
the emergency management practitioners. Are they valued? Are they sought after for their
advice? Or as they not as valued as they should be? How can emergency management related
tasks and activities achieve full integration into the administrator's role and responsibilities?
Regarding the difference between perceived resilience scores and the quantitative,
arguably more objective, indicators of the BRIC analysis, future research will be conducted to
provide more direct connections between the indicators and integration of quantitative and
qualitative measures to determine whether perceived resilience is always higher than the
objective counterpart. The researcher is interested to determine why perception is higher than
reality. Is this due to social desirability bias? Is it due to lack of complete understanding of their
community when taking into consideration aspects of crisis communication strategies that
integrate crisis typology and local community needs?
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You are invited to participate in a study entitled “The Use of Crisis Communication Strategies to
Build Community Resilience.” The purpose of the study is to examine the connections between
crisis communication strategies, local community needs and resilience. The survey also includes
demographic questions about you. The survey will take between 20 to 30 minutes to complete.
The principal investigator for this study is doctoral student Brittany Haupt under the faculty
supervision of Prof. Naim Kapucu. If you have questions about this survey, you may contact
Brittany Haupt at brittany.haupt@ucf.edu.
Please note: You must be 18 years of age or older to participate in this research. There are no
anticipated risks in completing this survey. Although there are no direct benefits to you, there are
potential benefits for emergency managers as a whole. This includes receiving valuable
information from this dissertation for county level practitioners regarding crisis communication
strategies and the impact on community resilience.
In addition, you are asked NOT to type your name anywhere in the survey. You have the right to
withdraw consent at any time without any consequence. In addition, you do not have to answer
any questions that you are not comfortable answering.
Research at the University of Central Florida is conducted under the oversight of the UCF
Institutional Review Board. Questions or concerns about research participants' rights may be
directed to the IRB office, University of Central Florida, Office of Research &
Commercialization, 12201 Research Parkway, Suite 501, Orlando, FL 32826-3246. The
telephone number is 407-823-2901.
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The Use of Crisis Communication Strategies to Build Community Resilience
This survey investigates the connections between crisis communication strategies and
community resilience. This survey will be used to assist emergency management practitioners
that are trying to improve their current plans and procedures. The survey takes between 20 to 30
minutes to complete. Your responses are confidential and will not be revealed without your
consent; only aggregate results will be made available. We would be happy to make a copy of
final results available to you. If you would prefer a hardcopy of this survey, please email Brittany
Haupt at Brittany.haupt@ucf.edu with your name, the county in which you work, and your
preferred address.
Thank you very much for your cooperation

Brittany Haupt
Doctoral Candidate
(407) 717-4040
brittany.haupt@ucf.edu

151

Please tell us about yourself:
1) Are you the addressee?
[ ]
Yes
[ ]
No → Please state your position/title here: _________________________
2) Which state are you located in?__________ Please name your County:______________
3) Which best describes your community? [ ] Urban [ ] Rural [ ] Other (please
specify)__________________________________________
Section 1: Crisis Communication Strategies: This section focuses on strategies used for
communicating about a crisis with your community.
Please note how recently your community has experienced the following crisis types:
1. Natural disaster (earthquakes, tornadoes, floods, hurricanes) [ ] 1 to 3 years [ ] 4 to 6
years [ ] 7 to 10 years [ ] 11 or more years
2. Health epidemic [ ] 1 to 3 years [ ] 4 to 6 years [ ] 7 to 10 years [ ] 11 or more years
3. Community violence [ ] 1 to 3 years [ ] 4 to 6 years [ ] 7 to 10 years [ ] 11 or more
years
Please state your agreement or disagreement for each of the following statements based upon the
scale provided below.
Strongly Agree

Agree

5

4

[ ]
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]

[ ]
[ ]

Neither Agree
nor Disagree
3

Disagree
2

Strongly
Disagree
1

My department is mainly responsible for creating crisis communication plans and
strategies
My department exercises crisis communication strategies regularly
My department exercises crisis communication strategies with community partners
My department adapts information for natural disasters
My department adapts information for health concerns
My department adapts information for community violence
My department focuses on information sharing between different community departments
My department markets our plans on our websites
My department markets our plans on other community partner’s websites
My department markets our plans on flyers and posters
My department markets our plans via social media
My department provides updated information at least every hour during the event
My department provides updated information at least once every three hours during the
event
My department assesses our crisis communication plan at least once a year
My department assesses our crisis communication plan with community partners
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[ ]

My department assesses our crisis communication plan with different community
departments

How important are the following avenues for disseminating information about crises? Please
assess the importance of the following utilizing the scale below:

[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[

Very Important

Important

5

4

]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]

Don’t Know/
Can’t Say
3

Unimportant

Not Applicable

2

1

Telephone notification
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association Radios
Email
Social networking
Text messaging system
Commercial radio stations
Local television stations
Outdoor Warning Sirens
Distributing flyers where/when needed
Community website (e.g. surge zone, evacuation route maps, shelters)
Daily situation reports made available online and through mass emails
Press conferences
Electronic signage

Section 2: Local Community Needs: This section focuses on the needs of your community
that may affect building resiliency.
Please state your agreement or disagreement for each of the following statements based upon the
scale provided below.

[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[

Strongly Agree

Agree

5

4

]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]

Neither Agree
nor Disagree
3

Disagree
2

Strongly
Disagree
1

My department has a positive relationship with the community
My department identifies what is most important for the community to know
My department provides tailored messages for different cultures within the community
My department provides communications in different languages for the community
My department provides community outreach campaigns for vulnerable populations
My department uses (easy-to-understand) language to explain what is going on
My department uses visual images such as maps to help explain what is going on
My department identifies the most important topics and highlights these in communication
My department uses a spokesperson with whom the community is familiar
My department includes specific action to be taken by the community in each warning
message
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Section 3: Community Resilience: This section focuses on elements a community may
require for building resiliency.
Please assess the importance of the following crisis communication strategies for your
community. Please use the following scale for all parts of the question:
Very Important

Important

5

4

[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]

[
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]
]

Don’t Know/
Can’t Say
3

Unimportant

Not Applicable

2

1

Leadership support from the state emergency management practitioner(s)
Leadership support from surrounding local emergency management practitioner(s)
Trust with the community
Providing emergency management training and certification opportunities for
administrators
Conducting routine assessments to update plans and procedures
Conducting routine needs assessments
Conducting comprehensive vulnerability assessments
Collaborating with community partners for support, expertise, etc.
Personally participating in training and certification opportunities focused on emergency
management
In the absence of a crisis, sustaining relationships with other organizations
In the absence of a crisis, being involved in collaborative strategies (such as exercises, and
meetings) with organizations you collaborate with during a crisis

[ ]
[ ]

Section 4: Open-Ended Questions
1. How would you describe your level of expertise?
2. Is there anything you would like to add that you believe is critical for crisis
communication?
3. Is there anything you would like to add that you believe is critical to building community
resilience?
4. Are there any documents or reports you would like to share that connects the concepts of
crisis communication and community resilience? If so, how can the copies be obtained?
Section 5: Demographics
1)
2)
3)
4)

How many years have you worked in your position? ________
How many years have you worked in your current jurisdiction?
________
How many years have you worked in public administration? _____
Approximately, how many full-time employees work in your department? (Please check
one) [ ] 1-5
[ ] 6-15
[ ] 16-25
[ ] 26-50
[ ] over 50
5) What is your gender? [ ] Male
[ ] Female [ ] Prefer not to respond
6) What is your age?
[ ] under 35
[ ] 35-44
[ ] 45-54
[ ] over 54
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7) What is your highest degree? [ ] High school graduate, diploma or the equivalent [ ]
Trade/technical/vocational training [ ] Associate Degree [ ] Bachelor’s Degree [ ]
Master’s Degree [ ] Doctorate degree
8) In which field is your highest degree? Public Administration, Engineering, Emergency
management, Sociology, Political Science, management, Others (please
specify)____________________
9) Are you interested in a follow-up conversation about crisis communication strategies and
your community? If yes, please state your name and contact information.
Thank you very much for your participation!

Follow-Up Survey Questions
1) Please describe your role and the county in which you serve
2) What are some aspects that support or hinder your crisis communication efforts?
3) What do you feel positively or negatively impacts your county’s resilience?
4) Anything else you would like to add when thinking of communication and your county?
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Table 30. Skewness and Kurtosis Values for Study Indicators.
Descriptive Statistics
Skewness
Kurtosis
Statistic
Std. Error Statistic Std. Error
Responsible for creating crisis communication
-.757
-4.039
-.022
-.058
plans
Exercises crisis communication strategies
-.742
-3.963
.135
.360
regularly
Exercises with community partners
-1.049
-5.598
1.574
4.202
Adapts information for natural disasters
-.245
-1.310
-.537
-1.434
Adapts information for health concerns
-.780
-4.162
.281
.751
Adapts information for community violence
-1.057
-5.642
3.329
8.886
Focuses on information sharing between
-.777
-4.147
.361
.965
community departments
Markets our plans on website
-.171
-.913
-.805
-2.149
Markets our plans on other community
.254
1.354
-.714
-1.906
partner's websites
Markets our plans on flyers and posters
.246
1.314
-.810
-2.161
Markets our plans on social media
-.221
-1.178
-.997
-2.661
Provides updated information at least every
.184
.983
-.609
-1.626
hour during event
Provides updated information at least once
-.695
-3.708
-.090
-.240
every three hours during event
Assesses our crisis communication plan at
-.997
-5.320
.582
1.554
least once a year
Assesses our crisis communication plan with
-1.051
-5.613
1.859
4.962
community partners
Has positive relationship with community
-.663
-3.537
-.585
-1.561
Identifies what is most important for
-.525
-2.803
.173
.461
community to know
Provides tailored messages for different
-.065
-.345
-.578
-1.542
cultures
Provides communications in different
-.233
-1.244
-.655
-1.748
languages
Provides community outreach campaigns for
-.607
-3.240
.297
.792
vulnerable populations
Uses easy-to-understand language
-.427
-2.281
.928
2.477
Uses visual images
-.726
-3.876
.973
2.597
Identifies the most important topics
-.547
-2.922
.326
.870
Uses a spokesperson community is familiar
-1.068
-5.701
1.557
4.155
with
Includes specific action for community to take
-.586
-3.130
.433
1.156
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Leadership support from state emergency
management practitioners
Leadership support from surrounding local
emergency management practitioners
Trust with the community
Providing emergency management training
and certification opportunities
Conducting routine assessments to update
plans and procedures
Conducting routine needs assessments
Conducting comprehensive vulnerability
assessments
Collaborating with community partners for
support
Personally, participating in training and
certification opportunities
In the absence of a crisis, sustaining
relationships with other organizations
In the absence of a crisis, being involved in
collaborative strategies
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1.313

7.010

1.451

3.874

1.132

6.043

.997

2.661

1.889
.797

10.082
4.255

2.764
.816

7.379
2.177

.710

3.792

-.522

-1.392

.586
.583

3.126
3.112

-.586
-.593

-1.564
-1.583

1.007

5.377

-.030

-.081

1.196

6.383

.438

1.170

1.125

6.007

.242

.647

1.339

7.146

.784

2.092
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Table 31. Respondents by State.
State
Alabama
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Florida
Georgia
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Maine
Maryland
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Virginia

Frequency
6
2
1
2
11
7
3
3
5
6
5
9
1
1
8
4
5
10
3
5
4
2
2
5
6
6
3
1
4
4
5
6
12
2
2
162

Percent
3.5
1.2
.6
1.2
6.4
4.1
1.8
1.8
2.9
3.5
2.9
5.3
.6
.6
4.7
2.3
2.9
5.8
1.8
2.9
2.3
1.2
1.2
2.9
3.5
3.5
1.8
.6
2.3
2.3
2.9
3.5
7.0
1.2
1.2

Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Total

1
1
4
4
171

.6
.6
2.3
2.3
100.0

Table 32. Cross-Tabulation of State and County and equivalents Type.
State
Alabama
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Florida
Georgia
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Maine
Maryland
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas

Urban
1
0
0
0
7
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
3
0
1
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0

Rural
5
2
1
2
0
5
2
2
5
5
5
5
1
1
7
4
4
6
3
4
3
2
0
3
6
6
2
1
3
4
5
6
10
163

Other
0
0
0
0
4
1
0
1
0
0
0
3
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
2
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
2

Total
6
2
1
2
11
7
3
3
5
6
5
9
1
1
8
4
5
10
3
5
4
2
2
5
6
6
3
1
4
4
5
6
12

Utah
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Total

0
0
0
0
0
0
20

2
2
1
1
2
4
132
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0
0
0
0
2
0
19

2
2
1
1
4
4
171
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Table 33. Correlation Analysis of Crisis Communication Strategies Indicators.
Spearman's rho Q1

Correlation Co.
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Q2 Correlation Co.
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Q3 Correlation Co.
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Q4 Correlation Co.
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Q5 Correlation Co.
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Q6 Correlation Co.
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Q7 Correlation Co.
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Q8 Correlation Co.
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Q9 Correlation Co.
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Q10 Correlation Co.
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Q11 Correlation Co.
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Q12 Correlation Co.
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

Q1
1.000
.
171
.469**
.000
171
.372**
.000
171
.247**
.001
171
.211**
.006
171
.193*
.012
171
.153*
.045
171
.254**
.001
171
.116
.131
171
.152*
.047
171
.328**
.000
171
.323**
.000
171

Q2
.469**
.000
171
1.000
.
171
.713**
.000
171
.275**
.000
171
.154*
.044
171
.095
.216
171
.160*
.036
171
.176*
.021
171
.177*
.020
171
.285**
.000
171
.455**
.000
171
.494**
.000
171

Q3
.372**
.000
171
.713**
.000
171
1.000
.
171
.348**
.000
171
.189*
.013
171
.162*
.035
171
.235**
.002
171
.258**
.001
171
.233**
.002
171
.322**
.000
171
.488**
.000
171
.551**
.000
171

Q4
.247**
.001
171
.275**
.000
171
.348**
.000
171
1.000
.
171
.187*
.014
171
.189*
.013
171
.165*
.031
171
.205**
.007
171
.128
.095
171
.180*
.018
171
.323**
.000
171
.356**
.000
171

Q5
.211**
.006
171
.154*
.044
171
.189*
.013
171
.187*
.014
171
1.000
.
171
.705**
.000
171
.553**
.000
171
.596**
.000
171
.245**
.001
171
.244**
.001
171
.243**
.001
171
.202**
.008
171

Q6
.193*
.012
171
.095
.216
171
.162*
.035
171
.189*
.013
171
.705**
.000
171
1.000
.
171
.712**
.000
171
.607**
.000
171
.269**
.000
171
.153*
.046
171
.218**
.004
171
.214**
.005
171

Q7
.153*
.045
171
.160*
.036
171
.235**
.002
171
.165*
.031
171
.553**
.000
171
.712**
.000
171
1.000
.
171
.655**
.000
171
.417**
.000
171
.211**
.006
171
.211**
.006
171
.215**
.005
171

Q8
.254**
.001
171
.176*
.021
171
.258**
.001
171
.205**
.007
171
.596**
.000
171
.607**
.000
171
.655**
.000
171
1.000
.
171
.250**
.001
171
.171*
.026
171
.157*
.040
171
.163*
.033
171

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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Q9
.116
.131
171
.177*
.020
171
.233**
.002
171
.128
.095
171
.245**
.001
171
.269**
.000
171
.417**
.000
171
.250**
.001
171
1.000
.
171
.507**
.000
171
.272**
.000
171
.245**
.001
171

Q10
.152*
.047
171
.285**
.000
171
.322**
.000
171
.180*
.018
171
.244**
.001
171
.153*
.046
171
.211**
.006
171
.171*
.026
171
.507**
.000
171
1.000
.
171
.359**
.000
171
.374**
.000
171

Q11
.328**
.000
171
.455**
.000
171
.488**
.000
171
.323**
.000
171
.243**
.001
171
.218**
.004
171
.211**
.006
171
.157*
.040
171
.272**
.000
171
.359**
.000
171
1.000
.
171
.695**
.000
171

Q12
.323**
.000
171
.494**
.000
171
.551**
.000
171
.356**
.000
171
.202**
.008
171
.214**
.005
171
.215**
.005
171
.163*
.033
171
.245**
.001
171
.374**
.000
171
.695**
.000
171
1.000
.
171

Table 34. Correlation Analysis of Local Community Needs Indicators.
Q18
Q13
Q14
Q15
Q16
Q17
**
**
**
Spearman's Q13
Correlation Co.
1.000
.499
.234
.030
.200
.375**
rho
Sig. (2-tailed)
.
.000
.002
.698
.009
.000
N
171
171
171
171
171
171
Q14
Correlation Co.
.499**
1.000
.340**
.232**
.290**
.467**
Sig. (2-tailed)
.000
.
.000
.002
.000
.000
N
171
171
171
171
171
171
Q15
Correlation Co.
.234**
.340**
1.000
.570**
.408**
.273**
Sig. (2-tailed)
.002
.000
.
.000
.000
.000
N
171
171
171
171
171
171
Q16
Correlation Co.
.030
.232**
.570**
1.000
.398**
.240**
Sig. (2-tailed)
.698
.002
.000
.
.000
.002
N
171
171
171
171
171
171
Q17
Correlation Co.
.200**
.290**
.408**
.398**
1.000
.408**
Sig. (2-tailed)
.009
.000
.000
.000
.
.000
N
171
171
171
171
171
171
Q18
Correlation Co.
.375**
.467**
.273**
.240**
.408**
1.000
Sig. (2-tailed)
.000
.000
.000
.002
.000
.
N
171
171
171
171
171
171
Q19
Correlation Co.
.288**
.314**
.232**
.165*
.569**
.673**
Sig. (2-tailed)
.000
.000
.002
.031
.000
.000
N
171
171
171
171
171
171
**
**
**
**
Q20
Correlation Co.
.367
.483
.254
.141
.398
.769**
Sig. (2-tailed)
.000
.000
.001
.065
.000
.000
N
171
171
171
171
171
171
Q21
Correlation Co.
.346**
.369**
.280**
.253**
.277**
.530**
Sig. (2-tailed)
.000
.000
.000
.001
.000
.000
N
171
171
171
171
171
171
Q22
Correlation Co.
.459**
.532**
.233**
.101
.315**
.580**
Sig. (2-tailed)
.000
.000
.002
.188
.000
.000
N
171
171
171
171
171
171
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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Q19

Q20
**

.288
.000
171
.314**
.000
171
.232**
.002
171
.165*
.031
171
.569**
.000
171
.673**
.000
171
1.000
.
171
.610**
.000
171
.386**
.000
171
.422**
.000
171

Q21
**

.367
.000
171
.483**
.000
171
.254**
.001
171
.141
.065
171
.398**
.000
171
.769**
.000
171
.610**
.000
171
1.000
.
171
.478**
.000
171
.573**
.000
171

Q22
**

.346
.000
171
.369**
.000
171
.280**
.000
171
.253**
.001
171
.277**
.000
171
.530**
.000
171
.386**
.000
171
.478**
.000
171
1.000
.
171
.516**
.000
171

.459**
.000
171
.532**
.000
171
.233**
.002
171
.101
.188
171
.315**
.000
171
.580**
.000
171
.422**
.000
171
.573**
.000
171
.516**
.000
171
1.000
.
171

Table 35. Correlation Analysis of Crisis Type Indicators.

Spearman's

Q23

rho
Q24

Q25

Q23

Q24

Q25

Correlation Co.

1.000

.490**

.431**

Sig. (2-tailed)

.

.000

.000

N

171

171

171

Correlation Co.

.490**

1.000

.588**

Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

.

.000

N

171

171

171

Correlation Co.

.431**

.588**

1.000

Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

.000

.

N

171

171

171

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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Table 36. Correlation of Community Resilience Indicators.
Spearman's
rho

Q26 Correlation Co.
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Q27 Correlation Co.
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Q28 Correlation Co.
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Q29 Correlation Co.
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Q30 Correlation Co.
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Q31 Correlation Co.
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Q32 Correlation Co.
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Q33 Correlation Co.
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Q34 Correlation Co.
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Q35 Correlation Co.
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Q36 Correlation Co.
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

Q26
1.000
.
171
.426**
.000
171
.275**
.000
171
.465**
.000
171
.378**
.000
171
.331**
.000
171
.321**
.000
171
.205**
.007
171
.401**
.000
171
.259**
.001
171
.258**
.001
171

Q27
.426**
.000
171
1.000
.
171
.471**
.000
171
.367**
.000
171
.476**
.000
171
.409**
.000
171
.412**
.000
171
.448**
.000
171
.390**
.000
171
.376**
.000
171
.277**
.000
171

Q28
.275**
.000
171
.471**
.000
171
1.000
.
171
.398**
.000
171
.534**
.000
171
.492**
.000
171
.467**
.000
171
.545**
.000
171
.558**
.000
171
.568**
.000
171
.615**
.000
171

Q29
.465**
.000
171
.367**
.000
171
.398**
.000
171
1.000
.
171
.533**
.000
171
.505**
.000
171
.560**
.000
171
.460**
.000
171
.516**
.000
171
.396**
.000
171
.399**
.000
171

Q30
.378**
.000
171
.476**
.000
171
.534**
.000
171
.533**
.000
171
1.000
.
171
.713**
.000
171
.694**
.000
171
.523**
.000
171
.539**
.000
171
.454**
.000
171
.419**
.000
171

Q31
.331**
.000
171
.409**
.000
171
.492**
.000
171
.505**
.000
171
.713**
.000
171
1.000
.
171
.823**
.000
171
.586**
.000
171
.586**
.000
171
.553**
.000
171
.496**
.000
171

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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Q32
.321**
.000
171
.412**
.000
171
.467**
.000
171
.560**
.000
171
.694**
.000
171
.823**
.000
171
1.000
.
171
.529**
.000
171
.545**
.000
171
.461**
.000
171
.471**
.000
171

Q33
.205**
.007
171
.448**
.000
171
.545**
.000
171
.460**
.000
171
.523**
.000
171
.586**
.000
171
.529**
.000
171
1.000
.
171
.510**
.000
171
.650**
.000
171
.605**
.000
171

Q34
.401**
.000
171
.390**
.000
171
.558**
.000
171
.516**
.000
171
.539**
.000
171
.586**
.000
171
.545**
.000
171
.510**
.000
171
1.000
.
171
.663**
.000
171
.662**
.000
171

Q35
.259**
.001
171
.376**
.000
171
.568**
.000
171
.396**
.000
171
.454**
.000
171
.553**
.000
171
.461**
.000
171
.650**
.000
171
.663**
.000
171
1.000
.
171
.825**
.000
171

Q36
.258**
.001
171
.277**
.000
171
.615**
.000
171
.399**
.000
171
.419**
.000
171
.496**
.000
171
.471**
.000
171
.605**
.000
171
.662**
.000
171
.825**
.000
171
1.000
.
171
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